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Abstract 
Who knows best? Mechanisms underlying infants’ selective social learning 
 
 
Cristina Crivello, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2019 
 
 The main objective of the present dissertation was to investigate the psychological 
mechanisms underlying selective social learning in infancy. Specifically, it was of interest to 
examine whether domain-specific or domain-general abilities guide infants’ selective behaviour. 
The aim of Study 1 was to examine whether theory of mind abilities (knowledge inference and 
false belief) and/or statistical learning abilities relate to 18-month-olds’ selective word learning. 
Results demonstrated that infants who had a superior performance on the knowledge inference 
task were less likely to learn a novel word from an informant who labeled objects inaccurately 
(i.e., who labeled a ball as a shoe). Infants’ false belief and statistical learning abilities were 
unrelated to their selective social learning.  
 The goal of Study 2 was to examine whether infants’ knowledge inference and/or 
associative learning abilities were linked with 14-month-olds’ selective trust in an emotional 
congruence paradigm. Findings revealed that infants with superior knowledge inference abilities 
were less likely to trust an incongruent emoter, that is, an emoter who expressed an emotional 
reaction that did not match the situation (i.e., expressing happiness after examining an empty 
container). No relation was present with the associative learning task.  
 Lastly, the objective of Study 3 was to investigate whether infants’ theory of mind 
abilities (knowledge inference and false belief) and/or associative learning abilities were related 
to 18-month-olds’ performance on a selective word learning task using a within-subjects 
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paradigm. Consistent with the two previous studies, only infants’ knowledge inference abilities 
were associated with their mistrust of the unreliable informant.  
Taken together, the findings from the three studies demonstrate that infants use domain-
specific abilities, such as their ability to infer others’ knowledge states, to selectively trust and 
learn from others. In other words, infants with superior knowledge inference abilities may be 
better able to infer whether someone is ignorant/unreliable and therefore not a good source to 
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Young children are constantly acquiring new information, most of the time by interacting 
with and observing others (Box, 1984). Although social learning is efficient, it can come with 
risks as informants may have inaccurate knowledge or may be deceptive (Dawkins & Krebs, 
1978). Thus, when children engage in social learning, they need to identify who is an accurate 
informant and who has good intentions (Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013). The past decade of research 
has shown that infants and young children can identify, and often prefer to learn from, accurate 
informants – that is, they engage in selective social learning (Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & 
Jaswal, 2018; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Nurmsoo, 
Robinson, & Butterfill, 2010; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Although there is limited 
research on the psychological mechanisms underlying social learning, those mechanisms have 
already been the topic of a heated debate (Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018; Heyes, 2017; 
Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Sabbagh, Koenig, & Kuhlmeier, 2017; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). On one 
side of this debate are researchers who argue for a rich mechanism underlying selective social 
learning, where higher-order, domain-specific mechanisms, such as theory of mind, are crucial. 
On the other side are those who propose a lean mechanism where lower-order, domain-general 
mechanisms, such as statistical learning and associative learning, drive social learning 
particularly in the first few years of life. Therefore, the purpose of this research was to contribute 
critical data to this debate by examining whether domain-specific or domain-general abilities 
relate to selective social learning in infancy. Study 1 and 3 examined whether rich versus lean 
mechanisms are involved in 18-month-olds’ selective word learning using different paradigms to 
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measure infants’ selectivity, whereas Study 2 investigated this research question in 14-month-
olds with an emotional congruency paradigm.  
Selective social learning 
Selective social learning can be defined as choosing to learn from some people over 
others (Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Nurmsoo, Robinson, & Butterfill, 2010). This 
ability allows children to discriminate between reliable and unreliable sources of information 
(Harris et al., 2018; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Mills, 2013; Nurmsoo, Robinson, & Butterfill, 
2010). Children may rely on a number of different cues to assess the reliability of an informant, 
including epistemic, communicative, and emotional cues (Mills, 2013). Epistemic cues arise 
when an informant gives accurate or inaccurate information, such as naming a familiar object 
accurately or inaccurately (Harris, 2007; Mills, 2013). Communicative cues are available when 
an informant demonstrates a behavioural intention toward other individuals or objects, such as 
helping someone or reaching a goal (Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011). Lastly, emotional cues 
are provided when an informant communicates through expressions of potential emotions, such 
as expressing an emotional reaction to a distressing event (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013).  
Social learning is influenced by these different cues as they help children infer the 
reliability and trustworthiness of others (Szcześniak, Colaço, & Rondón, 2012). The majority of 
the literature on selective social learning based on these cues has been conducted with preschool 
and school-age children, and shows that as children develop, they acquire the ability to 
differentiate trustworthy versus untrustworthy sources by becoming more critical of new 
information (for reviews, see Harris et al., 2018 and Mills, 2013). Research on selective social 
learning via epistemic cues has shown that 3- and 4- year-olds are more likely to learn a new 
word from a speaker who previously labeled familiar objects accurately (e.g., labeled a ball 
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“ball”) than a speaker who labeled them inaccurately (e.g., labeled a ball “shoe”) (Koenig, 
Clément, & Harris, 2004). Several studies have since replicated the finding that preschoolers 
prefer to learn a new word from an accurate speaker (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; 
Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005). Moreover, Fitneva 
and Dunfield (2010) demonstrated that 7-year-olds were more likely to seek information from an 
informant who provided a correct answer to a question rather than incorrect after one single 
encounter. They also found that 4-year-olds were able to do this when provided with trait labels 
(i.e., demonstrated who is not very good at answering). In terms of communicative cues, research 
suggests that young children prefer to trust an informant who displays benevolent intent in 
comparison to an informant who displays malevolent intent (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; 
Vanderbilt et al., 2011). For example, Mascaro and Sperber (2009) had 3-year-old children 
observe a puppet that was mean and another puppet that was kind. Both puppets then informed 
the child about the contents of a box (i.e., what object was inside) and children had to rely on 
their testimony, as they were not able to see the contents of the box themselves. Results revealed 
that children were less likely to trust the testimony of the mean puppet, suggesting that they were 
able to understand and evaluate both puppets’ intention, and use this information to decide 
whether or not to trust that puppet’s declarations. Thus, the literature demonstrates that children 
do not trust information from all sources, but rather become doubtful when given information 
from unreliable and malevolent individuals.  
Although most studies have focused on selective social learning in the preschool age 
period, there is now a growing body of literature reporting evidence of this ability in infancy (see 
review by Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Infants have been shown to use a variety of 
cues in order to assess the reliability of a model, particularly those stemming from the epistemic 
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and emotional domains. In a landmark study by Chow, Poulin-Dubois, and Lewis (2008), 14-
month-old infants observed an informant who examined the content of a box that contained a toy 
while displaying happiness (reliable emoter) or an informant who displayed happiness towards a 
box that was empty (unreliable emoter). When given access to the box, results demonstrated that 
infants’ latency to examine the content of the box increased across trials, but only in the 
unreliable condition, suggesting that they were able to detect the informant who was emotionally 
unreliable. In addition, infants were subsequently less likely to follow the gaze or to imitate 
novel actions of the unreliable emoter (Chow et al., 2008; Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Polonia, 
2011). In line with selective trust based on emotional cues, research suggests that 18-month-olds 
are able to detect an informant who displayed a congruent versus an incongruent emotional 
response to an event (i.e., expressing sadness following a positive event) (Chiarella & Poulin-
Dubois, 2013). Infants are subsequently less likely to trust the emotional signals of the unreliable 
emoter, as expressed in less willingness to help the emotionally unreliable informant when she 
expressed distress (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). In addition to emotional cues, evidence of 
selective social learning in infancy based on epistemic cues (i.e., verbal accuracy) has been 
reported in the literature (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-
Jespersen & Echols, 2012). For instance, Brooker and Poulin-Dubois (2013a) demonstrated that 
18-month-old infants were less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker compared 
to a reliable one. Moreover, research suggests that infants can use cues of competence (Zmyj, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010), confidence (Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 2010; 
Brosseau-Liard & Poulin-Dubois, 2014), expertise (Stenberg, 2013), familiarity (Buttelmann, 
Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013), and age (Ryalls, Gul, & Ryalls, 2000; Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, 
Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2012) to selectively learn from others. Taken together, there is 
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mounting evidence that infants are precocious selective learners who rely on several different 
cues in order to infer the reliability of others.  
The search for cognitive mechanisms  
Although the evidence is mounting that both infants and children prefer to learn from 
reliable informants, researchers have recently debated the psychological mechanisms underlying 
selective social learning in young children (Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Sabbagh, 
Koenig, & Kuhlmeier, 2017). The rich view claims that domain-specific, higher-order abilities 
guide infants’ selective social learning, whereas the lean view claims that infants use domain-
general, lower-order abilities to selectively learn from others, as do other species that engage in 
selective learning. This controversy was launched with a provocative paper suggesting that 
because species such as rats and pigeons also show selective social learning, higher-order 
cognitive abilities are not required (Heyes, 2017). Instead, infants are argued to use lower-level, 
domain-general abilities, such as associative learning, to guide their selective behaviour. In 
contrast, it has been argued that simple cognitive processes cannot account for the findings 
demonstrating selective social learning in infancy (Poulin-Dubois, 2017). Furthermore, Sobel 
and Kushnir (2013) argue that older children’s own conceptual knowledge permits them to infer 
the reliability and competence of a model, but that infants may be relying on more basic-level 
abilities, such as statistical learning. Despite the debate, researchers agree that more research is 
needed on the psychological mechanisms underlying this ability, particularly in infancy. 
Therefore, the current study aimed to clarify this debate, as well as contribute research to the 
large gap in the literature on the mechanisms of infants’ selective social learning. 
Domain-specific mechanisms  
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Domain-specific abilities, which are sophisticated, higher-order cognitive functions, are 
an important aspect of cognitive development (Kail, 2004). According to a domain-specific 
perspective of learning, individuals develop high-level, independent, specialized skills across 
typical development (Kail, 2004). In line with this view, it is believed that the mind is 
compartmentalized or modularized (Fodor, 1983; Spelke, 1990). In other words, an individual’s 
understanding of one concept (i.e., space) tends to differ from their understanding of another 
concept (i.e., language) (see review by Wellman & Gelman, 1992 on theories of cognitive 
development). According to Leslie (1994), the core cognitive architecture contains 
“heterogenous, task-specialized sub-systems”.  
An example of a domain-specific ability that might be important for selective social 
learning is theory of mind. This concept can be defined as the ability to understand others’ 
mental states, inferring that they may have different beliefs, intentions, desires, and knowledge 
(Wellman, 2014). Theory of mind is a key aspect of children’s socio-cognitive development, as 
they would not be able to interpret, predict, and understand other people’s behaviour without it 
(Meltzoff, 1995). Much of the research on children’s theory of mind has been on false belief 
understanding, which refers to the process of recognizing that others may have false or incorrect 
beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A traditional false belief task that exemplifies how theory of 
mind is studied is the Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In this task, 
children are told a story in which Sally and Anne are playing together. Sally places her ball in a 
basket, and then leaves. While Sally is away, Anne moves the ball from the basket to the box. 
Once Sally returns, children are asked where Sally will look for her ball: in the basket or the box. 
If children exhibit theory of mind, they will predict that Sally will look for her ball in the basket 
based on her false belief about its location.  
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Although the Sally-Anne task was commonly used with preschoolers, there is a large 
body of research suggesting some form of false belief understanding in infancy using looking 
time measures and non-verbal interactive tasks (see reviews by Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; 
Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Chow, 2009; and Sodian, 2011). False belief in infancy has been 
typically demonstrated through violation of expectation and anticipatory looking paradigms, 
where infants’ looking responses are coded (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Yott & Poulin-
Dubois, 2016). These tasks measure infants’ implicit false belief abilities, which refers to their 
spontaneous ability to reason without explicit awareness (Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016). 
However, the depth of infants’ implicit false belief understanding is also the subject of a 
controversial debate. The rich view proposes that infants develop theory of mind within the 
second year of life and fail explicit theory of mind tasks due to task demands (e.g., executive 
function, language), suggesting that there is continuity across implicit and explicit forms of 
theory of mind (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Scott, 2017). According to this perspective, 
theory of mind is a modularized and innate ability that is specialized in ascribing mental states to 
others (Leslie, 1994; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009). In contrast, the lean view proposes that infants’ 
looking responses on implicit false belief tasks can be due to a violation of behavioural rules 
(i.e., looking in the last place they saw the object; Ruffman & Perner, 2005) or low-level novelty 
(i.e., colours and movements of the object may be novel; Heyes, 2014). In addition, other 
researchers supporting a lean interpretation have suggested that there are two distinct systems 
(implicit and explicit) that develop in parallel (Low, Apprely, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 2016). 
Lastly, additional evidence supporting a lean interpretation of false belief understanding in 
infancy stems from a recent “replication crisis” (see Poulin-Dubois et al., 2018). For instance, 
several studies have not replicated implicit false belief tasks using a wide range of paradigms, 
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such as violation-of-expectation (e.g., Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Powell, Hobbs, Bardis, Carey, & 
Saxe, 2018; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016), anticipatory looking (e.g., Burnside, Ruel, Azar, & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Grosse Weismann, Friederici, Disla, Steinbeis, & 
Singer, 2018; Kulke, Reiß, Krist, & Rakoczy, 2018; Kulke, von Duhn, Schneider. & Rakoczy, 
2018; Schuwerk, Priewasser, Sodian, & Perner, 2018), and interactive tasks (e.g., Crivello & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2018). Taken together, false belief understanding in infancy has been largely 
debated in the literature, and much of the research suggests that it may not be a reliable and 
robust concept as once previous thought.  
In addition to false belief, knowledge inference is another aspect of theory of mind that 
seems to have its origins in infancy. While it has received less empirical attention than false 
belief, research has shown that preschoolers and infants can infer an individual’s knowledge state 
(Flavell, 1999; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Sodian, 1988). Tasks assessing knowledge inference 
typically require the child to understand that there is a causal association between seeing and 
knowing (Henning, Spinath, & Aschersleben, 2010). For instance, in a study by Tomasello and 
Haberl (2003), 12- and 18-month-old infants played with an experimenter with two novel toys, 
one at a time. The experimenter then left the room, and during her absence, an assistant played 
with the infant with a third, novel toy. Following this, the experimenter returned to the room, 
acted excitedly while looking at the three toys, and asked the infant for one of the toys. In order 
to succeed on the task, the infant had to understand that people are interested in new things and 
that new things tend to be ones that people have no prior experience with. The results 
demonstrated that both 12- and 18-month-olds were able to identify the object that the 
experimenter had not previously experienced, therefore, did not know about. Thus, infants were 
able to infer that the experimenter was not knowledgeable about the third novel toy.  
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The precursors to a theory of mind have been proposed as a potential mechanism 
underlying selective social learning, as children may be able to infer which informant is 
knowledgeable and which informant is deceptive based on their understanding of others’ mental 
states (Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau- Liard, 2016). In other words, children who have superior 
theory of mind abilities or a better understanding of others’ mental state of knowledge should be 
more selective in their learning (Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & Poulin-Dubois, 2015). These 
children may be better able to selectively learn from other individuals, as they can make 
inferences that the variability in accuracy/reliability of the informant suggests individual 
differences in knowledge states (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015).  
Several studies have found evidence of a relation between theory of mind abilities and 
selective social learning in preschool and school age children (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; 
DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni, Nini, Rheel, & Livelli, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; 
Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, & Berridge, 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). For instance, Brosseau- 
Liard and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that 3- and 4-year-olds who showed a superior 
performance on a battery of theory of mind tasks were more selective in their learning when the 
informants varied on epistemic cues, such as verbal accuracy. However, theory of mind abilities 
did not predict performance on a second selective social learning task when the informants 
varied on non-epistemic cues, such as physical strength. As physical strength is not a knowledge-
related attribute, the results suggest that children did not consider all attributes of the informants 
when deciding whether or not they should learn from them (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015). 
Although there are several studies demonstrating a link between theory of mind and selective 
social learning, there are also conflicting findings. For example, in an earlier study, researchers 
demonstrated that preschoolers who had weaker theory of mind abilities, measured through a 
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false belief task, still performed well on a selective social learning task (Pasquini, Corriveau, 
Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Therefore, the literature suggests that theory of mind may play a key 
role in children’s ability to selectively learn from others, but that it does not fully predict this 
ability and there may be other possible mechanisms involved (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015).  
Similar research supporting a rich interpretation of children’s selective social learning is 
research on trait inference. Trait inference can involve theory of mind abilities as one needs to 
understand an individual’s mental state when making a trait ascription of their knowledge. 
Research has shown that children can make trait inferences from an informant’s past behaviour 
that the informant is a good source of information for a particular task (Hermes, Behne, Bich, 
Thielert, & Rakoczy, 2017). Thus, when children are exposed to individuals who are experts in 
different domains, they seek knowledge from those individuals in their respective expertise 
(Kushnir, Vredenburgh, & Schneider, 2013; Lutz & Keil, 2002; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010). For 
instance, Hermes, Behne, and Rakoczy (2015) demonstrated that 4- and 5-year-olds preferred a 
strong model for a strength-related task and an accurate model for a knowledge-related task. In a 
subsequent study examining negative valence (low-competency), they found that the children 
avoided the inaccurate model for the knowledge-related task and avoided the weak model for the 
strength-related task. In both studies, this was only true for the children who correctly identified 
the traits of both models. Children who did not ascribe the traits correctly did not demonstrate 
any selectivity in choosing the models. These results suggest that selective social learning is 
based on rational trait-based reasoning, and not global impression formation (i.e., halo effects) or 
behaviour matching, which are both lean interpretations of selective social learning. It also 
provides support for Sobel and Kushnir’s (2013) view that rational inference is involved but only 
when the child has the conceptual background knowledge.  
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Although no evidence of global impression formulation was found in the aforementioned 
studies, there is some research demonstrating a “halo” or “pitchfork” effect. For example, 
research has shown that 5-year-olds demonstrated a halo effect by predicting that an individual 
who previously labeled objects accurately would have a more prosocial disposition (Brosseau-
Liard & Birch, 2010). In addition, a “pitchfork” effect when investigating incompetency rather 
than competency has been demonstrated in the literature. Specifically, Koenig and Jaswal (2011) 
found that children were more likely to seek information about dogs, but not artifact labels, from 
a dog expert over a novice informant. In contrast, children were more likely to seek information 
about both dogs and artifact labels from a neutral informant over a dog inexpert (i.e., making 
wrong claims). In other words, children use trait inference when judging the competency of 
others (positive valence), but they use global formation for the perceived incompetency (negative 
valence). This contrasts with Hermes and colleagues’ (2015) research as they found that trait 
inference was involved in children’s selectivity regardless of the valence. Taken together, several 
studies have shown a rich interpretation of preschoolers’ selective social learning by 
demonstrating that theory of mind and trait inference are involved. However, no study has yet to 
examine whether these abilities are related to infants’ selective social learning.  
Domain-general mechanisms  
Domain-general abilities, which are basic, low-level cognitive functions, are an essential 
piece of human cognition (Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005). According to a domain-general 
perspective of learning, individuals develop global processes (i.e., working memory, processing 
speed) that provide a contribution to cognitive development in numerous domains (Kail, 2004). 
These various domains are believed to be central aspects of the basic architecture of children’s 
cognitive systems (Kail, 2004). An example of a domain-general theorist of cognitive 
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development is Piaget. He believed that general stages of cognition (i.e., sensorimotor, 
preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational) apply to various domains with 
different areas of content (Wellman & Gellman, 1992). For instance, concrete-operational 
thinking is involved in the development of children’s comprehension of time, numbers, morality, 
etc. (Wellman & Gellman, 1992). According to Wellman and Gellman (1992), Piaget’s theory on 
cognitive development is based on “content-free logical structures”.  
An example of a domain-general ability that might be important for selective social 
learning is statistical learning. Infants are sensitive to statistical cues and use this ability to detect 
regularities in their environment (Aslin & Newport, 2012; Denison & Xu, 2014; Ruffman, 
Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 2012; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Evidence of statistical 
learning has been found in infants as young as six months old. For instance, Xu and Garcia 
(2008) demonstrated through a violation of expectation paradigm that 6- to 8-month-old infants 
looked significantly longer at a violation of random sampling. In addition, 12- to 14-month old 
infants were able to infer that a preferred object had a higher likelihood to be located in one of 
two cups (Denison & Xu, 2010). Statistical learning has been proposed to be a mechanism 
involved in infants’ selective social learning (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). While statistical learning 
involves extracting patterns of regularity, selective learning involves tracking the informants’ 
past accuracy in order to detect a pattern of reliability to learn from these sources in future 
interactions. Infants can use statistical reasoning abilities to infer outcomes and this ability may 
play a crucial role in early social learning. Therefore, young children’s ability to track 
informants’ accuracy likely involves statistical learning mechanisms (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). 
However, no research to date has investigated a link between statistical learning and selective 
social learning. Thus, it remains to be seen whether infants’ selective social learning is guided by 
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their ability to extract patterns of regularity through statistical cues. As such, one of the goals of 
the present dissertation was to examine whether there is a link between infants’ selective social 
learning and their statistical learning abilities.  
Associative learning, which is among the most basic forms of domain-general abilities, is 
another type of lower-order cognitive function. This basic cognitive ability can be defined as the 
process of learning an association between two stimuli (Abramson, 1994). Both humans and 
different species of animals have been shown to engage in operant conditioning, which is an 
aspect of associative learning (Domjan, 2006). Operant conditioning occurs when humans and/or 
animals learn that a response is associated with an effect it produces (e.g., behaviour is repeated 
when it is rewarded or reinforced) (Domjan, 2015; Rovee-Collier, Hayne, & Colombo, 2000). 
Skinner demonstrated that rats engage in associative learning by training them to press a lever to 
be rewarded with food (Domjan, 2015). Evidence of operant conditioning has also been found in 
infancy. For instance, research has shown that infants as young as 2 months of age can learn that 
kicking produces movement of a mobile above their head (Rovee-Collier et al., 2000). This 
response produces the movement of the mobile via a ribbon that is tied to their ankle and 
connected to the mobile (Rovee-Collier et al., 2000).  
Heyes (2017) has argued that selective social learning in infancy can be explained by 
associative learning mechanisms through action-outcome relationships and learned 
predictiveness (Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010). Learned predictiveness can be defined as the 
understanding that a particular stimulus is consistently followed by a particular outcome 
(Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010). This, in turn, influences how much attention is paid to a stimulus 
(Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013; Kruschke, 2003). An attentional bias is created, as one pays 
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more attention to a stimulus that has a higher predictability than a lower predictability (Le 
Pelley,Vadillo, & Luque, 2013; Kruschke, 2003).  
For example, in the study by Brooker and Poulin-Dubois (2013a) where they examined 
infants’ word learning, infants preferred to learn a new word from a reliable speaker in 
comparison to an unreliable one. The rich, domain-specific interpretation of this finding is that 
infants may have inferred that the reliable speaker was more knowledgeable, and therefore, were 
more likely to learn from her. From a domain-general viewpoint, however, when infants hear a 
word that does not predict the object they were expecting to see based on their past associations 
and experiences, they consider the informant odd (Heyes, 2017). Thus, they pay less attention to 
the subsequent vocalizations of the unreliable informant and are less likely to learn a new word 
from them. In other words, cues that have consistently predicted outcomes in the past will be 
paid attention to more in the future and will be more likely learned from compared to those that 
have been less predictive. This lean interpretation contrasts with the rich interpretation in 
requiring no higher-order, sophisticated abilities. According to this view, infants do not 
necessarily understand that an individual who demonstrates greater accuracy is reliable, 
knowledgeable, or trustworthy. For example, it has been argued that domain-specific abilities 
may play a role in children’s selective social learning starting only at the age of 4-5 years, as 
domain-specific skills are developed through language and theory of mind (Heyes, 2017). To our 
knowledge, although the lean view of the debate strongly argues that associative learning is a 
mechanism of selective social learning in infancy, no study has ever examined this possible link. 
Therefore, another goal of the present dissertation was to examine this potential link in infancy.   
Rationale of the dissertation 
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As the psychological mechanisms of selective social learning are currently unclear and 
have been the topic of a heated debate, the purpose of this dissertation was to better understand 
the nature of this ability in infancy. Therefore, the objective of my dissertation was to determine 
whether domain-specific (i.e., theory of mind) and/or domain-general (i.e., statistical learning, 
associative learning) skills play a role in this ability. A secondary objective was to explore a 
possible developmental trajectory in the mechanisms underlying selective social learning from 
14-months to 18-months of age; that is, examining the continuity of these mechanisms across 
development.  
The objective of Study 1 was to determine whether domain-general abilities, such as 
statistical learning, or domain-specific abilities, such as theory of mind, underlie selective social 
learning in 18-month-olds. Infants were exposed to an experimenter labeling familiar objects 
accurately or inaccurately, followed by a word learning task. Replicating previous studies, it was 
hypothesized that infants would be less likely to learn a new a word from an unreliable speaker 
compared to a reliable speaker. Moreover, in order to investigate potential mechanisms of 
selective social learning, infants’ false belief understanding, knowledge inference, and statistical 
learning abilities were examined. It was predicted that, if domain-general abilities are related to 
the first manifestation of selective social learning, then infants who show superior performance 
on the statistical learning task should be less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable 
speaker. In contrast, if domain-specific abilities are already related to selective social learning, 
then infants who show superior performance on the theory of mind tasks should be less likely to 
learn a new word from an unreliable speaker. In addition, no relation was expected in the reliable 
condition, as infants have demonstrated that they can learn new words even without any 
information about the competence of the speaker.  
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The objective of Study 2 was to examine whether the findings of Study 1 could be 
extended to a younger age group by looking at the most basic cognitive ability among domain-
general mechanisms – associative learning. By investigating associative learning mechanisms, 
we are closer at examining whether there is support for the lean interpretation that these basic 
level abilities that other species engage in are responsible for infants’ selective social learning. 
An additional objective was to examine whether younger infants’ selective social learning was 
linked to implicit theory of mind abilities. In order to test these research questions, 14-month-old 
infants were exposed to an experimenter who was emotionally congruent or incongruent. This 
was followed by a selective trust task, where infants were given the opportunity to follow the 
gaze of the experimenter behind a barrier. As infants were not able to see what the experimenter 
is looking at behind the barrier, they need to rely on their past experience with the experimenter 
in order to determine if they should trust her and follow her gaze. Accordingly, it was 
hypothesized that infants would be less likely to follow the gaze of an incongruent emoter 
compared to a congruent emoter. Furthermore, in order to investigate potential mechanisms 
underlying 14-month-olds’ selective social learning, knowledge inference and associative 
learning abilities were examined. In contrast to Study 1, it was hypothesized that domain-general 
abilities are linked to selective social learning in 14-month-olds due to their young age. In other 
words, infants in the incongruent condition who show superior performance on the associative 
learning task should demonstrate more selectivity. In addition, we hypothesized that there would 
be no relation between theory of mind abilities and infants’ selective social learning due their 
limited sophisticated socio-cognitive skills. Thus, it may be that as infants were younger, these 
basic-level abilities guide their selective social learning, but as children develop, their 
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understanding of others’ mental states plays a more important role to selectively learn from 
others.  
Lastly, the objective of Study 3 was to further explore the nature of selective social 
learning by examining whether associative learning and/or theory of mind abilities are related to 
infants’ selective word learning in 18-month-olds. However, in this study, two important 
methodological differences were observed. Firstly, infants’ selective social learning was 
measured through a within-subjects design, which provides a more conservative test of infants’ 
selective behaviour. This manipulation is limited in infancy, as the majority of studies 
investigating infants’ selective social learning have used a between-subjects design. Thus, infants 
observed two speakers label familiar objects, one who labeled them accurately and another one 
who labeled them inaccurately. It was expected that infants would be more likely to learn a new 
word from a reliable speaker than an unreliable one. Secondly, in contrast to the first and second 
studies, different tasks assessing theory of mind were used in order to extend previous research 
and provide additional data relevant to the rich versus lean debate in the field. Based on previous 
studies, a relation between infants’ selective word learning and their knowledge inference 
abilities was expected, but not their associative learning skills.  
In summary, the present series of three studies were designed in order to better 
understand the nature and depth of infants’ selective social learning by investigating whether 
domain-specific or domain-general abilities are related to this ability. Although much of the 
literature has focused on when infants develop selective social learning and what cues they use, 
this dissertation was designed to address, at least in part, the equally important research question 
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 Young children acquire new information mainly by interacting with and observing others 
(Box, 1984). This is known as social learning. Social learning is crucial for children, but it can 
also be risky as not all informants have accurate knowledge or good intentions (Poulin-Dubois & 
Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Because children frequently rely on information provided by other 
individuals, they need to be able to select informants who are accurate (Koenig & Sabbagh, 
2013). The last decade has revealed that children engage in selective social learning, where they 
can differentiate unreliable and reliable sources of information, and thus select whom to trust and 
learn from (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Nurmsoo, Robinson, 
& Butterfill, 2010). In a landmark study, Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004) presented 3- and 4-
year-olds with an informant who labeled familiar objects accurately and an informant who 
labeled the same objects inaccurately (e.g., a ball was labeled a shoe). Results revealed that 3- 
and 4-year-olds preferred to learn a new word from the reliable speaker compared to the 
unreliable one.  
While the bulk of the research on selective learning from testimony has been conducted 
with preschool-age children, there is now mounting evidence that it begins very early in 
development (see Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016, for a review). In a pioneering study, 
Chow, Poulin-Dubois, and Lewis (2008) presented 14-month-olds with an informant who looked 
inside a box containing a toy while expressing a positive emotion (reliable emoter) or an 
informant who demonstrated the same positive emotion towards an empty container (unreliable 
emoter). Results revealed that infants were able to detect the unreliable emoter, as shown by their 
increased latency to inspect the content of the box over trials. More importantly, they were less 
likely than the infants in the reliable emoter condition to subsequently follow the person’s eye 
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gaze in another context. Similarly, research has shown that infants are less likely to imitate the 
novel actions of an informant who displays unreliable emotional cues (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, 
& Polonia, 2011). In line with this research, 18-month-olds have been found to differentiate 
congruent and incongruent emotional reactions to events such as losing an object and are more 
willing to help and be guided by the emotional expressions of a reliable informant who 
previously displayed congruent emotional reactions (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013, 2018). In 
addition to emotional cues, infants have also been shown to rely on the conventionality (Zmyj, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010) as well as the confidence (Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 
2010; Brosseau-Liard & Poulin-Dubois, 2014) conveyed by the informant. Furthermore, studies 
have revealed that infants, like older children, use accuracy to determine whom to learn from, 
which is an epistemic, or knowledge-related cue (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Koenig & 
Woodward, 2010; Mills, 2013). For example, 18-month-old infants are more likely to learn a 
new word or a new action from a reliable speaker compared to an unreliable one (Brooker & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2013a).  
Although the evidence is well established that children prefer to learn from reliable 
sources of information, the psychological mechanisms underlying this ability are unclear and 
have recently been the topic of hot debate, particularly in interpreting infants’ behaviours 
(Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). According to one view, infants 
possess domain-specific, higher-order, cognitive abilities that allow them to selectively learn 
from others, whereas an alternative “leaner” interpretation posits that infants rely on more 
domain-general, lower-order, cognitive functions. In a recent provocative paper, Heyes (2017) 
has argued that given that selective learning occurs in animals which do not possess higher 
cognitive functions, such as theory of mind, cognitive sophisticated abilities are unnecessary to 
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account for infants’ selective behaviours. Instead, simple domain-general mechanisms, such as 
associative learning, might be sufficient (Heyes, 2017). It is only in adults and older children that 
social learning strategies can be explained by domain-specific processes, such as metacognition, 
learned through experience in social interactions (Heyes, 2016).  
In terms of domain-specific abilities, theory of mind has been proposed to account for 
how young children selectively learn from others. Theory of mind is defined as the ability to 
understand that others possess mental states, such as beliefs, knowledge, intentions, and desires 
(Wellman, 2014). A relation between these two abilities has been put forward as children can 
make inferences based on others’ mental states when deciding who is informative and who is 
deceptive. Thus, children who have a greater understanding of individuals’ mental state of 
knowledge should be better able to selectively learn from others, since they can infer that the 
variability in accuracy reflects individual variation in knowledge (Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2015). In fact, such a link has been documented in numerous studies that have 
focused on preschool and school age children (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 
2008; DiYanni, Nini, Rheel, & Livelli, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, 
& Berridge, 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). For example, in a recent study, 3- and 4-year-olds with 
superior theory of mind abilities performed better on a selective word learning task when the two 
informants differed on epistemic cues, such as verbal accuracy (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015). 
Conversely, there was no such association with another selective learning task when the two 
informants differed on non-epistemic cues, such as physical strength. According to Brosseau-
Liard and colleagues (2015), theory of mind should not be related to performance on a selective 
learning task involving physical strength, as it is not a knowledge-related attribute. Thus, 3- and 
4-year-olds’ theory of mind abilities did not lead them to selectively learn from informants by 
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considering all of their attributes, but it was specific to informants who displayed knowledge-
related cues. Although there is evidence of a relation between theory of mind and selective 
learning, the results are mixed. For example, in a study by Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, and 
Harris (2007), it was revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds who performed poorly on a false belief task 
were still able to perform well on a selective learning task. As such, the relation between theory 
of mind and selective learning is controversial and needs further research. In addition, this link 
has never been explored in infancy.  
With regard to domain-general abilities, statistical learning has been proposed as a 
mechanism underlying selective social learning. Statistical learning is a rapid and robust ability 
by which infants use statistical cues to identify regularities in their environment (Aslin & 
Newport, 2012; Denison & Xu, 2014; Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 2012; Saffran, Aslin, 
& Newport, 1996). For instance, in a violation of expectation paradigm, 6- to 8-month old 
infants looked significantly longer at a violation of random sampling (Xu & Garcia, 2008). It has 
also been demonstrated that 12- to 14-month-old infants are able to detect that an object has a 
higher probability of being found in one of two cups presented to them (Denison & Xu, 2010). 
More importantly, research suggests that there are individual differences in statistical learning in 
both infancy and childhood (Arciuli & Simpson, 2011; Ellis, Robledo, & Deák, 2014; Kaufman 
et al., 2010; Kidd, 2012; Kidd & Arciuli, 2016; Shafto, Conway, Field, & Houston, 2012). For 
instance, a recent study demonstrated that individual differences in statistical learning are 
associated with 6- to 8-year-olds’ comprehension of syntax (Kidd & Arciuli, 2016). According to 
Sobel and Kushnir (2013), these individual differences in statistical learning abilities may be 
related to infants’ selective social learning (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Just as statistical learning 
involves detecting patterns of regularity, selective social learning involves detecting patterns of 
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reliability by keeping track of the informant’s prior accuracy in deciding whether to learn from 
them (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Therefore, infants may be relying on statistical cues when 
tracking the accuracy of the informant and inferring conclusions based on their history (Sobel & 
Kushnir, 2013; Tummeltshammer, Wu, Sobel, & Kirkham, 2014).  
Taken together, the nature of the psychological mechanisms underlying early selective 
social learning is currently a controversial issue with little empirical evidence available to settle 
the debate. Although theory of mind and statistical learning have both been proposed as potential 
correlates, no study has ever pitted these abilities against one another when investigating 
individual differences in selective learning. Therefore, the main purpose of the present study was 
to provide a better understanding of the nature of selective social learning by investigating 
whether theory of mind and statistical learning skills play a role in this ability. Infants observed a 
speaker label familiar objects either accurately or inaccurately and were then provided the 
opportunity to learn a new word from this speaker. In line with prior research, we hypothesized 
that infants would be more likely to learn a new word from a reliable speaker than an unreliable 
one. Two theory of mind tasks and a statistical learning task were also administered to 
investigate whether these abilities are related to infants’ performance on the selective word 
learning task. If domain-general abilities are associated with selective social learning, then 
infants who performed better on the statistical learning task should be less likely to learn a new 
word from an unreliable speaker. Those with larger vocabularies might also be less likely to 
learn from an unreliable speaker if general abilities, such as verbal IQ, account for such 
selectivity. In contrast, if domain-specific abilities are associated with selective social learning, 
then superior performance on the theory of mind tasks should be associated with less willingness 
to learn from an unreliable speaker. No such links would be expected with performance in the 
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reliable condition, as infants have been shown to learn new words even without any information 
about the competence of the speaker.  
Method 
Participants 
The final sample consisted of 77 18-month-old infants (Mage = 18.54 months, SD = .50; 
range = 17.4–20; 39 males, 38 females). Infants were excluded from the sample if they did not 
meet a number of task-specific criteria (see details below). Participants were recruited from birth 
lists provided by a governmental health agency. All infants had no auditory or visual 
impairments and were exposed to English or French.  
Measures and Materials 
MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventories: Short Form (MCDI-I). 
The American-English and the French-Canadian adaptation of the MCDI-I were used to assess 
infants’ total productive and receptive vocabulary (Fenson et al., 2000; Trudeau, Frank, & 
Poulin-Dubois, 1999). This vocabulary checklist, used for children aged 8-18 months, was 
completed by the child’s primary caregiver. The MCDI-I consists of 89 vocabulary items and 
includes nouns, verbs, and adjectives that infants would have learned in this age range.  
Word comprehension checklist. Parents were asked to indicate, on a 20-word checklist, 
which words their infant understood (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). The checklist consisted 
of typical words infants of this age would understand. This report was used for the selective 
social learning task in order to select words that a given child was familiar with.  
Selective social learning. There were two phases in the task measuring selective social 
learning, where infants were presented with labels for both familiar and novel objects (Brooker 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2013a).  
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Reliability phase. Participants were randomly assigned to either a reliable (n = 33) or an 
unreliable (n = 44) condition. Four small plastic objects were labeled either correctly or 
incorrectly, depending on the condition. The four items were chosen from a set of words 
including ball, banana, bird, dog, spoon, chair, and shoe. The specific words tested depended on 
the child’s knowledge of these words as reported on the word comprehension checklist. Children 
were required to know three out of the four chosen objects in order to be included in this task 
(Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). In phase 1, the child was allowed 15 s to explore each object. 
In phase 2, the experimenter manipulated each object, one at a time, and labeled it three times 
either correctly (reliable speaker) or incorrectly (unreliable speaker). The objects were always 
given the same incorrect labels. For example, in the unreliable condition, infants watched as the 
experimenter pointed to a shoe and said, “That’s a bottle. See, it’s a bottle. Look at the bottle”, if 
their parents had indicated that they understood the word shoe and thus could recognize that it 
had been mislabeled (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). Once the experimenter was finished 
labeling the object, the child was allowed to play with the toy again for 15 s. 
Word learning phase. This task assessed infants’ willingness to learn from the 
experimenter based on her accuracy during the reliability phase (adapted from Baldwin, 1993). 
This task included three phases: a warm-up phase, a training phase, and a test phase. In the 
warm-up phase, the experimenter presented the infant with a tray holding a pair of familiar 
objects (two objects not previously used in the reliability phase) and requested one. This phase 
was included for the purpose of making sure the infant understood the demands of the task 
(Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). In the training phase, the experimenter modeled the function 
of a pair of novel toys. For instance, a wooden nut and bolt was spun, and a type of rattle was 
shaken. Both objects were then given to the child to explore for 15 s. The experimenter then 
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retrieved one of the novel objects from the child and provided a novel label for it by saying, “It’s 
a Dax”. The same novel object was labeled four times with the same label. In the test phase, the 
experimenter presented the child with one of two pairs of objects on a tray: two familiar objects 
or two novel objects. The same object pairs were used across all trials. The experimenter 
requested one of the two objects from the infant by saying, “Where is X? Give me the X”. The 
novel object that was requested was always the one that the experimenter had provided a novel 
label for in the training phase. Four familiar trials were alternated with four novel trials, for a 
total of eight trials. The novel object chosen, the location of the objects on the tray (left or right), 
and the type of trial (familiar or novel) that was presented first, was counterbalanced across 
participants. During the test phase, the object that the infant selected and gave to the 
experimenter was coded. If both toys were given simultaneously, the trial was repeated. This task 
yielded two scores measuring the proportion of trials (out of four) where infants offered the 
correct object; one for novel words and one for familiar words. A Pearson product-moment 
correlation was computed to assess inter-rater reliability and revealed perfect agreement among 
raters (r(38) = 1.00). 
False belief Theory of Mind task. An interactive false belief task was used to examine 
infants’ theory of mind abilities by assessing their understanding that others may have different 
beliefs (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). In this task, one experimenter (E1) 
announced that she was going to get a toy. While E1 was away, the other experimenter (E2) 
showed the infant how to lock and unlock a set of 30 x 30 x 30 cm green and orange boxes with 
wooden pins, which were positioned at the furthest end of a table. E1 returned to the room with a 
toy caterpillar and told the infant that she was putting her toy in one of the boxes, while placing 
the toy inside as the child watched. E1 then said that she forgot her keys outside and left the 
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room again. Following this, E2 invited the infant to play a trick on E1 by switching the location 
of the toy to the other box. When E1 returned, she tried to open the box in which she placed her 
toy, and displayed disappointment and confusion as she realized that she was not able to open it. 
At this point, E2 pushed the boxes closer to the infant in order to allow the infant to touch and 
open one of the boxes. The infant was then prompted to help E1 find the toy in the correct box. 
This task assessed infants’ ability to understand that E1 may hold a different belief of where the 
hidden toy was located. The trial was coded as pass or fail, where a pass was given to the child 
for choosing the box where the toy was currently located, demonstrating understanding of the 
experimenter’s false-belief. A Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was computed as ĸ = 1.00, which is 
indicative of a perfect degree of consistency across independent raters. 
Knowledge Theory of Mind task. A second theory of mind task was used to assess 
knowledge inference (Moll & Tomasello, 2007). This task measured infants’ understanding that 
others may have knowledge that differs from their own and can make inferences based on this 
assumption. In a familiarization trial, two experimenters and the infant played with three familiar 
objects (i.e., a ball, a teddy bear, and a car) for 50 s. In a pre-test trial, E1 requested each of these 
toys, one at a time, in order to make sure that the infant was comfortable sharing with the 
experimenter. In order to pass the pre-test, infants were required to give the experimenter one of 
the first two objects requested. E1 then expressed, “I’m going over there”, while the infant 
watched her walk to the other end of the room and sit on a chair. E2 retrieved a novel toy (i.e., a 
plastic gardening tool) and brought it to E1 to play with for 30 s, as the infant watched. E2 then 
retrieved the toy from E1 and brought it back to the table for the infant to play with for 30 s. This 
process was repeated for a second novel toy (i.e., a modified bird-cage mirror). After playing 
with the second toy, E2 placed it on the tray next to the first novel object as E1 announced that 
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she was leaving the room. E2 then introduced a third novel object to the infant and added it to the 
tray (i.e., a small modified abacus). The third novel object served as the target object. When E1 
returned to the room, she had a look of surprise on her face and exclaimed “Oh, look! Look 
there! Look at that there! Can you give it to me please?”, while pointing towards the tray with 
her arm. This task was coded on a pass or fail basis, where a pass reflected the child giving the 
target object to E1. This task reflected infants’ ability to understand that E1 was acting surprised 
toward a new toy that was not there before she had left the room and was therefore not 
knowledgeable about this toy. The target toy, the order in which the toys were introduced, as 
well as the placement order on the tray were counterbalanced. A Cohen’s Kappa was computed 
as ĸ = .88, indicating excellent inter-rater agreement. 
Statistical learning task. This task assessed infants’ ability to make statistical 
inferences, while detecting patterns in others’ behaviour. In this task, adapted from Kushnir, Xu, 
and Wellman (2010), the child was first introduced to two types of small objects (i.e., mini frogs 
and ducks or cows and pigs) and had two minutes to explore them with the experimenter. The 
infant, experimenter, and a confederate then engaged in a turn-taking game with some objects 
(i.e., a toy car, a cup, and a ball) in order to allow the child to become comfortable with sharing. 
After the game, the confederate left the room. The experimenter then showed the infant a clear 
box containing two of the animals they had been exposed to and labeled the two types of animals 
inside. The box always had a ratio of 7:31 animals, where one animal served as the minority and 
the other animal served as the majority. For instance, if the box contained 7 ducks and 31 frogs, 
the minority animal was the duck and the majority animal was the frog. In the next phase, the 
confederate sampled five of the same type of object from the box (i.e., 5 ducks or 5 frogs), while 
labeling the toy (e.g., “Wow frogs! Ribbit, ribbit!”). This served as the target object, while the 
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remaining animals were considered the alternative objects. The confederate then left the room 
and the experimenter removed the box and put two bowls containing each toy in front of the 
infant. The confederate re-entered the room and exclaimed, “Oh goody! Just what I wanted! Can 
you give me one?” where the infant was then required to give a toy animal to the confederate. 
Each infant participated in this task twice, with the confederate sampling the majority animal on 
one trial and the minority animal on the other trial. For this reason, two sets of animals were used 
(i.e., cows and pigs in the other trial). On a minority trial (i.e., 7 ducks and 31 frogs), pulling out 
all ducks violated random sampling. Therefore, the child should use statistical reasoning to infer 
that the experimenter has a preference for this toy. On a majority trial (i.e., 31 cows and 7 pigs), 
pulling out all cows would not violate random sampling. This task was coded on a pass or fail 
basis. In order to replicate Kushnir and colleagues (2010), an infant passed when he or she gave 
the target toy on the minority trial. Since on the majority trial the confederate’s selection was due 
to random sampling, it was expected that infants would randomly select the object to offer the 
confederate, and therefore passed this trial regardless of their selection. The minority and 
majority animal, the trial order, and the placement of the bowls (left or right) were 
counterbalanced. A Cohen’s Kappa was computed as ĸ = 1.00, which is indicative of perfect 
inter-rater agreement. 
Procedure 
A warm-up phase was first conducted, during which infants familiarized themselves with 
the environment and the experimenters. During this time, the caregiver filled out the MCDI-I and 
the word comprehension checklist in order to establish the words that would be used on the 
selective social learning task. The testing session began with the selective social learning task, 
where each child was randomly assigned to either the unreliable or the reliable condition. The 
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infant then participated in the theory of mind tasks (false-belief and knowledge) and the 
statistical learning task, where the order of these tasks was counterbalanced. The selective 
learning task was always administered first because this task served as the basis for the study and 
it was crucial to avoid a fatigue effect with this key task. In total, there were three experimenters. 
The experimenter who conducted the selective learning task did not carry out the other tasks to 
avoid carry-over effects from the word learning manipulation. Parents received $20 as financial 
compensation, and infants received a certificate of merit as well as a small gift.  
Results 
 Participants excluded from the selective learning task were also excluded from all 
additional analyses in the present study. This decision was justified by the fact that performance 
on the selective learning task was required to test all hypotheses. Accordingly, in addition to the 
final sample of 77 infants, an additional 32 infants were tested but were excluded due to 
fussiness (n = 17), parental interference (n = 4), experimenter error (n = 2), not having enough 
words in their vocabulary to participate in the selective learning task (n = 6), a side preference on 
the word learning task (n = 1), or giving all ambiguous responses (touching and offering both 
toys or none) on the word learning task (n = 2).  
Comparisons were made between the two conditions to ensure that both groups were 
equivalent on a number of factors. There were no significant differences between the two 
conditions with regard to age, t(75) = -.47, p = .64, or gender, χ2(1) = .11, p = .74. No significant 
differences were also observed in infants’ receptive vocabulary across the reliable (M = 55.09, 
SD = 23.85) and unreliable conditions (M = 48.73, SD = 18.53), t(75) = -1.32, p = .19, Cohen’s d 
= .31, or in infants’ expressive vocabulary across the reliable (M = 19.27, SD = 18.11) and 
unreliable conditions (M = 17.93, SD = 16.33), t(75) = -.34, p = .74, Cohen’s d = .08. 
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Furthermore, infants did not differ with regard to the number of familiar words they knew in the 
reliability phase of the selective social learning task across the reliable (M = 3.85, SD = .36) and 
unreliable (M = 3.86, SD = .35) conditions, t(75) = .19, p = .85, Cohen’s d = -.03.  
Selective Social Learning Task 
Infants’ behaviours and looking time in seconds were coded during the reliability phase 
to ensure that infants in each group were equally attentive when the experimenter was labelling 
the objects and to the toy that they were given to engage with during the training phase. Six 
participants were excluded from the analyses on looking time, as their eyes were not in clear 
view to be coded. Results indicated that infants’ proportion of looking time to the experimenter 
as she was labeling the toys during phase 2 of the reliability task was equivalent across 
conditions (unreliable: M = .94, SD = .11; reliable: M = .96, SD = .07), t(69) = -.68, p = .50, 
Cohen’s d = -.21. These results suggest that infants were equally attentive when the experimenter 
was labeling the familiar objects accurately or inaccurately. Furthermore, a condition 
(reliable/unreliable) by looking area (experimenter/toy/parent) mixed ANOVA was computed 
with infants’ proportion of looking time during phase 3 of the reliability task (once the infant was 
given the toy) as the dependent variable. No main effect of condition, F(1, 69) = .10, p = .75, ηp2 
= .001, nor significant interaction, F(2, 68) = 1.78, p = .18, ηp2 = .05, was found. However, a 
significant main effect of looking area was revealed, F(2, 68) = 215.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, 
indicating that infants’ proportion of looking time at the toy (M = .46, SD = .15) was 
significantly greater than their looking time at the experimenter (M = .29, SD = .13) or at their 
parent (M = .07, SD = .07). Thus, infants were also equally likely to engage with the toy, 
irrespective of whether the experimenter’s label was accurate or not. During the word learning 
task, the proportion of time spent looking at the experimenter as she labeled the novel object was 
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coded. Results revealed that infants in the unreliable condition (M = .69, SD = .20) and reliable 
condition (M = .76, SD = .18) looked equally long at the experimenter during the labeling, t(69) 
= -1.49, p = .14, Cohen’s d = -.37. In addition, there was no significant difference in the 
proportion of trials (out of four) that infants disengaged from their toy to attend to the 
experimenter’s toy during the labelling phase between the reliable (M = .81, SD = .24) and 
unreliable (M = .84, SD = .24) conditions, t(75) = .49, p = .63, Cohen’s d = -.13. These findings 
suggest that infants across both conditions were equally attentive as the experimenter labelled the 
novel object.   
In order to determine whether infants in the unreliable condition were less likely to learn 
a new word in comparison to infants in the reliable condition, a condition (reliable/unreliable) by 
trial type (novel/familiar) mixed ANOVA was conducted. The dependent variable was the 
proportion of trials where infants offered the target object. A significant main effect of trial type 
was found, wherein infants performed significantly better on the familiar trials (M = .66, SD = 
.32) than on the novel trials (M = .54, SD = .31), F(1,75) = 6.33, p = .01, ηp2 = .08. In addition, a 
significant main effect of condition was observed, revealing that infants in the reliable condition 
(M = .66, SD = .34) outperformed infants in the unreliable condition across trial types (M = .54, 
SD = .30), F(1,75) = 5.69, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. However, no significant interaction was found 
between condition and trial type, F(1,75) = .86, p = .36, ηp2 = .01. Nevertheless, in support of our 
hypothesis, planned comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference in word 
learning on the novel trials between infants in the unreliable and reliable conditions, F(1,75) = 
5.89, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. In contrast, on the familiar trials, no significant difference was found 
between the unreliable and reliable conditions, F(1,75) = 1.23, p = .27, ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 1).
 Furthermore, using one-sample t-tests, the proportion of correct offers on the novel and 
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familiar trials were compared to chance (.50). On the familiar trials, infants in both the reliable 
(M = .70, SD = .29), t(32) = 3.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .68, and unreliable conditions, (M = .62, 
SD = .33), t(43) = 2.38, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .36, performed significantly above chance. In 
contrast, on the novel trials, infants in the reliable condition performed above chance (M = .62, 
SD = .27), t(32) = 2.62, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .46, whereas infants in the unreliable condition 
performed at chance on the novel word trials (M = .45, SD = .33), t(43) = -.96, p = .34, Cohen’s d 
= -.15.  
Correlates of Selective Social Learning 
 In order to investigate whether domain-specific or domain-general abilities are related to 
selective social learning, a condition (reliable/unreliable) by score (pass/fail) ANOVA was 
conducted for each of the three tasks assessing the potential correlates of selective learning: false 
belief, knowledge, and statistical learning. The dependent variable for each ANOVA was the 
proportion of novel word trials where infants offered the target object on the word learning task. 
Pearson correlations were also computed between the MCDI scores and performance on the 
word learning task in order to determine whether infants’ vocabulary size was related to their 
ability to selectively learn new words from others.  
 False Belief Task. One additional participant was excluded on the false belief task due to 
inattentiveness. Descriptive statistics indicated that on this task, 51% of the 76 infants touched 
the correct box. A binomial test revealed that infants did not perform significantly above chance 
(.50) (p = .91). A condition (reliable/unreliable) by false belief task score (pass/fail) ANOVA 
with infants’ performance on the novel trials of the word learning task as the dependent variable 
revealed a non-significant interaction F(1,72) = .84, p = .36, ηp2 = .01. Planned comparisons 
indicated that for infants in the unreliable condition, performance on the novel trials of the word 
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learning task did not significantly differ as a function of whether the infant passed (n = 22, M = 
.40, SD = .28) or failed (n = 21, M = .53, SD = .35) the false belief task, F(1,72) = 2.17, p = .15, 
ηp2 = .03, although results were in the expected direction (see Figure 2). Similar results were 
obtained in the reliable condition. No significant difference was found in the proportion of 
correct choices on the novel trials between infants who passed (n = 17, M = .62, SD = .25) or 
failed (n = 16, M = .63, SD = .29) the false belief task, F(1,72) = .01, p = .94, ηp2 = .00.  
 Knowledge Task. Sixteen additional participants were excluded on the knowledge task 
due to failure of the pre-test (n = 8), fussiness (n = 5), and experimenter error (n = 3). Descriptive 
statistics indicated that on this task, 46% of the 61 infants touched the target object. Using a 
binomial test, it was found that infants performed at a level above chance (.33) (p = .04). A 
condition (reliable/unreliable) by knowledge task score (pass/fail) ANOVA with infants’ 
performance on the novel trials of the word learning task as the dependent variable yielded a 
statistically significant interaction, F(1,57) = 4.36, p = .04, ηp2 = .07. Planned comparisons 
revealed that for infants in the unreliable condition, there was a significant difference in the 
proportion of correct responses on the novel trials of the word learning task between infants who 
passed (n = 13, M = .35, SD = .32) and failed the knowledge task (n = 20, M = .58, SD = .29), 
F(1,57) = 4.87, p = .03, ηp2 = .08 (see Figure 2). This suggests that infants who passed the 
knowledge task were significantly less likely to learn a novel word from an unreliable speaker. 
As expected, this was not the case in the reliable condition, where infants who passed (n = 15, M 
= .68, SD = .26) and failed (n = 13, M = .60, SD = .30) the knowledge task performed equally on 
the selective social learning task, F(1,57) = .63, p = .43, ηp2 = .01.  
 Statistical Learning Task. Five additional participants were excluded on the statistical 
learning task due to fussiness (n = 4), and parental interference (n = 1). Descriptive statistics 
 35 
indicated that on this task, 49% of the 72 infants passed by touching the target object on the 
minority trial. As expected, the results of this task demonstrated that infants were significantly 
more likely to touch the target object on the minority trial and were more likely to touch the 
alternative or both objects on the majority trial, χ2 = 6.85, p = .03 (see Table 1). A condition 
(reliable/unreliable) by statistical learning task score (pass/fail) ANOVA with infants’ 
performance on the novel trials of the word learning task as the dependent variable yielded a 
non-significant interaction, F(1,68) = .001, p = .98, ηp2 = .00. Planned comparisons revealed that 
there was no statistically significant difference between infants who passed (n = 18, M = .54, SD 
= .28) or failed (n = 23, M = .41, SD = .35) the statistical learning task in terms of their 
performance on the novel trials of the word learning task in the unreliable condition, F(1,68) = 
1.73, p = .19, ηp2 = .03 (see Figure 2). Similarly, in the reliable condition, infants who passed the 
statistical learning task (n = 17, M = .69, SD = .29) were as likely to offer the correct object on 
the novel word trials as infants who failed the statistical learning task (n = 14, M = .57, SD = 
.23), F(1,68) = 1.22, p = .27, ηp2 = .02.  
 MCDI. No statistically significant correlation was found between infants’ receptive 
vocabulary measured through the MCDI and their performance on the word learning task in the 
unreliable, r(42) = .12, p = .43, or reliable condition, r(31) = .17, p = .33. The correlation was 
also not significant when examining the relation between infants’ expressive vocabulary 
measured through the MCDI and their performance on the word learning task in the unreliable, 
r(42) = .17, p = .26, or reliable condition, r(31) = .17, p = .35. 
Discussion 
 The goal of the present study was to examine the contribution of domain-general and 
domain-specific correlates to selective social learning in infancy. Specifically, it was designed to 
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contribute to the current debate regarding a rich versus lean interpretation of selective social 
learning (Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017 Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). One side of the debate 
posits that higher-order, domain-specific functions, such as theory of mind, are fundamental to 
young children’s ability to selectively learn from others. It is argued that children who show a 
greater understanding of others’ behaviour should be more selective in their learning (Brosseau-
Liard et al., 2015; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). The other side of the debate posits 
that lower-order, domain-general abilities, such as associative or statistical learning, influence 
selective social learning. According to Heyes (2017), the selective learning observed in infancy 
does not require any cognitive sophisticated skills, as a wide range of animals display this ability 
as well. In addition, Sobel and Kushnir (2013) suggested that infants’ selective learning might 
depend on their ability to detect statistical cues. The present study found preliminary support for 
a rich interpretation, as the only link observed is between performance on the selective social 
learning and a theory of mind task.   
The present contribution to the debate was to investigate the relation between infants’ 
performance on theory of mind and statistical learning tasks and their ability to learn from an 
unreliable or reliable informant. Specifically, 18-month-olds participated in a word learning task 
following exposure to a competent or an incompetent speaker. We hypothesized that infants 
would be less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker compared to a reliable 
speaker. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that if domain-general functions are related to 
selective social learning, then infants who passed the statistical learning task should be less likely 
to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker in comparison to infants who failed. On the other 
hand, if domain-specific functions are related to selective social learning, then infants who pass 
the theory of mind tasks should be less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker in 
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comparison to infants who failed. We hypothesized that there would be no relation between these 
correlates and selective learning in the reliable condition, as infants have been shown to learn 
novel words from individuals who do not display any information about their competence.  
 The results of the selective learning task were as expected and replicated previous 
research with a statistically significant difference in performance on the word learning task 
between infants in the unreliable and reliable conditions. Specifically, infants who observed a 
speaker label familiar objects inaccurately exhibited a lower proportion of correct responses on 
the novel trials in comparison to infants who observed a speaker label familiar objects 
accurately. As expected, infants in both conditions performed at a level significantly above 
chance on the familiar word trials. Furthermore, it was found that the differences in word 
learning across both conditions were not due to a lack of attention to the unreliable speaker 
during the labeling phase of the task. Taken together, these findings suggest that 18-month-olds 
are able to detect when an individual is unreliable and have the ability to learn selectively from 
someone who provides more accurate information. These results are consistent with previous 
studies demonstrating selective social learning in the verbal domain with infants and toddlers 
(Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 
2012). For instance, Brooker and Poulin-Dubois (2013a) demonstrated that 18-month-olds were 
less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker compared to a reliable speaker. 
Moreover, the present study adds to a growing body of literature demonstrating that young 
children are precocious selective learners who can use a speaker’s reliability to guide their 
learning (see reviews by Mills, 2013; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016).  
 In terms of the results regarding the psychological correlates, the findings of the present 
study support the hypothesis that domain-specific abilities are linked to selective learning in 
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infancy, rather than domain-general abilities. It was found that infants who passed the knowledge 
task were significantly less likely to learn a novel word from an unreliable speaker compared to 
infants who failed the knowledge task. Importantly, in support of our hypothesis, no such 
relation was found for infants in the reliable condition. These results suggest that infants with 
superior theory of mind abilities may have been better at inferring that the unreliable speaker was 
ignorant or not knowledgeable. This finding is consistent with many studies demonstrating a 
relation between theory of mind abilities and selective learning in preschool-age and school-age 
children (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni et al., 2012; Fusaro 
& Harris, 2008; Lucas et al., 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). However, this is the first study to 
demonstrate that this link is also apparent in infancy. It is important to point out that such link 
does not provide support for a mentalistic view of theory of mind in infancy, that is, the 
knowledge that infants possess about people’s behaviours might be rather shallow as opposed to 
deep. There is a current debate regarding the nature of theory of mind in infancy, with one view 
proposing continuity between implicit and explicit forms of theory of mind whereas another 
view suggests two separate systems developing in parallel (Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 
2016). Regardless of the depth of infants’ computations in the knowledge inference task, the 
present study provides evidence that the precursors of theory of mind are related to selective 
learning in human infants.  
 The present study included two different theory of mind tasks. While both tasks measured 
infants’ understanding of others’ mental states, one task assessed infants’ ability to understand 
that others may have different beliefs, whereas the other task assessed infants’ ability to attribute 
knowledge states to others. The inclusion of two theory of mind tasks was important as both of 
these tasks are epistemic in nature and can both potentially help infants in detecting inaccuracy 
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when choosing whom to learn from (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). Furthermore, it was of 
particular interest to contrast performance on the false belief and knowledge tasks to their 
relation to selective learning abilities. Although performance on the knowledge task was 
significantly related to selective learning, performance on the false belief task was not, but the 
results were in the expected direction. This null result is consistent with findings from Pasquini 
and colleagues (2007), where no significant relation was found between false belief abilities and 
selective learning. However, the researchers argued that the absence of this relation might be 
explained by the fact that performance on the false belief task was at chance level. Similarly, the 
null findings that we observed with false belief might be due to the infants’ poor performance on 
this task. 
When looking at the difference in the pattern of results across both theory of mind tasks, 
the findings revealed that the effect size for the knowledge task was three times greater than the 
effect size of the false belief task when examining its influence on infants’ word learning. 
Therefore, the ability to infer knowledge states, as opposed to false beliefs, is a better predictor 
of selective social learning. Passing the knowledge task suggests that the infant has the ability to 
infer knowledge, as research indicates that infants not only understand what individuals are 
doing and seeing, but also what individuals know (Moll & Tomasello, 2007). Infants infer what 
other individuals know by understanding what they have had previous experience with (i.e., not 
having experience with the third object; Moll & Tomasello, 2007). With regard to the word 
labelling phase, infants may expect a speaker to share their knowledge of the labels for these 
common objects, so when they observe the speaker use inaccurate labels, they detect a lack of 
“agreement” and are less likely to subsequently learn from this speaker. In summary, these 
results suggest that infants who display a greater understanding of the knowledge states of others 
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are more selective in their word learning, as they are better able to form attributions regarding 
whether this individual is knowledgeable and thus the best source to learn from (Brosseau-Liard 
et al., 2015; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016).  
Aside from infants’ understanding of knowledge states being the ability most clearly 
related to their selective learning abilities, another potential reason why the false belief task did 
not reach statistical significance may be due to the fact that the original results were not 
replicated. Specifically, 51% of infants in the present study passed the false belief task, whereas 
72% of infants passed in the study conducted by Buttelmann and colleagues (2009). Consistent 
with the present findings, a recent study also reported a low performance of 36.6% on the same 
false belief task with 18-month-old infants (Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2016). Additional research 
has also shown that even preschoolers fail this false belief task when control conditions are 
added to the design (Allen, 2015). However, it is important to note that slight methodological 
changes were made to the false belief task of the current study. Specifically, Buttelmann and 
colleagues (2009) administered the false belief task on the floor, whereas we administered the 
task on a table with infants sitting in a high chair. In fact, two recent studies have replicated 
Buttelmann and colleagues’ (2009) pattern of results when the task was administered on the floor 
(Powell, Hobbs, Bardis, & Carey, 2017; Preiwasser, Rafetseder, Gargitter, & Perner, 2017). 
Given that the main goal of the present study was to contrast infants who passed and failed this 
task, the observed distribution of scores in the false belief task is ideal for our analyses since it 
provided us with similar sample sizes across subgroups. Still, future research should attempt to 
replicate the present null findings using other false belief tasks, such as those measured through 
an anticipatory looking or the violation of expectation paradigms.   
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Importantly, the present study did not find support for the hypothesis that domain-general 
abilities are linked to selective social learning in infancy, as no relation was found between 
infants’ performance on the statistical learning task and their performance on the selective 
learning task. Specifically, infants who passed the statistical learning task demonstrated a similar 
performance on the word learning task to infants who failed this task. Although the link between 
statistical learning and selective learning has been suggested in the literature (Sobel & Kushnir, 
2013), this is the first study to empirically investigate this relation. What is noteworthy is that the 
non-significant link between statistical learning and selective learning found in the present study 
cannot be accounted for by non-replication of the statistical learning task. In fact, 18-month-olds’ 
performance on the statistical learning task in the present study is consistent with the 
performance of 19- to 24-month-olds’ performance of this task in the original study conducted 
by Kushnir and colleagues (2010). The pattern of responses demonstrated that infants touched 
the target object significantly more on the minority trial compared to the majority trial. Since the 
experimenter’s selection was likely not due to random sampling on the minority trial, it was 
expected that infants should recognize the experimenter’s preference, and thus, offer the toy that 
the experimenter picked out. In contrast, infants touched the alternative object significantly more 
on the majority trial compared to the minority trial. According to Kushnir and colleagues (2010), 
infants may be able to recognize that the experimenter’s selection on the majority trial was likely 
due to random sampling. As a result, infants may prefer the alternative toy, which is more novel 
to them (Kushnir et al., 2010). Although this task involves inferring the experimenter’s 
preference, the pattern of results demonstrates that infants are using statistical and probabilistic 
cues when deciding which object to give to the experimenter. If the choice of object was based 
solely on the inference of a preference, then infants would be more likely to touch the target 
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object on the majority trial as well. However, future studies should attempt to replicate these 
findings with other statistical learning tasks in order to provide further evidence that this ability 
is not associated with infants’ selective social learning. Another domain-general correlate that 
was included in the present study was infants’ vocabulary size, as a proxy for infants’ verbal 
intelligence. The results revealed no significant association between infants’ verbal skills and 
their selective learning behaviours. Thus, infants’ tendency to learn less from the unreliable 
speaker was not due to the size of their vocabulary, suggesting that the effect between infants’ 
knowledge attribution and selective social learning is robust and does not require advanced 
verbal skills. 
In conclusion, this is the first study to investigate the correlates of selective social 
learning in infancy while examining theory of mind and statistical learning simultaneously. It is 
also the first to demonstrate that infants’ ability to select competent informants is associated with 
the ability to infer people’s knowledge state. Thus, our findings provide preliminary support for 
the rich interpretation of early selective social learning, in that domain-specific, socio-cognitive 
functions are linked with this ability in infancy. Future research should investigate the correlates 
of selective social learning in younger as well as older infants. This would allow researchers to 
explore a possible developmental trend in the correlates underlying this ability; that is, 


































































































Figure 2. Mean proportion of correct responses in the unreliable condition as a function of 
performance on the theory of mind and statistical learning tasks. 
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Table 1 
Infants’ responses on the statistical learning task 
 
 
 Minority trial 
(sampling violation) 
 Majority trial 
(no sampling violation) 
Response  n  n 
Target toy  35  20 
Alternative toy  18  28 
Both (target and alternative)  19  24 
Total  72  72 
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Infants’ ability to detect emotional incongruency: Deep or shallow? 
 Like other species, humans acquire knowledge through social learning. Social learning, 
or socially mediated learning, can be defined as the acquisition of an individual’s behaviour that 
has been influenced by attending to another individual (Box, 1984). Social learning allows 
individuals to acquire novel information and/or skills at a quicker pace and at a lower cost than 
asocial learning but entails the risk of acquiring false information or useless skills (van Schaik, 
2010). Therefore, it is essential for humans to be able to select whom to trust and learn from 
(Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013).  
Research over the past decade has uncovered evidence that young children are able to 
differentiate unreliable and reliable sources of information and trust the more accurate sources in 
a learning context (see Mills, 2013 and Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016 for reviews). In a 
ground-breaking study, Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004) found that 3- and 4-year-olds were 
more likely to learn a novel word from a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects 
accurately in comparison to a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects inaccurately 
(e.g., a ball was labeled as a shoe). This research has since been extended to infancy, where it 
was found that 18-month-olds were less likely to learn a novel word from an unreliable speaker 
compared to a reliable one (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). However, the question of what 
individual differences predict infants’ tendency to mistrust unreliable sources of information 
remains largely unexplored. This research question is currently the subject of a controversy in 
the literature. Therefore, the main goal of the present study was to contribute to this debate in 
order to shed light on the mechanisms associated with the emergence of selective trust in the 
emotional domain.  
Selective trust based on emotional cues 
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Although most research on infants’ selective trust have focused on epistemic cues or 
knowledge-related cues, infants have been shown to be sensitive to the “reliability” of emotional 
cues. For instance, in a landmark study by Chow, Poulin-Dubois, and Lewis (2008), 14-month-
old infants observed an experimenter express positive affect while looking inside a container that 
held a toy (i.e., reliable emoter) or that was empty (i.e., unreliable emoter). It was found that 
infants took significantly longer to examine the contents of the container across the four trials 
when the emoter was previously unreliable in comparison to reliable. Furthermore, infants were 
less likely to imitate novel actions demonstrated by the unreliable emoter (Poulin-Dubois, 
Brooker, & Polonia, 2011), as well as less likely to follow her gaze behind a barrier (Chow et al., 
2008) compared to the reliable emoter.  
Additional research has since extended these findings demonstrating that 18-month-olds 
can differentiate emotional reactions that are congruent and incongruent to events and engage in 
more checking behaviour when an informant expresses an unjustified emotion after an event 
(i.e., expressing happiness after getting hurt) (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013). In a recently 
published follow-up study, infants in the justified emotion group were more likely to be guided 
by the informant’s emotions on a subsequent emotional referencing task, as well as more likely 
to help on an empathic helping task, compared to infants in the unjustified emotion group 
(Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). Interestingly, this effect did not generalize to learning 
situations where the emoter was neutral (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2015). Similarly, 16- and 
19-month-olds were found to demonstrate more concern and engage in more prosocial actions 
when their parent expressed sadness after hitting rather than missing their hand (Walle & 
Campos, 2014). Furthermore, 14-month-olds demonstrated increased pupil dilation when 
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watching the video of an informant expressing emotions that were not congruent with her 
behaviour (i.e., petting a toy tiger while expressing anger) (Hepach & Westermann, 2013).  
Other studies have shown that even younger infants can recognize incongruent emotional 
reactions. For instance, Skerry and Spelke (2014) found that 10-month-olds looked longer at a 
cartoon that demonstrated incongruent facial expressions after completing or failing to complete 
a goal (i.e., expressing sadness after climbing a barrier and reaching the desired location). In 
addition, a recent study found that 12-month-olds were sensitive to incongruent emotional 
reactions (Reschke, Walle, Flom, & Guenther, 2017). Taken together, these results suggest that 
infants are sensitive to emotional inaccuracy and prefer to trust and learn from individuals who 
demonstrate justified and reliable emotions.   
These recent studies expand previous work on social referencing, which can be seen in 
infants from the age of 10 months (Feinman, Roberts, Hsieh, Sawyer, & Swanson, 1992). In 
standard social referencing procedures, infants are exposed to an ambiguous object or situation in 
order to prompt them to seek information from a person who expresses positive or negative 
affect toward that object or situation. Following the adults’ expression, infants tend to adjust 
their behaviour toward the object accordingly (Feinman et al., 1992; Stenberg, 2013). For 
instance, it has been shown that infants tend to avoid the ambiguous object when the adult reacts 
with a negative emotion, whereas they tend to approach it when a positive emotion is expressed 
(Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). In a landmark study demonstrating social referencing, 
it was found that infants were more likely to cross an ambiguous visual cliff if their mother 
expressed a positive emotional reaction compared to if she expressed a negative emotional 
reaction (Sorce et al., 1985). Thus, infants can recognize that positive affect refers to a positive 
experience. Selective trust capitalizes on this knowledge by introducing infants to an individual 
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who expresses an emotion that is incongruent with the valence of her experience (i.e., positive 
affect and negative experience). Furthermore, consistent with selective trust, researchers have 
questioned whether infants prefer to seek information from certain individuals instead of others 
when faced with uncertainty (Harris & Lane, 2014; Stenberg, 2009; Walle, Reschke, & Knothe, 
2017).  
Selective trust: the mechanisms  
Although the past decade of research has revealed that infants engage in selective trust, 
the psychological mechanisms underlying young children’s selective trust has been recently 
debated in the literature (Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018; Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017; 
Sabbagh, Koenig, & Kuhlmeier, 2017; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). According to one view of this 
debate, children possess socio-cognitive abilities, often reported as an implicit form of theory of 
mind, that allow them to selectively learn from others (Poulin-Dubois, 2017). In contrast, an 
alternative “leaner” interpretation of selective trust suggests that young children, like other 
species, rely on more domain-general cognitive abilities, such as asocial associative learning 
(Heyes, 2017). Finally, some researchers believe that both mechanisms may be involved in 
children’s selective trust. For instance, infants may start with general associative learning 
capacities, but quickly begin to incorporate social information, including knowledge, into their 
reliability judgments in a rational manner (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). In addition, a dual-process 
account of selective trust has been proposed, which involves both associations and rational social 
inferences about an informants’ knowledge (Hermes, Behne & Rakoczy, 2018). Type I processes 
are fast, inflexible, implicit, automatic, and based on associative processes, which relates to the 
lean interpretation of selective social learning described above (Hermes, Behne, Bich, Thielert, 
& Rokoczy, 2017; Herme,s Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018). Conversely, Type II processes are slow, 
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flexible, explicit, conscious, and are based on inferential processes, which relates to the rich 
interpretation of selective social learning (Hermes et al., 2017; Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 
2018). It has been argued that Type II processes can replace Type I processes depending on 
children’s executive functioning and conceptual background knowledge, as well as the type of 
task (i.e., task demands) (Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018).  
A type of sophisticated cognitive ability proposed to be involved in young children’s 
selective trust is theory of mind, which can be defined as the ability to understand that others 
may have different beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowledge than their own (Wellman, 2014). 
A relation between theory of mind and selective trust has been suggested as children can infer 
others’ quantity and quality of knowledge based on their past accuracy in a given domain 
(Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). An individual who repeatedly displays accuracy would 
be identified as knowledgeable and would therefore be expected to provide better information in 
the future (Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Some evidence for the rich view of selective 
trust exists in the literature, as many researchers have demonstrated a link between theory of 
mind and selective trust, particularly in preschoolers (Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & Poulin-Dubois, 
2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni, Nini, Rheel, & Livelli, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; 
Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, & Berridge, 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). However, the results are 
mixed, as one study found that children who passed a false belief task were still selective in their 
behaviour (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007).  
According to the “leaner” interpretation of selective trust, associative learning, that is, 
learning an association between two stimuli, may be all that is needed to account for selective 
trust in very young children (Heyes, 2017). Only after years of social interaction will children 
develop explicit judgments about others’ reliability through domain-specific mechanisms such as 
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metacognition (Heyes, 2017). Associative learning has been proposed as infants’ selective trust 
can be explained through action-outcome relationships and learned predictiveness (i.e. 
understanding that a stimulus is consistently followed by the same outcome) (Mitchell & Le 
Pelley, 2010). Learned predictiveness, in turn, influences how much attention one pays towards a 
stimulus (Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013; Kruschke, 2003). Specifically, an attentional bias 
is produced, as one pays more attention to stimuli with a higher predictability than those with a 
lower predictability. In turn, those who have a higher predictability will be learned from quicker.  
 For instance, previous research has found that infants prefer to learn a novel word from a 
reliable speaker over an unreliable one (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Crivello, Phillips, & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2017). The interpretation of these findings from a domain-general perspective 
would propose that infants may have found the experimenter odd, as the label that the unreliable 
informant provided did not predict the object infants were expecting to see, which was 
established from associations that they had made in the past (Heyes, 2017). Consequently, they 
paid less attention to the sound that the unreliable informant was making (i.e., labeling the 
object), and were, in turn, less likely to learn a novel word from her. From this perspective, it is 
believed that infants were not inferring that the inaccurate speaker was untrustworthy, unreliable, 
and/or ignorant. Until recently, no study had investigated whether associative learning is related 
to infants’ ability to selectively trust others.  
 In order to further clarify the nature of selective trust and contribute to this debate, 
Crivello and colleagues (2017) recently examined whether domain-specific or domain-general 
abilities were related to infants’ ability to selectively learn from others. Specifically, 18-month-
olds were administered a selective social learning task, two theory of mind tasks assessing 
infants’ false belief understanding and knowledge attribution, as well as a statistical learning task 
 53 
assessing infants’ ability to infer the experimenter’s preference using statistical sampling. The 
results revealed that infants who passed the theory of mind task measuring knowledge attribution 
were less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker in comparison to infants who 
failed this task. As expected, this effect was specific to the unreliable condition, and not to the 
reliable condition. Moreover, no such effect was observed for the false belief and statistical 
learning tasks.  
Similar findings were found when investigating the mechanisms underlying infants’ 
social referencing. In a study by Stenberg (2009), 12-month-olds were presented with an 
ambiguous object by either the experimenter or their mother, and both conveyed position 
information about the object. It was found that 12-month-olds looked more at the experimenter 
compared to their mother and were more likely to use the information provided by the 
experimenter to guide their behavior towards the object, regardless of who presented the toy. 
These findings suggest that infants preferred to seek information from an individual who had 
more expertise and who was more knowledgeable about the situation. Stenberg (2009) ruled out 
associative learning as a mechanism, as infants did not associate the toy with the individual who 
presented it. Therefore, preliminary evidence has been found that higher-order cognitive abilities, 
such as infants’ ability to make knowledge inferences, are related to infants’ selective trust and 
social referencing.  
The present study 
 Given that previous research has found a link between theory of mind and selective trust 
in 18-month-olds, the objective of the present study was to examine the correlates of selective 
trust in younger infants, specifically 14-month-olds, by examining whether it may be linked to a 
domain-specific (i.e., theory of mind) or a domain-general (i.e., associative learning) ability. 
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Infants aged 14 months were tested as this is the youngest age in which infants have been shown 
to engage in selective trust. It was particularly important to examine associative learning as a 
potential correlate, as associative learning is one of the most basic forms of a domain-general 
ability. In addition, most theoretical accounts hypothesize that it should account for selective 
trust in such young infants, in parallel with domain-specific abilities or alone. As associative 
learning has been found in most species, such as rats and pigeons, Heyes’ (2017) arguments can 
be directly tested.  
In the present study, the same procedure as in Chow and colleagues (2008) was used to 
assess infants’ selective trust. Specifically, infants observed an experimenter expressing joy 
while looking inside a container that was empty (incongruent condition) or that held a toy 
(congruent condition). Following this, infants were given the opportunity to follow the 
experimenter’s gaze in front and behind a set of barriers. Infants’ associative learning and theory 
of mind abilities were then assessed. We hypothesized that infants would be able to detect 
emotional incongruency, as expressed in an increased latency to examine the contents of the 
container across trials, but only for infants in the incongruent condition. We also hypothesized 
that infants in the incongruent condition would subsequently be less likely to follow the gaze of 
the experimenter behind the barriers. With regard to the correlates of selective trust, it was 
hypothesized that domain-general abilities would be related to 14-month-olds’ selective trust. 
Specifically, it was expected that infants in the incongruent condition who show superior 
performance on the associative learning task would be more selective in their behaviour. This 
effect was not expected in the congruent condition. Furthermore, we did not expect any relation 





 A total of 102 infants were included in the final sample (Mage = 14.60 months, SD = .52, 
range = 13.6 – 16.1; 45 males, 57 females). Additional infants were tested but were excluded due 
to reasons specific to each task (please see below). Infants were randomly assigned to a 
congruent (n = 51) or incongruent (n = 51) condition. They were required to have no visual or 
auditory impairments and to be exposed to either English and/or French in order to be included 
in the study. Participants were recruited from a birth list provided by a government health service 
agency from a large Canadian city. The present study was conducted according to guidelines laid 
down in the Declaration of Helsinki, with written informed consent obtained from a parent or 
guardian for each child before any assessment or data collection. All procedures involving 
human subjects in this study were approved by the University Human Research Ethics 
Committee at Concordia University.  
Measures and Procedure  
Infants and their caregivers visited the laboratory where they began with a warm-up 
session in which the child would play and interact with the experimenters to become accustomed 
to them and the new environment. First, the procedure of the study was explained to the parent or 
caregiver. Following this, the caregiver was asked to read and sign the consent form, as well as 
complete a demographics questionnaire. Once the forms were completed, the infant first 
participated in the reliability exposure task (Chow et al., 2008) followed by a gaze following 
task, a theory of mind and an associative learning task, with the last two tasks counterbalanced 
across participants. The reliability exposure task was always performed first as it was the most 
important task in the study and it was therefore crucial to avoid any fatigue effect that would 
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prevent the detection of emotional reliability. It is important to note that the experimenter 
involved in the gaze following and reliability exposure tasks (E1) did not administer the other 
two tasks (associative learning and theory of mind task; E2 and E3) in order to avoid any 
carryover effects as a result of their incongruency/congruency during the selective trust task. The 
caregiver received a $20 compensation for the child’s participation, and the child received a 
certificate of merit with a small gift for their participation.    
Reliability exposure task. This task (adapted from Repacholi, 1998) involved two 
warm-up trials and four training trials. On the warm-up trials, the infant watched the 
experimenter (E1) look inside a yellow container while she stated, ‘What’s in here?’. Following 
this, E1 shook the container, removed the lid, and allowed the infant to see a block (i.e., blue or 
pink) inside by tilting the container. The experimenter then closed the lid and gave the container 
to the infant while saying, ‘Now it’s your turn’. The infant was given 30 s to explore the 
container and its content. This was repeated a second time, for a total of two warm-up trials. The 
warm-up phase was the same for infants in both conditions.  
For the training trials, rather than using a yellow container as in the warm-up trials, a blue 
and orange container was used instead. Furthermore, as E1 looked inside the container, she 
exclaimed ‘Wow!’ while displaying happy facial expression. This demonstration lasted 
approximately 10 s. She then closed the lid and placed the container in front of the infant. The 
procedure was repeated for a total of four training trials. The difference across the congruent and 
incongruent condition was that for infants in the congruent condition, the container held a toy, 
whereas for infants in the incongruent condition, the container was empty. Infants’ latency to 
examine the content of the container (s) in each trial was the dependent variable.  Inter-rater 
reliability revealed excellent agreement among coders (r(102) = .96). Six infants were excluded 
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from the reliability exposure task due to parental interference (n = 1), distraction (n = 1), 
technical error (n = 1), experimenter error (n = 1), or failure to open the lid of any of the 
containers (n = 2). 
Gaze following task. The gaze following task was administered immediately after the 
reliability exposure task in order to examine whether infants’ willingness to follow E1’s gaze 
was influenced by E1’s reliability (adapted from Moll & Tomasello, 2004). In this task, three 
barriers (i.e., blue, yellow, orange) and a red bucket were positioned around a stool where the 
infant was seated with a parent. The barriers were approximately 95 cm away from the stool. 
Each barrier/bucket consisted of a visible and non-visible trial, for a total of four visible trials 
and four non-visible trials. The non-visible trials consisted of a small toy (i.e., hen, horse, owl, 
sheep) placed behind the barriers, whereas the visible trials consisted of a sticker placed in front 
of the barriers. The barrier, trial (visible or non-visible), and location of E1 next to the barrier 
(i.e., right of left) were counterbalanced. However, the order of the trials was the same across the 
barriers (e.g., visible trials first for all barriers).  
Prior to commencing the task, the parent was given instructions to sit on the stool and 
keep hold of their child until they were given a signal to let her/him go. First, E1 kneeled and 
faced the side of a barrier, while getting the infant’s attention by stating “Hi (name of infant)!”. 
On the non-visible trials, E1 leaned to look at the toy behind the barrier, while exclaiming 
“Ooooh”, and holding her gaze for a total of 3 s. She then leaned back in order to allow the infant 
to approach the barrier. This was repeated a second time if the infant did not approach the back 
of the barrier after 4 s. As for the bucket, E1 leaned to look at the toy inside the bucket. The 
number of trials in which infants followed E1’s gaze was coded, which consisted of infants 
moving to reach a distance where they could see the back of the barrier or inside the bucket. The 
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same procedure was administered for the visible trials, except E1 looked at a sticker placed in the 
front of the barrier. Access to behind the barrier was blocked by the experimenter in order to 
prevent the infant from discovering or approaching the toy. Coding for the visible trials was 
based on the number of trials in which infants followed E1’s gaze in front of the barrier, by 
approaching the sticker or pointing to it. Inter-rater reliability revealed excellent agreement 
among coders (r(46) = .99). Seven infants were excluded on the gaze following task due to 
fussiness (n = 6) and parental interference (n = 1). 
Associative learning task. The associative learning task examined infants’ ability to 
understand cause and effect (adapted from Bhat, Galloway, & Landa, 2010). Infants were seated 
in a high chair with a push button directly in front of them that was connected to a toy (Fisher 
Price light-up lion stacker) placed on a table approximately 95 cm away from the infant. This 
task consisted of a baseline, acquisition, and extinction phase. During the baseline phase 
(minutes 0 to 1), whenever the infant pushed the button, the toy did not activate. However, a 
light attached to the high chair (not visible to the infant) was activated in order to accurately code 
the number of times the infant pushed the button. Following this, the acquisition phase began 
(minutes 1 to 3), where the association between pushing the button and the toy being activated 
was formed. In other words, every time the infant pushed the button, the toy played music and lit 
up for 5 s. At the beginning of the baseline and acquisition period, the experimenter stated, 
“Look at that!” and pointed to the button. During the acquisition period, if the infant did not push 
the button within 20 seconds, the experimenter repeated the prompt. The extinction phase then 
began (minutes 3 to 4), where the toy did not activate when the infant pushed the button.  
The number of times infants pushed the button in each phase was coded using 
INTERACT 14 (Mangold, 2017). In order to assess if infants learned this association, a baseline 
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ratio was calculated, that is, the number of times the infant pushed the button during the 
extinction phase divided by the number of times the infant pushed the button during the baseline 
phase. Furthermore, an additional method to investigate associative learning was used by 
dividing the frequency of button pushes in the acquisition phase by four. This provided a 
frequency of button pushes in four 30 s intervals. Infants’ rate of pushing in each interval was 
calculated by dividing the frequency of button pushes by the duration (30 s). Inter-rater 
reliability revealed strong agreement among coders (ĸ = .80). Forty-two infants were excluded 
from the associative learning task due to fussiness (n = 25), parental interference (n = 2), no 
response (n = 1), experimenter error (n = 1), and distraction (n = 13). 
Knowledge inference task. A knowledge inference task was administered in order to 
assess infants’ theory of mind abilities (Moll & Tomasello, 2007). In a pre-test, the infant and 
two experimenters (E2 and E3) played with three familiar objects (i.e., ball, teddy bear, car) one 
after the other for approximately 50 s. Following this, E2 requested each toy one at a time, in 
order to ensure that the infant understood the nature of the task. In order for infants to pass the 
pretest, they had to correctly touch at least one of the first two toys that the experimenter 
requested.  
Following this, E3 introduced the infant to a novel object (i.e., abacus, bird cage toy, 
garden tool) and gave it to E2. E2 and the infant played with the novel object for 60 s while 
taking turns. During this joint engagement, E2 demonstrated to the infant how to manipulate the 
object, while saying “Look what you can do with this!” and “That’s nice!”. This procedure was 
repeated with a second novel object. Once finished playing with the second novel object, E3 
placed it on a tray next to the first object (location was counterbalanced). E2 then announced that 
she was leaving the room by stating “I am going outside now. Bye bye!”. Following this, E3 
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stated to the infant: “(E2’s name) is outside now. She cannot see us. We’ll keep playing!”. E3 
introduced the infant to a third novel object (i.e., target object) and took turns with the infant 
playing with the object for 60 s. E3 then placed it on the tray with the other two objects. Once E2 
returned to the room, she exclaimed with excitement and surprise “Oh look! Look at that! Look 
there!”, while pointing towards the tray. She then asked, “Can you give it to me, please?”, while 
she held out her hand in the direction of the center of the tray. If no response ensued, E2 asked 
this question a maximum of five times. In order for infants to pass this task, they had to first 
touch the target object. Inter-rater reliability revealed perfect agreement among coders (ĸ = 1.00). 
Twenty infants were excluded from the knowledge task due to failing the pretest (n = 11), 
fussiness (n = 2), experimenter error (n = 3), touching two objects during the test phase (n = 2), 
and no response (n = 2). 
Results 
First, comparisons were computed to ensure that infants in both conditions did not differ 
on demographic characteristics. The samples included in the congruent and incongruent 
condition did not differ in terms of age, t(100) = -1.19, p = .24, or gender χ2(1) = .99, p = .32.  
Selective Trust  
Reliability exposure task. In order to determine if infants developed an expectation 
about the reliability of the emoter over time, a 2 (condition) X 4 (trial) mixed ANOVA was 
computed. The dependent variable was the latency to examine the contents of the container. 
Because the data were found to be not normally distributed, a log transformation was applied to 
the data. Thus, the inferential statistics are presented as the log-transformed data, whereas the 
descriptive statistics are based on the raw values.  
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The results of an ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of trial, F(3, 300) = 3.54, p = 
.02, ηp2 = .03, and condition, F(1, 100) = 4.69, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. Conversely, no significant 
interaction was found between condition and trial, F(3, 300) = 1.82, p = .14, ηp2 = .02. According 
to Keppel and Wickens (2004), if comparisons were planned and a priori, then they may be 
tested even if the omnibus F statistic is not significant. Given that one of the research questions 
was to examine whether infants in each condition differed across trials, planned comparisons 
were executed. Infants in the incongruent condition took significantly longer to examine the 
contents of the container across trials, F(3, 98) = 3.38, p = .02, ηp2 = .09. Specifically, for infants 
in the incongruent condition, the latency to examine the contents in the fourth trial (M = 14.38, 
SD = 11.16) was significantly longer than the first trial (M = 8.67, SD = 8.35; p = .02), and 
second trial (M = 9.89, SD = 9.84; p = .05) (p values adjusted using Bonferroni correction; see 
Figure 3). In contrast, infants in the congruent condition took equally long to examine the 
contents of the container across the four trials (1st trial: M = 6.87, SD = 6.92; 2nd trial: M = 8.82, 
SD = 8.81; 3rd trial: M = 7.14, SD = 7.87; 4th trial: M = 9.20, SD = 9.35), F(3, 98) = 1.32, p = .27, 
ηp2 = .04. Furthermore, a significant difference between conditions emerged on the fourth trial, 
F(1, 100) = 7.15, p = .01, ηp2 = .07), as well as a trend on the third trial, F(1, 100) = 3.60, p = .06, 
ηp2 = .04 (see Figure 3). No significant differences across conditions were observed in the first, 
F(1, 100) = 1.61, p = .21, ηp2 = .02, or second trial, F(1, 100) = .19, p = .66, ηp2 = .00.   
 Gaze following task. In order to determine if the reliability of the emoter would transfer 
to another context, we examined if infants’ gaze following would be affected by their exposure 
to the experimenter’s reliability during the reliability exposure task. As age was found to be 
correlated with infants’ performance on the gaze following task, r(93) = .35, p = .001, a 
condition (congruent/incongruent) by trial (non-visible/visible) mixed ANCOVA, controlling for 
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age, was computed. However, it was found that 82% of infants followed the gaze of the 
experimenter to look inside the red bucket trial during the experimental trial. Due to this ceiling 
effect (less effort was required to succeed), this trial was removed from the analyses in order to 
conduct a more conservative test. Therefore, the dependent variable was the proportion out of 
three trials (i.e., blue, orange, and yellow barriers) in which infants followed the experimenter’s 
gaze.  
A significant main effect of trial was found, revealing that infants followed the gaze of 
the experimenter more often on the visible trials (M = .77, SD = .32) in comparison to the non-
visible trials (M = .32, SD = .34), F(1,91) = 113.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. In addition, a significant 
main effect of condition was found, indicating that infants in the congruent condition (M = .60, 
SD = .26) were more likely to follow the gaze of the experimenter than infants in the incongruent 
condition (M = .50, SD = .26), F(1,91) = 3.84, p = .05, ηp2 = .04. No significant interaction was 
found, F(1, 91) = .22, p = .64, ηp2 = .002. Nevertheless, planned comparisons revealed that 
infants in the incongruent condition (M = .26, SD = .34) tended not to follow the gaze of the 
experimenter behind the barrier compared to infants in the congruent condition (M = .39, SD = 
.34), F(1, 91) = 3.19, p = .077, ηp2 = .03. As expected, infants in the incongruent condition (M = 
.73, SD = .33) were as likely to follow the gaze of the experimenter in front of the barrier 
compared to infants in the congruent condition (M = .82, SD = .33), F(1, 91) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp2 
= .02. 
Correlates of Selective Trust 
 Knowledge inference task. One of the main goals of the present study was to investigate 
whether infants’ selective trust, in other words, their performance on the reliability exposure task 
was related to their theory of mind abilities. It was found that 41% of infants passed the 
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knowledge inference task. A binomial test revealed that infants performed at a level above 
chance (.33), although this effect was at the trend level, p = .067. In order to investigate whether 
infants’ selective trust was related to their theory of mind, a condition (incongruent/congruent) 
by score (pass/fail) ANOVA was computed. The dependent variable was infants’ latency to 
examine the contents on the last trial of the reliability exposure task (log transformed), as this 
was a critical trial in which a statistically significant difference emerged between the congruent 
and incongruent conditions. Planned comparisons were also computed as the comparisons were a 
priori and based on prior research and theory. For example, one of the main goals of the present 
study was to compare infants who passed and failed the knowledge inference task within the 
incongruent and congruent conditions. The ANOVA investigating the relation between infants’ 
theory of mind abilities and their latency to examine the content on the last trial yielded no 
significant interaction, F(1, 78) = 1.41, p = .24, ηp2 = .02. Nevertheless, planned comparisons 
revealed that for infants in the incongruent condition, those who passed the knowledge inference 
task (n = 17, M = 19.77, SD = 11.17) took significantly longer to examine the content of the 
container on the last trial compared to infants who failed this task (n = 25, M = 11.51, SD = 
10.83), F(1, 78) = 5.31, p = .02, ηp2 = .06 (see Figure 4). In contrast, there was no significant 
difference between infants who passed (n = 17, M = 9.76, SD = 10.14) and failed the knowledge 
inference task in the congruent condition (n = 23, M = 8.66, SD = 9.50), F(1, 78) = .36, p = .55, 
ηp2 = .01.   
 In addition, we were interested in examining whether their performance on the 
knowledge inference task was related to their performance on the gaze following task. Therefore, 
an ANCOVA (controlling for age) examining the link between infants’ theory of mind abilities 
and the proportion of trials in which infants followed the experimenter’s gaze behind the barriers 
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(non-visible trials) was computed. No significant interaction was found, F(1, 72) = .06, p = .81, 
ηp2 = .001. Planned comparisons demonstrated that infants who passed the knowledge inference 
task (n = 16, M = .25, SD = .33) followed the gaze of the incongruent experimenter equally often 
compared to infants who failed this task (n = 24, M = .28, SD = .34), F(1, 72) = .03, p = .86, ηp2 
= .000. Similar results were found for the congruent condition, wherein no statistically 
significant difference was found between infants who passed (n = 15, M = .40, SD = .40) and 
failed the knowledge inference task (n = 22, M = .42, SD = .37), F(1, 72) = .03, p = .87, ηp2 = 
.000. 
 Associative Learning Task. An additional goal of the present study was to examine 
whether infants’ performance on the reliability exposure task was linked to their associative 
learning abilities. The frequency of button pushing was calculated in each phase of the 
associative learning task. Four outliers were found and were converted to the next highest score 
within three standard deviations from the mean (Kline, 2009). At the group level, it was found 
that the number of times infants pushed the button during the extinction phase (M = 15.18, SD = 
11.12) was not significantly different than the number of times infants pushed the button during 
the baseline phase (M = 16.82, SD = 13.60), t(59) = .10, p = .92, d = -.13. As the baseline phase 
was found to be problematic (i.e., high rate of button pushes due to attractiveness of the button), 
the baseline ratio was not used in the following analyses (M = 2.25, SD = 3.88) (see Appendix A 
for analyses using the baseline ratio).  
An alternative method was used to examine whether infants engaged in associative 
learning by comparing their rate of pushing the button during the acquisition period. Infants’ 
frequency of pushes was coded by dividing the duration of the task into four intervals of 30 s 
each. A rate of pushing was calculated by dividing the frequency of pushes by 30 s. Four outliers 
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were replaced with the next most extreme score that was within three standard deviations from 
the mean (Kline, 2009). As the data was still skewed despite the replacement of outliers, a non-
parametric Friedman Test was computed to investigate changes on the rate of pushes over time. 
There was a statistically significant difference between the rate of pushes across intervals, χ2(3) = 
9.27, p = .03. Post hoc tests using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (Bonferroni corrected; 
corrected α = .008) revealed that the rate of pushes significantly increased from the first to the 
third interval (Z = -3.55, p < .001) and fourth trial (Z = -2.69, p = .007). This suggests that infants 
learnt across time that pushing the button activates the toy. No other significant differences 
across intervals were observed.  
In addition, a Pearson correlation was computed to examine the link between infants’ 
performance on the reliability exposure task and the increase in rate of button pushes, which was 
calculated by subtracting the rate of the first interval from the rate of the fourth interval. No 
significant relation was found between this difference score and infants’ latency to examine the 
content of the container on the last trial in the incongruent condition, r(29) = .06, p = .73, or 
congruent condition, r(27) = -.02, p = .94. Moreover, using a partial correlation controlling for 
age, no link was observed between this difference score and infants’ performance on the gaze 
following task in the incongruent, r(26) = .13, p = .52, or congruent condition, r(24) = .20, p = 
.33.  
Discussion 
The main goal of the present study was to investigate whether theory of mind abilities 
and/or associative learning abilities relate to 14-month-old infants’ selective trust. This is a 
critical research question as the type of cognitive mechanisms underlying infants’ selective trust 
is currently a topic of much controversy, whereby researchers have proposed both rich (domain-
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and species-specific) and lean (domain-general shared with other species) interpretation of 
infants’ selective behaviour (Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017). The findings of the present 
study provide preliminary support for the “rich” view on the correlates associated with selective 
trust, as only a relation between infants’ theory of mind skills and their selective behaviour was 
observed. Infants’ associative learning abilities, a form of asocial learning, were unrelated to 
their ability to detect the misleading behaviour of an emoter. 
Evidence of selective trust in infancy 
The current findings extend past research on selective trust in infancy by replicating the 
observation that infants detect an unreliable source of information about the hidden content of a 
box. As expected, infants in the incongruent condition took significantly longer to examine the 
content of the container across trials compared to infants in the congruent condition on the 
reliability exposure task. Consequently, a significant difference emerged on the last trial across 
conditions, such that infants in the incongruent condition were taking longer to examine its 
contents. These results suggest that infants in the incongruent condition had built up an 
expectation that the person’s attentional and affective cues were misleading and that there was 
nothing to look at inside the containers and became disinterested in its contents. Thus, infants 
were able to detect the informant who expressed incongruent emotions and were subsequently 
less likely to trust her gaze in a different context.  
These findings replicate the pattern of results demonstrated by previous studies using the 
same procedure (Chow et al., 2008; Poulin-Dubois & Chow, 2009; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2011) 
and add to a growing body of literature demonstrating that infants use emotional cues to help 
determine whom to trust and learn from. Specifically, several studies have shown that infants can 
recognize when an individual’s emotional reaction is incongruent with a prior event (Chiarella & 
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Poulin-Dubois, 2013; Hepach & Westermann, 2013; Reschke et al., 2017; Skerry & Spelke, 
2014; Walle & Campos, 2014) and prefer to trust those who display congruent emotional 
reactions (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). The results are also consistent with the past decade 
of research revealing that children and infants engage in selective trust, where they prefer to trust 
and learn from reliable sources of information (Mills, 2013; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 
2016).  
In addition to measuring infants’ selective trust using the reliability exposure task, we 
were interested in examining whether infants’ prior exposure to the informant’s emotional 
reliability would generalize to a subsequent gaze following task. It was hypothesized that infants 
would be less likely to follow the gaze of the incongruent emoter behind the barrier in 
comparison to the congruent emoter. The results of the gaze following task supported our 
hypothesis, as infants were more likely to trust the congruent emoter and follow her gaze behind 
barriers when she showed interest in an invisible object. However, it is important to note that this 
effect was small, as demonstrated by a difference at the trend level. Nevertheless, as expected, no 
significant difference across conditions was found on the visible trials, as infants in both 
conditions equally followed the gaze of the experimenter in front of the barrier. The distinction 
between the visible trials and non-visible trials is important, as the reliability manipulation 
should only affect infants’ performance on the non-visible trials. As infants could not see what 
the informant was looking at behind the barrier, following the informant’s gaze involved trusting 
her looking and vocal cues. Alternatively, infants were not required to trust the informant on the 
visible trials, as they were able to see the target object (i.e. sticker) that the informant was 
looking at in front of the barrier. These results replicate prior research reported with the same 
procedure (Chow et al., 2008).  
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Identifying the mechanisms  
Given that the main goal of the study was to investigate the cognitive mechanisms related 
to infants’ selective trust, we examined whether infants’ performance on the reliability exposure 
task was related to their performance on a knowledge inference task and associative learning 
task. Interestingly, a relation was found between infants’ theory of mind abilities and their 
performance on the reliability exposure task. For infants in the incongruent condition, those who 
passed the knowledge inference task took significantly longer to examine the contents of the 
container on the last trial compared to infants who failed this task. Importantly, no such effect 
was observed in the congruent condition. These results suggest that infants with superior theory 
of mind abilities may have been better at detecting a person who shows unreliable emotional 
referencing. However, it is important to note that the knowledge inference task consisted of only 
one trial that children either passed or failed. Future research should examine the link between 
infants’ selective social learning and their knowledge inference abilities using a task that has 
more variability in order to provide more definitive support for this relation.  
The present findings are consistent with several studies revealing that theory of mind is 
linked to selective trust in preschool and school-age children (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; 
DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni et al., 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas et al., 2013; 
Mills & Elashi, 2014). Furthermore, these results provide additional support and extend the 
findings of Crivello and colleagues’ (2017) study, as the researchers demonstrated that 18-
month-olds who passed the knowledge inference task were more selective in their word learning 
than infants who failed this task. The researchers argued that infants who had a better 
understanding of the knowledge state of others were better able to infer that the unreliable 
speaker was not knowledgeable. However, such a link does not support the view that infants 
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have a rich theory of mind, as there is also a controversial debate in the literature regarding the 
depth of infants’ theory of mind abilities with many recent studies providing support for a lean 
interpretation (Heyes, 2014; Ruffman, 2014; Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2017). Nonetheless, the 
present findings provide additional support for the interpretation that infants’ selective trust is 
related to domain-specific abilities, such as the precursors of theory of mind or socio-cognitive 
abilities.  
In contrast to the findings showing a link between infants’ performance on the knowledge 
inference task and the reliability exposure task, no such link was observed on the gaze following 
task. One possible explanation for these findings is that the difference across conditions on the 
reliability exposure task was much larger than the difference observed on the gaze following 
task. Thus, the weak effect on the gaze following task may explain the lack of association with 
infants’ theory of mind abilities. An additional explanation may be due to the fact that the 
variability in the outcome measure of the gaze following task (range: 0-3) is much less than the 
variability in the reliability exposure task (range: 0-30). 
Furthermore, in contrast to the argument that infants’ selective trust is driven by simple 
associative learning, we observed no relation between infants’ performance on a task measuring 
such skills and selective trust tasks. Infants’ associative learning was assessed by investigating 
the change in the rate that infants pushed the button across the acquisition period. As expected, 
infants’ pushing rate significantly increased across this phase, demonstrating that they learned 
the association between pushing the button and activating the toy. This is consistent with 
research showing that infants as young as 3 months of age have been shown to understand cause-
effect relationships (Rovee-Collier, Hayne, & Colombo, 2001). In addition, 6-month-old infants 
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at low and high risk for Autism Spectrum Disorder learned the association between a wrist 
movement and the activation of a toy (Bhat et al., 2010).  
It is important to note that infants’ baseline ratio was not used in the analyses of the 
present study due to the high frequency of button pushes in the baseline phase. This is in contrast 
to other studies that have used a baseline ratio to assess infants’ associative learning (e.g., Bhat et 
al., 2010). One explanation for this difference could be the way in which infants’ baseline of 
responses was measured. For instance, in the study by Bhat and colleagues (2010), 6-month-olds 
were tested by attaching their hand to a joystick through a string. The toy activation occurred 
when infants bent the joystick during the acquisition phase. For the baseline phase, the 
researchers assessed a baseline of how many times infants moved their hand. For the current 
adaptation of the associative learning task, infants were required to push a button in order to 
activate the toy. The number of times infants pushed the button in the baseline phase was also 
calculated. A novelty effect may explain the high number of responses in the baseline phase as 
they were attracted to the push button and wanted to explore it. Even though the toy is not being 
activated when infants push the button in the baseline phase, pushing the button is a reward for 
them. In contrast, there is no reward in the baseline phase in previous research. Due to the 
unexpected rewarding baseline phase, the average baseline ratio was so low that only a small 
percentage of infants passed the task. As a result, the baseline measure was dropped from the 
analyses and the acquisition phase was used to assess infants’ associative learning.  
Infants’ pattern of responding in the acquisition phase demonstrates that although they 
engaged in associative learning, this ability was not related to their selective trust. The present 
findings are consistent with the results reported in a recent study showing no relation between 
18-month-olds’ selective word learning and their statistical learning abilities (Crivello et al., 
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2017). In summary, the lack of association between infants’ associative learning abilities and 
their selective trust does not support Heyes’ (2017) arguments that infants, like different species 
of animals, are using domain-general abilities to guide their selective behaviour. These results 
provide further support for a rich interpretation of selective trust, rather than a leaner 
interpretation.  
The present findings have important implications for understanding the nature of infants’ 
selective trust, emotional development, and social cognition more broadly. Trusting others can 
be risky as not all individuals are reliable sources of information (Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-
Liard, 2016). This risk is particularly prevalent in infancy, as infants learn an abundance of novel 
information from other individuals. In addition, infants engage in social referencing, where they 
frequently refer to an adult’s emotional reaction when faced with uncertainty (Sorce et al., 1985). 
Consequently, understanding how infants select others is crucial, as inadequate selective trust 
abilities can bring about negative consequences in a child’s future social development (Mills, 
2013).  
Importantly, examining “how” infants selectively trust others directly contributes to the 
controversial debate in the literature regarding the mechanisms of infants’ selective trust. Some 
researchers have suggested that children’s selective trust is guided by rational inference and 
theory of mind (e.g., Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). According to a rich 
view, it is assumed that even infants’ selective trust is guided by their theory of mind skills. 
Thus, infants who have superior theory of mind abilities should be better able to selectively trust 
others (Crivello et al., 2017; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). In contrast, others have 
argued that because animals, such as rats, demonstrate selective learning, such selectivity is not a 
unique aspect of human social learning and does not necessitate sophisticated cognitive skills 
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(Heyes, 2017). As a result, this lean view of selective trust would predict that infants’ associative 
learning abilities guide their selective behaviour (Heyes, 2017).  
Other domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms have been proposed to underlie 
infants’ selective trust, such as metacognition and causal learning (Heyes, 2016). Metacognition 
is a domain-specific ability, that refers to the skill of reflecting on one’s own cognitive processes, 
such as memory or knowledge (Gliga & Southgate, 2016). This has been proposed to influence 
children’s selective trust, as one modifies their learning strategies based on their own knowledge 
state (Goupil, Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016). Metacognition and theory of mind have been 
compared in the literature, as both concepts involve “knowledge about the mental world” (Ebert, 
2015). Moreover, previous research has found that theory of mind predicts metamemory later in 
development above and beyond language, and thus, can be seen as a precursor to metacognition 
(Ebert, 2015; Lockl & Schneider, 2007). In addition to metacognition, causal learning has been 
proposed to be involved in infants’ selective trust. Similar to associative learning, infants may be 
less likely to learn from an unreliable speaker because the association between the label provided 
and the object identified does not match (Heyes, 2016). Additional research should also examine 
these other domain-specific and domain-general correlates to further understand the depth of 
infants’ selective trust.  
In addition to the domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms mentioned above, 
other individual differences have been identified in the literature. For instance, children of 
parents who have higher, versus lower, authoritarianism are less likely to trust an inaccurate 
informant (Reifen Tagar, Federico, Lyons, Ludeke, & Koenig, 2014). As parents with an 
authoritarian style exhibit strict rules, the child is more likely to dismiss information that is 
inaccurate/non-conventional (Reifen Tagar et al., 2014). Similarly, preschoolers’ reliance on 
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their mother’s claims differs based on the attachment profile during infancy (Corriveau et al., 
2009). It was found that children with a secure attachment had a flexible strategy and accepted 
claims from their mother or stranger when appropriate, whereas children with an insecure 
attachment had an inflexible strategy (Corriveau et al., 2009). Following this study, Brooker and 
Poulin-Dubois (2013b) demonstrated that toddlers’ selective trust is influenced by the model’s 
emotional availability and responsiveness, as 24-month-olds were less likely to learn a novel 
word from a caregiver who was less sensitive and responsive. Furthermore, Canfield, Saudino, 
and Ganea (2015) demonstrated that young children rated high in affect/extraversion performed 
better on a selective trust task, suggesting that temperament may be influencing children’s 
competency in social interactions. Lastly, research has shown that children between 2.5 and 3.5 
years of age who were frequently deferential to the experimenter’s misleading information had 
more difficulty on an inhibitory control task compared to children who were more skeptical 
(Jaswal et al., 2014). The researchers suggest that children with poorer inhibitory control may 
have more difficulty inhibiting a bias to trust others’ testimony. Future research should 
investigate these individual differences and others in infancy, as there may be additional 
mechanisms involved.  
Limitations 
One of the limitations in the design of the present study is that there was no toy in the 
container in the incongruent condition. Therefore, an alternative explanation of the results of the 
reliability exposure task may be that infants took longer to examine the contents of the container 
because they kept finding an empty container, not because the experimenter was incongruent in 
her emotional expression. As a result, future research should include a 2 (toy/no toy) X 3 (happy, 
neutral, sad) design that controls for this potential confound. For instance, it would be of 
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particular interest to compare infants who observe an experimenter express sadness while 
looking inside a container that holds a toy (incongruent) or that is empty (congruent). However, 
this “crybaby” condition is unlikely to generate an effect as previous research has failed to show 
such detection in infants of that age (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013). In addition, an 
experimenter expressing no emotion after finding a toy might not be considered an incongruent 
emoter as even older infants do not consider a neutral emoter who lost an object as incongruent 
(Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2015).  
Despite this limitation, the findings of the present study regarding the correlates of 
selective trust provide support for the hypothesis that the reliability exposure task does measure 
infants’ selective emotional referencing. In the present study, infants who had better social-
cognitive skills showed a stronger decrease of interest in searching inside the container when the 
emoter was emotionally misleading. This is a striking replication of the pattern of results 
reported by Crivello and colleagues (2017) who demonstrated that 18-month-old infants’ 
performance on the same theory of mind task assessing knowledge attribution was related to 
their selective trust in a very different task, a word learning task. Thus, if infants’ behavior in the 
reliability exposure task does not reflect a form of selective trust but is due to a confound of no 
“reward”, it remains to be explained why losing interest in looking inside the container due to an 
absence of reward would be specifically related to theory of mind abilities.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, this is the first study to examine the correlates of selective trust using an 
emotional reliability manipulation. The findings of the present study support the rich 
interpretation of selective trust in infancy, such that domain-specific abilities were related to 
infants’ ability to detect when someone is producing emotional cues that mismatch her 
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experience. Further evidence for this conclusion is that domain-general abilities were unrelated 
to infants’ selective trust. Future research should include different age groups within the same 
study in order to address developmental changes in the mechanisms driving infants’ selective 
trust. In addition, future attempts to extend these findings should use different theory of mind 
tasks to assess whether the present pattern of findings can be replicated. This would provide 









































Figure 4. Mean latency to examine content on the last trial as a function of condition and 
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Infants’ ability to infer others’ knowledge is linked to selective social learning 
Young children most often acquire knowledge from the testimony of those around them 
(Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018). However, children do not learn indiscriminately 
from others, but instead preferably learn from reliable sources of information (Koenig & 
Sabbagh, 2013; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). This crucial ability has been termed 
selective social learning, which can be defined as differentiating among reliable and unreliable 
individuals and choosing to learn from one source over the other (Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; 
Mills, 2013; Nurmsoo, Robinson, & Butterfull, 2010). There has been an abundance of research 
over the past decade demonstrating that children engage in selective social learning (see review 
by Mills, 2013). More recently, research on selective social learning has revealed that this 
precocious ability begins within the first year of life (Tummeltshammer, Wu, Sobel, & Kirkham, 
2014). In fact, infants appear to rely on a number of social characteristics in order to assess the 
reliability of a model (see review by Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). For example, 
infants take into account an individual’s age (e.g., Ryalls, Gul, & Ryalls, 2000; Zmyj, Daum, 
Prinz, Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2012), confidence (e.g., Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 2010; 
Brosseau-Liard & Poulin-Dubois, 2014), competency (e.g., Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & 
Daum, 2010), expertise (e.g., Stenberg, 2013), and emotional credibility (e.g., Chiarella & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2013, 2018; Chow, Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008; Walle & Campos, 2014) 
when choosing from whom to learn.  
One of the most researched cues that infants and children rely on is verbal accuracy. In a 
seminal study, Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004) demonstrated that 3- and 4-year-olds 
preferred to learn a new word from an informant who had previously labeled familiar objects 
accurately (e.g., a ball was labeled as a ball) compared to an informant who labeled them 
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inaccurately (e.g., a ball was labeled as a shoe). This finding has also been observed in infancy 
and toddlerhood (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Crivello, Phillips, & Poulin-Dubois, 2017; 
Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012; Luchkina, Sobel, & Morgan, 
2018). For instance, Brooker and Poulin-Dubois (2013a) found that infants as young as 18 
months were more likely to learn a new word from a reliable speaker rather than an unreliable 
speaker.  
Furthermore, in addition to documenting when selective learning develops and what cues 
are guiding this selectivity, researchers have started to examine the cognitive processes 
underlying this ability. More specifically, researchers have a thorough understanding of what and 
when infants selectively learn from others, yet how infants engage in selective social learning is a 
topic that is heavily debated in the literature. Specifically, there are discrepant views regarding 
the psychological mechanisms underlying infants’ selective social learning (Heyes, 2017; 
Poulin-Dubois, 2017). According to the rich interpretation, domain-specific, sophisticated 
cognitive abilities (e.g., theory of mind) guide infants’ selectivity. In contrast, the lean 
interpretation suggests that infants use domain-general, basic level abilities (e.g., associative 
learning) to selectively learn from others.  
The lean view of infants’ selective social learning has proposed that other species of 
animals also selectively learn from others, suggesting that simple species-general mechanisms 
might be involved (see review by Rendell et al., 2011). For instance, research has shown that 
small fish are sensitive to many cues when learning from their tutors, such as age (Dugatkin & 
Godin, 1993), size (Duffy, Pike, & Laland, 2009), boldness (Godin & Dugatkin, 1996), and 
familiarity (Swaney, Kendal, Capon, Brown, & Laland, 2001). As selective social learning has 
been found in cognitively unsophisticated animals, it has been argued that infants’ selectivity is 
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based on domain-general cognitive processes, such as associative learning. According to Heyes 
(2017), infants’ selective social learning is based on action-outcome relationships and learned 
predictiveness, which refers to a stimulus consistently being followed by the same outcome 
(Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010). An individual will pay more attention to a stimulus with a higher 
predictability (i.e., followed by the same outcome) than one with a lower predictability. This 
greater attention to the stimulus allows for quicker and superior learning. For example, infants’ 
selective word learning can be explained by the fact that when infants hear a label provided by 
the unreliable speaker, it does not match the object they were expecting based on past 
associations that they have made (Heyes, 2017). As the stimulus has low predictability, infants 
paid less attention to the unreliable speaker labeling the novel object and were therefore less 
likely to learn a new word from her compared to the reliable speaker where more attention was 
allocated. Despite this argument, there is a debate in the literature on the attentional theories of 
associative learning (Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013). For example, Mackintosh’s (1975) 
theory posits that more attention is given to cues with higher predictability of the outcome, 
whereas Pearce & Hall’s (1980) theory suggests that more attention is given to stimuli followed 
by surprising outcomes (consisted with research using a violation of expectation paradigm). 
Thus, Heyes’ arguments are in line with Mackintosh’s theory that infants pay more attention to 
informants when there is greater learned predictiveness.  
 In contrast to this lean interpretation, the rich view suggests that infants’ selective social 
learning is based on rational inference or theory of mind abilities. Researchers have suggested 
that children may infer that an individual has particular traits based on their past accuracy (e.g., 
the individual is more knowledgeable as they provided accurate information) (Hermes, Behne, & 
Rakoczy, 2015; Hermes, Behne, Bich, Thielert, & Rakoczy, 2017; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). This 
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sophisticated reasoning has been demonstrated in studies showing that children are sensitive 
towards domains of competence (Kushnir, Vredenburgh, & Schneider, 2013; Lutz & Keil 2002; 
VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). For instance, preschoolers are more likely to trust adults 
compared to children when it involves a subject that adults know more about (e.g., food), but are 
more likely to trust children compared to adults when it involves a subject that children know 
more about (e.g., toys) (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). According to Liu, Gelman, and 
Wellman (2007), the child needs to infer a trait based on the individual’s past behaviour, as well 
as predict the individual’s future behaviour based on this trait. In relation to selective social 
learning, children who demonstrate superior theory of mind abilities or trait inference should be 
better able to selectively learn from others as they can make inferences about the knowledge 
states of others (Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & Poulin-Dubois, 2015). Evidence of a link between 
children’s theory of mind abilities and their selective social learning has been demonstrated in a 
large body of research (e.g., Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni, 
Nini, Rheel, & Livelli, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, & Berridge, 
2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014; but see Pasquini et al., 2007).  
In addition to the lean and rich interpretation being examined separately, some 
researchers argue that both lower-order and higher-order cognitive abilities may be involved in 
selective social learning (Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Sobel and 
Kushnir (2013) developed a theoretical model which proposes that infants may be using more 
basic-level abilities, such as statistical learning, and then progress to using more sophisticated 
abilities when growing older but only once they have the conceptual background knowledge. 
Such sophisticated abilities include being able to infer the competence of the informant. In other 
words, simple associative learning rules may be predominant in early stages of development and 
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then knowledge inference becomes dominant later on. Similarly, Hermes, Behne, and Rakoczy 
(2018) have proposed a dual-process account of selective social learning. They argue that several 
factors can influence whether children will use trait inference or more basic cognitive abilities, 
such as their level of executive functioning skills and conceptual background knowledge, as well 
as the demands of the task. For example, children can infer the informant’s knowledge if they 
have the conceptual background knowledge and sufficient executive functioning skills to 
complete the task.   
Despite there being an increasing number of studies discussing the mechanisms of 
selective social learning, much of the research has focused on preschool-age children. However, 
recent studies that examined the mechanisms underlying infants’ selective social learning have 
found evidence favoring a rich interpretation. For example, Crivello and colleagues (2017) 
examined whether domain-specific (e.g., theory of mind) or domain-general (e.g., statistical 
learning) abilities were related to 18-month-olds’ selective word learning. The findings revealed 
that infants who passed a theory of mind task assessing knowledge inference were significantly 
less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker compared to infants who failed this 
particular task. In addition, no link was found between infants’ selective social learning and their 
statistical learning abilities (inference of preference from a violation of sampling) or false belief 
understanding. These results suggest that infants may have inferred that the unreliable speaker 
was not knowledgeable, and were therefore, less likely to learn from her. A follow-up study by 
Crivello and Poulin-Dubois (2019) examined whether theory of mind or associative learning 
abilities were related to 14-month-olds’ selective trust after exposure to emotional incongruency 
(e.g., expressing happiness after a negative event). Extending the findings of their first study, the 
researchers found that infants with superior knowledge inference abilities were better able to 
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detect the emotional incongruency of the experimenter. No relation was found between this 
ability and their associative learning skills, as measured by the ability to learn the association 
between pushing a button and a toy lighting up and playing music. Moreover, in a recent study, 
Luchkina and colleagues (2018) found that infants were more likely to generalize words from a 
speaker who correctly labeled an object than one who did so incorrectly. In a second experiment, 
infants observed two informants ask questions containing the correct or incorrect labels instead 
of statements (e.g., “is this a cup? as the informant holds a ball). If infants are using associative 
learning abilities, in other words are making associations among labels, objects, and speakers, 
then they should believe that the informant who used the correct label in their question is a more 
reliable source than the informant who used the incorrect label. On the other hand, if infants are 
inferring the epistemic state of the informants, then they should believe that both informants are 
equally reliable or unreliable. In fact, the researchers found that infants did not consider either 
informant reliable when they asked questions containing the correct or incorrect labels instead of 
statements. This finding suggests that 18-month-olds evaluated the speaker based on epistemic 
competence and not through associative learning processes (i.e., label-object-speaker 
associations). Taken together, these results provide preliminary support for a rich interpretation 
of infants’ selective social learning, such that individual differences in domain-specific abilities 
are related to individual differences in infants’ selective behaviour.  
 Although previous research supports a rich interpretation of infants’ selectivity, the 
psychological mechanisms underlying this ability remain to be determined. Thus, the main 
objective of the present study was to investigate whether theory of mind and/or associative 
learning predict selective social learning in 18-month-old infants. There are many differences 
between the current study and the study by Crivello et al. (2017). Firstly, a within-subjects 
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design was used, in which infants were exposed to an informant who labeled familiar objects 
accurately and another informant who labeled familiar objects inaccurately. A forced-choice 
word learning paradigm was then administered, whereby infants had the opportunity to learn a 
novel word from each of the informants who provided conflicting information. Based on 
previous research, it was expected that infants would choose to learn a new word from the 
reliable speaker rather than from the unreliable one. Although this type of design contrasts with 
previous research in infancy, it is a more conservative test to measure selective social learning, 
as infants are presented with two informants and they are then required to choose from whom to 
learn which can eliminate potential differences between conditions (Hermes, Rakoczy, & Behne, 
2018). Furthermore, a new set of theory of mind tasks were used in the present study to 
investigate potential mechanisms. Crivello and colleagues (2017) found that infants’ 
performance on a knowledge inference task (Moll & Tomasello, 2007) was linked to infants’ 
selective social learning, but not to their performance on a false belief task (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). However, the null results with false belief may have been due to 
infants’ poor performance on the original false belief task. Therefore, a different false belief task 
was administered in the present study to further examine its possible relation with selective 
social learning. In particular, we sought to measure false belief abilities with a different task in 
an effort to confirm that no link is present. Moreover, a different task assessing infants’ 
knowledge inference was used in order to investigate whether previous findings could be 
extended and replicated. This would provide additional evidence for the rich interpretation of 
infants’ selective social learning. Lastly, instead of using a statistical learning task as in Crivello 
et al. (2017), an associative learning task was administered. Investigating associative learning as 
a mechanism was essential, as it is the lowest level of domain-general functioning observed in 
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several species (e.g., rats, pigeons). Heyes (2012) has argued that the core mechanism underlying 
infants’ social learning is the same associative learning mechanism responsible for asocial 
learning. Thus, in order to test Heyes’ arguments, a nonsocial associative learning task was 
needed in the current study. Furthermore, no study has yet assessed the link between infants’ 
associative learning abilities and their selective word learning. In line with Crivello and 
colleagues’ (2017) study, it was hypothesized that infants with superior theory of mind abilities 
would be less likely to learn a new word from the unreliable informant. No relation between 
infants’ word learning and associative learning abilities was expected.   
Method 
Participants 
A total of 79 infants were tested for the present study. Out of these participants, 23 were 
excluded for various reasons, such as fussiness (n = 9), throwing toys (n = 5), consistently 
touching both objects simultaneously on test trials (n = 2), lack of responses on all test trials (n = 
1), lack of attention (n = 1), experimenter error (n = 1), technical issues (n = 1), and not having 
enough words to participate in the word learning task (n = 3). After these exclusions, 56 infants 
(30 males and 26 females) composed the final sample (Mage = 18.30 months, SD = .87; range = 
17 – 20.5). Reflecting the demographics of the population of Montréal, Québec, infants’ primary 
language was either English or French. All infants were tested in their mother tongue, which was 
determined by asking the primary caregiver what language the child was most exposed to. These 
infants were recruited from birth lists provided by the Agence de la Santé et des Services 
Sociaux de Montréal after approval by the Commission d’Accès à L’Information du Québec. 
Infants had no auditory or visual impairments. 
Measures and Procedure 
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MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventories: Short Form (MCDI-
II). The American-English or the French-Canadian adaptation of the MCDI-II was used to assess 
productive vocabulary (Fenson et al., 2000; Trudeau, Frank, & Poulin-Dubois, 1999). This 
vocabulary checklist, typically used with children between 16-30 months, consisted of 100 items 
(i.e., nouns, verbs and adjectives) and was completed by the child’s primary caregiver.  
Word comprehension checklist. Parents were asked to complete a 20-item checklist in 
order to indicate which words their infants understood (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). The 
checklist consisted of words that were typically understood by 18-month-olds. Responses from 
the checklist were used to select familiar items for the reliability exposure phase of the selective 
social learning task.  
Selective social learning. There were two phases in the task measuring selective social 
learning, where infants were presented with labels for both familiar and novel objects (Brooker 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). Each phase was repeated twice in order to reinforce which 
experimenter was reliable and which was unreliable. Therefore, two trials of the reliability 
exposure phase were followed by three test trials in the word learning phase. This procedure was 
repeated twice for a total of four reliability exposure trials and six test trials.  
Reliability exposure phase. A total of four small plastic objects were labeled both 
correctly (by the reliable informant) and incorrectly (by the unreliable informant). The familiar 
items were chosen from a set of words known to be understood by infants of that age according 
to the norms of the French and English versions of the MCDI (e.g., ball, banana, bird, dog, 
spoon, chair, and shoe). The specific words that were tested depend on reports of the 20-item 
word comprehension checklist, as completed by the parents. To be included in the task, children 
were required to know three out of the four chosen items (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). 
 88 
Three experimenters administered this task: one who labeled familiar objects accurately 
(Experimenter 1 – E1), one who labeled familiar objects inaccurately (Experimenter 2 – E2), and 
a third “neutral” experimenter who did not label the toys during that phase (Experimenter 3 – 
E3). In phase 1, E3 introduced the toy and allowed the child 15 s to explore it. In phase 2, E3 
turned her back to the child, while E1 turned around to face the child, manipulated the object and 
labeled it correctly three times (reliable speaker). At this point, E1 turned her back to the child, 
while E2 turned to face the child, manipulated the object, and labeled it incorrectly three times 
(unreliable speaker). The objects were always given the same incorrect labels. For example, 
when labeling a familiar object inaccurately, infants watched as the unreliable experimenter 
pointed to a shoe and said, “Look it’s a bottle. See, a bottle. Wow, it’s a bottle”. If the parents 
had previously indicated that the child understood the word shoe, the infant should be able to 
recognize that it had been mislabeled (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a). In phase 3, which is 
after both experimenters finished labeling the objects, E3 allowed the child to play with the 
object for an additional 15 s. The order in which the reliable and unreliable speakers labeled the 
objects, as well as which experimenter was reliable or unreliable, was counterbalanced among 
participants. 
Word learning phase. This task evaluated infants’ willingness to learn from the two 
experimenters who labeled the toys, given their past record of accuracy during the reliability 
exposure phase (adapted from Baldwin, 1993). It included three phases: a warm-up phase, a 
training phase, and a test phase. In the warm up phase, E3 presented the infant with two familiar 
objects (which had not previously been seen in the reliability exposure phase) and requested one 
of them. In the training phase, E3 demonstrated the function of two novel objects and, 
subsequently, gave both objects to the infant to explore for 15 s. E3 then retrieved one of the 
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objects and turned around. Until this point in the word learning phase, both E1 and E2 were 
seated on opposite sides of E3, with their backs towards the infant. Once the object was 
retrieved, E1 turned around to face the child and labeled the toy that she retrieved four times by 
repeatedly saying, “It’s a Dax”. As E1 turned her back to the child, E2 then turned to face the 
child and provided a different label to the novel object by repeating four times, “It’s a Fep”. E3 
then allowed the infant to explore both novel objects for 30 s. Only E3 administered the test 
phase, while both E1 and E2 turned their backs to the infant. In this phase, E3 presented both 
novel objects on a tray and requested one of the two objects from the infant by saying, “Where is 
the Dax/Fep? Give me the Dax/Fep”. If both toys were given simultaneously, the trial was 
repeated. A total of 6 test trials were administered in separate blocks: 3 asking for the label 
provided by the reliable informant in one block (e.g., Dax) and 3 asking for the label provided by 
the unreliable informant in another block (e.g., Fep). The object that the infant first touched was 
coded. Thus, this task yielded two separate scores – that is, a proportion of correct touches to the 
target object labeled by the reliable speaker out of trials completed  (reliable block) and a 
proportion of correct touches to the target object labeled by the unreliable speaker out of trials 
completed (unreliable block). A Pearson correlation was computed to assess inter-rater reliability 
by two independent coders and revealed near-perfect agreement among raters, r(24) = .97, p < 
.01. The novel object chosen, the location of the objects on the tray (left or right), and the order 
of the block of reliable and unreliable test trials, were counterbalanced across participants.  
Theory of Mind battery. Two theory of mind tasks were administered to evaluate 
infants’ understanding of others’ false belief and knowledge inference. 
False belief task. An interactive task was administered to assess infants’ concept of false 
belief (Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010). During a warm up phase, an experimenter was 
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seated on the floor with the infant and two familiar objects (i.e., a duck and a teddy bear). The 
infants were given 10 s to explore the objects. The experimenter then placed one object in each 
of two boxes and asked the child to find one of the objects by saying, “Can you find the duck?”. 
Once the first object was found, the experimenter then asked the child, “Can you find the teddy 
bear?”. Once the child located the two objects subsequently from two different boxes, the test 
trial began (Southgate et al., 2010). In the test trial, the experimenter placed two novel objects 
(e.g., a red lemon squeezer and a blue watering can spout) in front of the child. The child had 10 
s to play with the objects. The experimenter then placed one object in each box, closed the lids of 
the boxes, and excused herself from the room. While the experimenter was outside, a second 
experimenter entered the room. This second experimenter crept forward in a deceptive manner 
while making a “sh” vocalization. The second experimenter switched the location of the objects 
and then left the room. The first experimenter then returned to the room, pointed at one of the 
boxes, and said, “Do you remember what I put in here? There’s a sefo in here. There’s a sefo in 
this box. Shall we play with the sefo?”. The experimenter then opened the lids of both of the 
boxes, so that only the child was able to see inside the boxes, and asked, “Can you get the sefo?”. 
The object that the infant either pointed towards or approached was coded (Southgate et al., 
2010). In order to pass the task, infants had to point to or approach the box that contained the 
target object (i.e., the box that the experimenter did not refer to when asking the test question). A 
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of ĸ = 1.00 was obtained, which is indicative of perfect agreement 
between two independent raters. Fourteen participants were excluded from the false belief task 
due to fussiness (n = 5), distraction (n = 4), parental interference (n = 2), and no response (n = 3) 
for a final sample of 42 infants. 
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Knowledge inference task. A second theory of mind task was used to assess infants’ 
understanding that others may have knowledge that differs from their own (Liszkowski, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). The infant was seated on the floor in front of a table with two 
short ramps and two long ramps attached to it. In the first phase, the demonstration phase, the 
experimenter placed an object pair (such as a pair of child safety scissors and a small glue stick) 
on a foam block. The experimenter showed each object to the infant and modeled the function of 
each object by using it on a substrate (e.g., using the scissors to cut a piece of paper). In the 
displacement phase, the experimenter lifted one of the objects (object A) and placed it near the 
edge of one of the ramps. She then turned her back to object A, while attending to the second 
object (object B), as she placed it near the edge of the ramp on the opposite side of the table. The 
experimenter then let object B fall out of her hand and watched as it slid down the ramp. While 
attending to object B, the experimenter secretly pulled a hidden trigger that allowed object A to 
fall down the ramp on the other side of the table. In the search phase, the experimenter oriented 
back to the center of the table, looked at the foam block and then back at the participant. The 
experimenter expressed surprise, raised her hands with her palms up and said, “Hmm? Where did 
it go? Where is it?”. During this time, the infant had 30 s to point to the object that the 
experimenter did not attend to while it was falling down the ramp (object A). If the child pointed 
towards the non-target object (object B), the experimenter said, “Yes there”, and continued to 
engage in a searching behaviour until the child identified the target object (object A). At the end 
of this phase, once the child located the target object, the experimenter used that object on a third 
substrate and expressed satisfaction. A total of four test trials were administered, each using 
different object pairs and substrates. The order of the object presented, the target object within 
each pair, and the object that fell first were counterbalanced among all participants. During the 
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search phase, the object that the infant pointed at or approached was coded for each trial. The 
proportion of trials out of total trials included in which infants first pointed or approached the 
target or distractor was calculated. The proportion scores were also converted to a pass/score. A 
pass was coded if the infant was more likely to approach the target object, whereas a fail was 
coded if the infant was more likely to approach the distractor or approach the target and 
distractor equally. A Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of ĸ = .91 was obtained, which is indicative of 
excellent agreement between two independent raters. Six participants were excluded from the 
knowledge task due to fussiness (n = 4), parental interference (n = 1), and technical error (n = 1) 
for a final sample of 50 infants. 
Associative learning. This task was used to evaluate infants’ ability to learn cause-effect 
relationships (adapted from Bhat, Galloway, & Landa, 2010). The infants were seated at a table, 
in an infant chair, with a large push button in front of them. The button was connected to a 
colorful stacking toy located 56 cm from the infant’s reach. Each time the infant pushed the 
button throughout the task, it activated a light attached to the side of the chair, just outside of the 
infant’s visual field. The purpose of this light was to help coders record the number of times the 
infant pressed the button. The task involved three distinct phases: baseline, acquisition, and 
extinction. During the baseline phase, the child then had 30 s to press the button, during which 
the toy was not activated. During the acquisition phase, lasting 60 s, the child was free to push 
the button as many times as he/she wished and each time the button was pressed, the toy lit up 
and produced music. The experimenter expressed “Look at that” at the beginning of the baseline 
and acquisition phase. In the final extinction phase, the toy was turned off and, therefore, did not 
illuminate and produce music when the child pressed the button. The child had 30 s to press the 
button. The duration of each phase was shorter than in previous research (Crivello & Poulin-
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Dubois, 2019) in order to reduce the number of exclusions due to a fatigue effect. The number of 
pushes at each phase was coded using the software Mangold Interact 14 (Mangold, 2017). A 
baseline ratio was calculated by dividing the total number of times infants pushed the button in 
the extinction phases by the total number of times infants pushed the button in the baseline 
phase. In addition, the frequency of button pushes in the acquisition phase was divided into four 
intervals of 15 s. This frequency was then divided by 15 s to determine if infants’ rate of button 
pushing increased across the acquisition phase, which would demonstrate associative learning. A 
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was computed as ĸ = .86, reflecting excellent inter-rater reliability. 
Nine participants were excluded from the associative learning task due to fussiness (n = 4), 
distraction (n = 3), experimenter error (n = 1), and technical issues (n = 1) for a final sample of 
47 infants. 
Design 
Testing sessions began with a warm-up phase, during which infants familiarized 
themselves with their environment and the experimenters. During this time, the caregiver 
completed the MCDI-II and the word comprehension checklist. The testing session always began 
with the selective social learning task, as this task was the basis of the study and it was necessary 
to avoid fatigue effects. The two theory of mind tasks (false belief and knowledge inference) and 
the associative learning task were administered next. The order of administration of these tasks 
was counterbalanced among participants. In total, there were three experimenters. The 
experimenters who displayed accuracy or inaccuracy during the selective learning task did not 
carry out the other tasks as primary experimenters to avoid carry-over effects from the word 
learning manipulation. Therefore, the neutral experimenter (E3) in the selective social learning 
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task carried out the other tasks. As a compensation for participation, caregivers received $20, and 
infants received a certificate of merit, as well as a small gift.  
Results 
Word learning task  
 A series of analyses were conducted to examine if infants’ performance on the word 
learning task was influenced by their verbal skills. Firstly, infants’ expressive vocabulary 
measured through the MCDI (M = 15.95, SD = 12.72) was not related to infants’ proportion of 
correct responses in the reliable block (i.e., when the reliable label was used), r(53) = .10, p = 
.46, or unreliable block (i.e., when the unreliable label was used), r(53) = .09, p = .50, on the 
word learning task. One participant was excluded from theses analyses due to missing data. 
There was also no link between the number of familiar words on the vocabulary checklist (M = 
3.95, SD = .23) and infants’ proportion of correct responses in the reliable, r(54) = .08, p = .58, 
or unreliable block, r(54) = .04, p = .75.  
Additional analyses were conducted to ensure that infants’ performance on the word 
learning task was not confounded by their level of attention. Thus, in order to ensure that infants 
were equally attentive to the reliable and unreliable informants labeling the novel object, the 
number of trials (out of eight) that infants attended to the speaker and disengaged from their own 
toy was coded. Infants were equally attentive to the reliable (M = 7.54, SD = 1.14) and unreliable 
informant (M = 7.48, SD = .91) when they were labeling the novel object, t(55) = .44, p = .66, d 
= .06. Furthermore, infants’ proportion of looking time at the informants when labeling (out of 
total looking time of 8 s) was examined. There was no significant difference in the proportion of 
looking time at the reliable (M = 97.01, SD = 6.25) and unreliable informant (M = 97.00, SD = 
5.90) when labeling the familiar objects, t(55) = .01, p = 1.00, d = .00. Infants also spent an equal 
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amount of time looking at the reliable (M = 91.22, SD = 16.75) and unreliable informant (M = 
90.91, SD = 10.67) when labeling the novel object, t(55) = .14, p = .89, d = .02.  
 In addition, two sets of ANOVAs were conducted to ensure that the proportion of correct 
responses on the word learning task was not influenced by a preference for an experimenter. 
Specifically, the dependent variable was the proportion of correct responses on the word learning 
task and the independent variable was the experimenter who labelled the objects either reliably 
or unreliably. Results revealed that there was no experimenter preference in the reliable speaker 
trials, F(2, 53) = .89, p = .42, or in the block of  unreliable speaker trials, F(3, 52) = 1.43, p = .25. 
Moreover, as the order in which the speaker labeled the novel object was counterbalanced, it was 
imperative to ensure that there was no recency effect. Thus, infants’ performance on the word 
learning task was contrasted between infants who heard the novel object being labeled last by the 
reliable and unreliable speaker. Infants’ proportion of correct responses on the word learning task 
in the reliable block was not influenced by whether the reliable (M = .46, SD = .30) or the 
unreliable (M = .39, SD = .33) speaker labeled the novel object last, t(54) = .89, p = .38, d = .23. 
Similarly, whether or not infants heard the reliable (M = .31, SD = .26) or unreliable (M = .35, 
SD = .30) speaker label the novel object last did not influence the proportion of correct responses 
in the unreliable block, t(54) = -.46, p = .65, d = -.15. These results suggest that no recency effect 
was present on the word learning task.  
 The proportion of correct first touches on the test trials was calculated and compared to 
chance (.50). Infants’ performance on the word learning task was significantly below chance 
when the unreliable (M = .33, SD = .28; t(55) = -4.68, p <.001, d = -.61) label was tested. 
However, infants’ performance was not significantly different than chance when the reliable 
label was tested (M = .43, SD = .32; t(55) = -1.73, p = .09, d = -.23). In order to investigate 
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whether infants were more likely to learn a novel word from the reliable speaker, a paired 
samples t-test was conducted. Results indicated that infants’ proportion of correct first touches 
was significantly greater in the reliable block than in the unreliable block, t(55) = 2.05, p = .045, 
d = .34. Although the task was challenging and children do not appear to have been able to learn 
the novel word in the reliable condition, these results suggest that infants preferred to learn a new 
word from the reliable informant compared to the unreliable one.  
False belief task  
When examining the success rate, it was found that 55% of 42 infants passed the false 
belief task. A binomial test indicated that infants’ performance on this task was not significantly 
different from chance (.50; p = .36). It is important to note that infants’ performance on the false 
belief task did not differ as a function of the administration order, χ2(1) = .20, p = .90. In order to 
investigate whether infants’ false belief abilities would impact their success on the word learning 
task, a 2 (reliable block/unreliable block) X 2 (pass/fail) ANOVA was computed. No significant 
interaction was found, F(1, 40) = .14, p = .71. Planned comparisons revealed that infants who 
passed the false belief task (n = 23, M = .31, SD = .27) had a similar proportion of correct 
responses in the unreliable block on the word learning task compared to infants who failed the 
false belief task (n = 19, M = .35, SD = .32), t(40) = .44, p = .66, d = -.14 (see Figure 5). 
Similarly, there was no significant difference in the reliable block between infants who passed (n 
= 23, M = .41, SD = .28) and failed (n = 19, M = .49, SD = .39) the false belief task, t(40) = .82, p 
= .42, d = -.25.  
In addition to examining the proportion of correct responses in the reliable and unreliable 
block, infants’ difference score on the word learning task was examined as a function of their 
performance on the false belief task. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the 
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proportion of correct responses in the reliable block by the proportion of correct responses in the 
unreliable block. An independent samples t-test was computed with infants’ score on the false 
belief task as the independent variable and the difference score on the word learning task as the 
dependent variable (range:  -1 to 1). Results revealed no significant difference in the word 
learning difference score between infants who passed (n = 23 M = .09; SD = .38) and failed (n = 
19; M = .14; SD = .42) the false belief task, t(40) = .38, p = .71, d = -.13.  
Knowledge task 
There was no significant difference between the proportion of trials in which infants first 
pointed/approached the target object (i.e., the object that the experimenter had not seen fall; M = 
.45, SD = .34) compared to the distractor (M = .35, SD = .35), t(49) = 1.13, p = .26, d = .29. 
However, there was a significant difference when examining the frequency of infants who 
approached more often the target than the distractor. Specifically, 42% of infants approached the 
target more often compared to 24% who more often approached the distractor, p = .03. The other 
34% of infants (17 infants) approached the target and distractor equally (11/17) or approached 
neither (6/17). As Liskowski and colleagues (2008) found that the temporal sequence of the 
target object falling was a confound, a 2 (target, distractor) X 2 (first to fall, second to fall) 
ANOVA was conducted to examine whether the temporal sequence influenced which object 
infants approached. The results revealed no significant interaction, F(1, 91) = .05, p = .82, ηp2 = 
.00, suggesting that, unlike 12-month-olds, 18-month-old infants’ performance on the knowledge 
task was not influenced by whether the target object fell first or second. Therefore, in contrast to 
the original study, the temporal sequence of the target object falling was not a confound. 
Moreover, infants’ performance on the knowledge task was not influenced by the order of 
administration, χ2(1) = 3.51, p = .17. 
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In order to examine whether infants’ superior knowledge inference abilities would be 
related to better performance on the word learning task, a 2 (reliable block/unreliable block) X 2 
(pass/fail) ANOVA was computed. Infants who approached neither the target nor distractor 
(6/50) were excluded from this analysis. The results from this ANOVA revealed no significant 
interaction, F(1, 42) = 2.37, p = .13, ηp2 = .05. However, planned comparisons indicated that 
infants who passed the knowledge task (i.e., approached the target object more; n = 21, M = .22, 
SD = .22) had a significantly lower proportion of correct responses in the unreliable block 
compared to infants who failed the knowledge task (i.e., approached the distractor more or 
approached the target and distractor equally; n = 23, M = .41, SD = .28), t(42) = 2.50, p = .02, d 
= -.77 (see Figure 5). In contrast, no difference emerged in word learning from the reliable 
speaker between infants who passed (n = 21, M = .43, SD = .30) and failed (n = 23, M = .45, SD 
= .33) the knowledge task, t(42) = .22, p = .83, d = -.06. In addition to the ANOVA, an 
independent samples t-test with the difference score on the word learning task as the dependent 
variable revealed no significant difference between infants who passed (n = 21, M = .21, SD = 
.30) and failed (n = 23, M = .04, SD = .42) the knowledge task, t(42) = -1.54, p = .13, d = .47.  
Associative learning task  
 Using a Fisher’s Exact Test, the order of administration was found to have no impact on 
infants’ score on the associative learning task (p = .14). Two outliers (one in each of the baseline 
and extinction phase) were converted to the next most extreme score within three standard 
deviations from the mean (Kline, 2009). Contrary to what was expected, the number of times 
infants pushed the button in the baseline phase (M = 9.78, SD = 6.72) was higher than in the 
extinction phase (M = 7.19, SD = 5.94), t(46) = 2.21, p = .03, d = .41. As a result, a different 
method was used to investigate infants’ associative learning, specifically by examining whether 
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infants’ rate of pushing the button increased across the acquisition phase. A paired-samples t-test 
was used to compare the rate of pushing in the first interval and the fourth interval. Results 
revealed that infants’ rate of pushing significantly increased from the first interval (M = .20, SD 
= .16) to the fourth interval (M = .29, SD = .28), t(46) = -2.01, p = .05, d = -.39. These results 
indicate that infants engaged in associative learning, as they learnt that pushing the button causes 
the toy to light up and play music. Moreover, the increase in rate of pushing was calculated by 
subtracting the rate of pushing in the first interval from the rate of pushing in the fourth interval. 
A Pearson correlation demonstrated no statistically significant relation between the difference 
score across intervals and the proportion of correct responses in the unreliable block, r(45) = .21, 
p = .17, and reliable block, r(45) = -.07, p = .63. Also, no link was found with the difference 
score on the word learning task, r(45) = -.21, p = .15.  
Discussion 
 
 The goals of the present study were two-fold: 1) to investigate whether infants prefer to 
learn a new word from a reliable speaker using a within-subjects design, and 2) to examine 
whether domain-specific abilities (i.e., theory of mind) or domain-general abilities (i.e., 
associative learning) relate to infants’ selective word learning. The findings from the word 
learning task replicated previous evidence of selective social learning in infancy using a more 
conservative approach – that is, a within-subjects design where two informants offered 
conflicting labels for the same object. Thus, infants preferred to learn a new word from a reliable 
speaker over an unreliable speaker. Furthermore, the results of the present study revealed that 
infants with superior knowledge inference abilities were more adept at identifying the unreliable 
informant and were less likely to learn from her in a word learning context, which support a rich 
interpretation of selective social learning in infancy.  
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 The results of the selective social learning task extend past research demonstrating that 
infants prefer to learn new words from informants who had previously labeled familiar objects 
accurately compared to inaccurate speakers (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Crivello et al., 
2017; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012; Luchkina et al., 2018). 
However, unlike studies with preschoolers, almost all studies on infants’ selective social learning 
have tested this ability using a between-subjects design in order to minimize tasks demands (i.e., 
requires fewer executive functioning skills). Despite a between-subjects design being the most 
common design to measure infants’ selective social learning, a within-subjects design was 
considered a more conservative approach, as infants are expected to choose one of two 
informants to learn from. To date, only one study has examined infants’ selective word learning 
using a within-subjects design (Schmid et al., 2018). The researchers found that 2-year-olds did 
not prefer to learn from the reliable speaker compared to the unreliable speaker. The results of 
the present study are in contrast to those of Schmid and colleagues (2018), as we found that 
infants were significantly more likely to learn a new word from the reliable speaker. The 
contrasting results may be due to the different methodology used to assess infants’ selective 
word learning. For instance, Schmid and colleagues (2018) tested infants’ word learning using an 
endorsement and a disambiguation task using an eye-tracker paradigm, as well as one single test 
trial of an interactive task. In contrast, in the present design, infants’ word learning was assessed 
using six test trials of an interactive task, which were divided into two blocks to test their 
preference to learn from the reliable and unreliable speaker separately. The two blocks allowed 
minimization of task demands, as infants were re-exposed to the reliability of the speakers in the 
second block before being tested on a new word. Although the two blocks allowed infants to 
experience less task demands, the within-subjects word learning task was still challenging for 18-
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month-olds, as infants’ proportion of correct responses in the reliable block was not significantly 
different from chance. In other words, despite the modifications to the within-subject design, it 
could be that task demands were still too high (i.e., a lot of information to process, remembering 
what each experimenter said, etc.). According to Hermes, Rakoczy, and Behne (2018), a within-
subject task with two informants involves higher task demands and requires more working 
memory and inhibitory control abilities compared to a between-subjects task with only one 
informant. Despite the fact that a within-subjects design may be more challenging for infants due 
to increased task demands, there is research demonstrating that the number of informants 
presented to the child influences their selective trust (Vanderbilt, Heyman, & Liu, 2014). 
Specifically, Vanderbilt and colleagues (2014) found that preschoolers were more likely to trust 
an inaccurate informant when presented alone than when presented alongside an accurate 
informant, revealing that children display more selectivity when exposed to two informants who 
offer conflicting information.   
 In addition to examining infants’ selective social learning using a conservative approach, 
it was of main interest to examine the mechanisms underlying infants’ selectivity in order to shed 
some light on the controversial debate in the literature. According to the rich view of infants’ 
selective social learning, infants use domain-specific abilities, such as precursors of theory of 
mind, to selectively learn from others (Poulin-Dubois, 2017). On the other hand, the lean view 
suggests that infants rely on domain-general abilities, such as associative learning (Heyes, 2017). 
Since different species of animals that do not possess sophisticated cognitive abilities also 
engage in selective behaviour (Rendell et al., 2011), it was proposed that infants rely on very 
basic cognitive processes to guide their selectivity.  
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 The results of the present study provide no evidence for a lean interpretation of infants’ 
selective social learning. Specifically, infants’ performance on the word learning task was not 
influenced by their associative learning skills. Consistent with previous research showing that 
infants engage in associative learning (Bhat et al., 2010; Rovee-Collier et al., 2001), 18-month-
olds in the present study were able to learn the association between pushing the button and the 
toy activating, as demonstrated by an increase in their rate of pushing across the acquisition 
phase. However, in the present study, a large button was used to measure infants’ associative 
learning in contrast to other studies where the infant’s body part (e.g., wrist, ankle) was tied with 
a string and attached to the apparatus. This change in methodology may be the reason why 
infants’ baseline ratio was problematic in the present study and could not be used as a measure of 
associative learning. Specifically, the attractive button may have been too attractive in itself and 
a distractor that enabled infants to display a higher than expected frequency of button pushes in 
the baseline phase. In other words, pushing the button in the baseline phase was a reward for the 
infants, whereas previous research examining infants’ associative learning did not include a 
baseline phase involving a reward. Thus, the number of pushes in the baseline phase may have 
been significantly greater than the number of pushes in the extinction phase due to the 
unexpected attractiveness of the button. Despite this limitation, the lack of relation between 
infants’ selective word learning and their associative learning abilities suggests that infants may 
not be simply using past object-label associations when deciding who is the best source of 
information. The findings also replicate previous studies that ruled out domain-general abilities 
as a mechanism of infants’ selective social learning (Crivello et al., 2017; Crivello & Poulin-
Dubois, 2019; Luchkina et al., 2018). 
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 As predicted, the findings of the present study demonstrated that domain-specific 
abilities, particularly knowledge inference, were related to infants’ selective social learning. 
Specifically, infants who passed a knowledge inference task were less likely to learn a new word 
from an unreliable speaker compared to infants who failed. No such link was observed with 
infants’ performance in the reliable block on the word learning task. These results suggest that 
infants who have superior knowledge inference abilities may have been better at inferring that 
the unreliable speaker was not knowledgeable or ignorant, and were therefore, less likely to learn 
from her. This extends previous findings in the literature that have shown that selective social 
learning in preschool and school-age children is related to their theory of mind abilities 
(Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni et al., 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 
2008; Lucas et al., 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). More importantly, the present results are 
consistent with recent findings demonstrating that the precursors of theory of mind are linked to 
infants’ selective social learning (Crivello et al., 2017; Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2019; 
Luchkina et al., 2018). For instance, a recent study demonstrated that 18-month-olds make 
judgments about the epistemic knowledge of the speakers during a word learning task, and do 
not base their learning on simple associative learning mechanisms (Luchkina et al., 2018). In 
addition, the present results replicate and extend the findings from two recent studies 
demonstrating that infants with superior knowledge inference abilities are more selective in their 
behaviour (Crivello et al., 2017; Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2019). Specifically, Crivello and 
colleagues (2017) demonstrated that 18-month-olds who passed a knowledge inference task were 
less likely to learn a new word from an unreliable speaker, but that this was not the case with a 
reliable speaker. In a follow-up study, Crivello and Poulin-Dubois (2019) recently found that 14-
month-olds who passed the same knowledge inference task as in their previous study were better 
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able to detect an experimenter who expressed an incongruent emotional reaction to a situation, 
but not an experimenter who expressed congruent emotions. In the present study, the same 
conclusion was drawn using a different knowledge inference task, which provides further 
support for the rich interpretation of infants’ selective social learning. Furthermore, the effect 
was specific to the unreliable block, replicating the same pattern of findings as previous research. 
Importantly, all three studies ruled out domain-general mechanisms, as no relation was found 
between infants’ selective social learning and a range of learning tasks, measuring associative 
learning as well as statistical learning abilities.  
 Although infants’ knowledge inference abilities were related to their selective social 
learning, infants’ false belief abilities were not. Infants who passed or failed the false belief task 
performed similarly on the word learning task. This is also consistent with findings from Crivello 
and colleagues (2017) who found that only performance on the knowledge inference task, and 
not the false belief task, influenced infants’ tendency to learn a new word from the unreliable 
speaker. Thus, there is evidence from two different false belief tasks that not all theory of mind 
abilities may be guiding infants’ selective social learning. Specifically, the ability to attribute 
others’ knowledge states may be a more important predictor than the ability to understand that 
others may have different beliefs. It is important to note the pass rate of the false belief task in 
the current study (55%) did not replicate infants’ performance on this task in the original study 
(75%; Southgate et al., 2010). However, other studies have also not replicated this particular 
false belief task, in which the pass rate was not significantly different from chance (Dörrenberg, 
Rakoczy, & Liszkowski, 2018; Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & Steinbeis, 2016; Király, 
Oláh, Kovács, & Csibra, 2016). In fact, there is a controversial debate regarding the depth of 
infants’ theory of mind, particularly false belief abilities, as well as a number of failed attempts 
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to replicate false belief tasks in infancy, measured with spontaneous or elicited responses. 
Several recent studies have failed to replicate standard implicit false belief tasks using 
anticipatory looking paradigms (e.g., Burnside, Ruel, Azar, & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Dörrenberg 
et al., 2018; Grosse Weismann, Friederici, Disla, Steinbeis, & Singer, 2018; Kulke, Reib, Krist, 
& Rakoczy, 2018; Schuwerk, Priewasser, Sodian, & Perner, 2018), violation-of-expectation 
paradigms (e.g., Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Powell, Hobbs, Bardis, Carey, & Saxe, 2018; Yott & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2016), and interactive tasks (e.g., Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). These non-
replications cast doubt on the reliability and robustness of false beliefs abilities in infancy. In 
addition to non-replications, some researchers argue that a violation of behavioural rules 
(Ruffman, 2014; Ruffman & Perner, 2005) or low-level novelty (Heyes, 2014) may explain 
infants’ performance on implicit false belief tasks. Regardless of the depth of the interpretation 
of infants’ behavior in false belief tasks, it appears not to be relevant to infants’ selective social 
learning. Thus, the lack of association between infants’ performance on the false belief task and 
their performance on the word learning task may be due to several reasons – i) infants’ false 
belief skills are not a good predictor of their ability to selectively learn from others, ii) 
researchers have yet to establish a way to adequately measure this implicit ability in infancy, or 
iii) the depth of infants’ false belief abilities is rather shallow.  
It is important to note that although the current study focuses on theory of mind and 
associative learning as potential mechanisms, several studies have found that other mechanisms 
might be at play. For example, executive functioning may be involved, as research has 
demonstrated that young children with poor inhibitory control were less skeptical of an 
informant’s misleading information, suggesting that inhibiting their bias to trust testimony was 
more challenging (Jaswal et al., 2014). Other studies have focused on whether parenting style 
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and attachment predict children’s selective social learning. For example, children who have 
parents with high authoritarianism are less willing to trust an unreliable informant in comparison 
to children who have parents with lower authoritarianism (Reifen Tagar, Federico, Lyons, 
Ludeke, & Koenig, 2014). Moreover, Corriveau and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that 
children who had a secure attachment accepted claims made by a stranger or their mother 
depending on the perceptual information that was available. In contrast, children with an 
insecure attachment either relied on their mother’s claims too often if they were resistant or did 
not rely on their mother’s claims enough if they were avoidant. Likewise, toddlers are less 
willing to learn a new word from a caregiver who demonstrated less sensitivity and 
responsiveness (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013b). Finally, temperament (i.e., 
affect/extraversion) has been shown to predict young children’s selective social learning 
(Canfield, Saudino, & Ganea, 2015).  
 In summary, the ability to learn from reliable sources of information is a critical skill for 
infants to develop. This is the first study to show that infants as young as 18-months choose to 
learn a new word from the reliable informant when two informants are presented to them who 
provide conflicting information. Furthermore, this research provides important implications for 
understanding how infants selectively learn from others. Specifically, the findings of the present 
study add to a growing body of literature demonstrating that infants’ ability to infer others’ 
knowledge state is related to their selective social learning. In other words, infants’ ability to 
infer ignorance may be guiding their unwillingness to learn from unreliable informants. This 
study directly contributes to the controversial debate providing evidence that selective social 
learning is a mature and precocious ability in infancy. Future research should examine other 
domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms, such as metacognition and causal learning, in 
 107 
order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of infants’ selective social 





Figure 5. Proportion of correct responses in the unreliable block on the word learning task as a 






























 Throughout their development, children often engage in social learning as there are many 
advantages of learning from others’ expertise and knowledge (Einav & Robinson, 2014; 
Stephens, Suarez, & Koenig, 2015). However, although people typically offer information that is 
true, in some cases, they can provide misleading and/or inaccurate information (Einav & 
Robinson, 2014; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Therefore, in order to take full 
advantage of social learning, children need to be able to evaluate the reliability or accuracy of 
informants and select reliable sources of information – that is, engage in selective social learning 
(Einav & Robinson, 2014; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013). Selective social learning has been a 
popular topic of study in the past decade in developmental science. Several studies demonstrate 
that both children and infants prefer to learn from reliable sources of information (see reviews by 
Harris et al., 2018; Mills, 2013 and Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Although most of 
the research has focused on “who” infants selectively learn from and “when” this ability begins, 
“how” infants engage in such selectivity is an area of research that needs to further be explored. 
It particularly needs more attention given the hot debate on the putative mechanisms underlying 
infants’ selective social learning (Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Sabbagh et al., 2017; Sobel 
& Kushnir, 2013). A rich view posits that infants’ selective social learning is guided by domain-
specific, sophisticated abilities, whereas the lean view posits that it is based on domain-general, 
low-level cognitive abilities. While some research on the mechanisms of selective social learning 
is available to account for selective trust in preschoolers, this has yet to be explored in infancy. 
Providing empirical evidence to contribute to this debate would help us better understand the 
depth of infants’ selective social learning.  
Research Goals and Overview of Findings 
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 The main goal of the present dissertation was to investigate the psychological 
mechanisms underlying infants’ selective social learning. Specifically, it was of interest to 
explore whether domain-specific abilities, such as theory of mind, and/or domain-general 
abilities, such as statistical learning and associative learning, were involved in this ability. Study 
1 (Crivello, Phillips, & Poulin-Dubois, 2017) examined this research question by investigating 
whether infants’ selective social learning was related to their false belief, knowledge inference, 
or statistical learning skills. First, 18-month-olds were exposed to a reliable speaker or an 
unreliable speaker, followed by a word-learning task. Based on previous research (Brooker & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012), it was 
expected that infants in the reliable condition would be more likely to learn a novel word in 
comparison to those in the unreliable condition. Infants also completed two theory of mind tasks 
(false belief and knowledge inference) and a statistical learning task in order to examine potential 
mechanisms. Although exploratory, hypotheses regarding the mechanisms were as follows: If 
infants’ selective social learning is guided by domain-specific abilities, then those who 
demonstrate superior performance on the theory of mind tasks should be more selective word 
learners (i.e., learn less from the unreliable speaker). This would support a rich interpretation of 
infants’ selective social learning. On the other hand, if infants use more domain-general abilities 
to selectively learn from others, then infants who have better statistical learning abilities should 
be less likely to learn from the unreliable speaker. This would support the lean interpretation of 
infants’ selective social learning. It is important to note that if such an effect exists, we expected 
that it would only be present in the unreliable condition given that infants have been shown to 
learn new words without any information about the speaker’s competence.  
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Findings of Study 1 were consistent with our first hypothesis and demonstrated evidence 
of selective social learning in 18-month-olds. Specifically, we found that infants were more 
likely to learn a new word from a reliable speaker. In terms of the results regarding the 
mechanisms, it was found that infants who passed a knowledge inference task were less likely to 
learn a new word from the unreliable speaker. Importantly, and as predicted, the effect was 
specific to the unreliable condition. However, infants’ selective word learning was not related to 
infants’ theory of mind abilities in general, as this finding was not replicated when examining 
infants’ false belief abilities. No such effect was observed in the case of statistical learning. Thus, 
the findings of Study 1 provided partial support for a rich interpretation of infants’ selective 
social learning.  
Similar to our first study, Study 2 (Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2019) also examined 
whether domain-specific and/or domain-general abilities were related to infants’ selective social 
learning. Three important differences in the methodology were observed. First, it was of interest 
to examine the mechanisms of infants’ selective social learning using a different manipulation of 
reliability cues. Thus, instead of manipulating epistemic cues as in Study 1, we manipulated 
emotional congruency. Second, a different domain-general ability was examined, which was 
associative learning. In Study 1, infants’ statistical learning was assessed through a task that 
required them to infer the experimenter’s preference based on probabilistic cues. Although a 
valid measure of statistical learning, this task required infants to make inferences, which is a 
socio-cognitive aspect of development. In order to directly test the argument that infants, like 
other species such as rats and pigeons, are using very basic cognitive abilities to selectively learn 
from others, a very rudimentary skill shared across species was examined – associative learning. 
Lastly, an important difference with the first study was the age group. Specifically, 14-month-
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olds were tested rather than 18-month-olds in order to examine the mechanisms underlying 
younger infants’ selective social learning, allowing us to explore whether these mechanisms are 
continuous across development. Thus, the main rationale for changing the age in Study 2 was to 
examine a possible developmental trend, as well as to examine whether younger infants may be 
using more basic-level abilities to guide their selectivity.  
In order to examine this research question, infants observed an individual who expressed 
happiness while looking inside a container that was empty (incongruent emoter) or that 
contained a toy (congruent emoter). It was hypothesized that infants would be able to detect the 
individual’s emotional incongruency, as demonstrated by an increase in the latency to examine 
the contents of the container across trials. In addition, infants’ interactions with the individual in 
a different context was expected to be influenced by their prior experience with her. Thus, a gaze 
following task was administered following the emotional congruency exposure. We 
hypothesized that infants would be less likely to follow the gaze of the incongruent emoter. 
Finally, in order to examine the mechanisms underlying infants’ selective trust, a knowledge 
inference task (modified from Study 1) and an associative learning task were administered. 
Given the age of the infants, we expected different findings from Study 1 regarding the 
mechanisms. Specifically, it was expected that infants in the incongruent condition who had 
superior associative learning abilities would be more selective in their behaviour. No link was 
expected with infants’ theory of mind abilities due to their more limited skills in this domain at 
14-months of age. Thus, in contrast to our first study, we expected 14-month-olds to rely on 
domain-general abilities rather than domain-specific abilities due to their young age. In other 
words, we suspected that younger infants might be using basic-level abilities to selective learn 
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from others, but as children mature, their sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities such as the 
understanding of others’ mental states might be more involved in their selective social learning.   
 The findings of Study 2 provided evidence of selective trust using an emotional 
congruency paradigm with 14-month-olds. Infants in the incongruent condition took significantly 
longer to examine the contents of the container across trials compared to infants in the congruent 
condition, suggesting that infants were able to detect the emotional incongruency of the 
experimenter. Furthermore, infants’ prior exposure to the congruency of the experimenter’s 
emotions influenced their gaze following in a subsequent context. Specifically, infants were less 
likely to follow the gaze of the incongruent emoter when the target object was not visible to 
them. These results demonstrate that infants were less likely to trust the gaze and emotional 
expression of the experimenter after observing her express emotions that were incongruent with 
the situation. Regarding the mechanisms, results were inconsistent with our prediction. In fact, 
similar results to Study 1 were observed, such that infants in the incongruent condition who 
passed the knowledge inference task demonstrated more selectivity (i.e., took longer to examine 
the contents of the container on the last trial). In addition, no effect was observed with domain-
general abilities (i.e., associative learning). Therefore, findings from our second study provided 
additional support for the rich interpretation of infants’ selective social learning.    
  Lastly, Study 3 (Crivello, Grossman, & Poulin-Dubois, 2019) continued to investigate 
the mechanisms of infants’ selective social learning. However, in this study, a more conservative 
approach was used to examine infants’ selective social learning – that is, a within-subjects 
design. In contrast to research with preschool-age children, the majority of studies examining 
infants’ selective social learning have used a between-subject paradigm with the aim of 
minimizing task demands, such as utilizing fewer executive functioning abilities. Such a design 
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would be considered a more conservative and optimal approach to investigate the nature of 
infants’ selective social learning, as infants are required to choose one of two informants to learn 
a new word from. Thus, 18-month-old infants were presented with two informants: one who 
labeled familiar objects accurately and one who labeled inaccurately. A word learning task was 
then administered, in which infants were given the opportunity to learn a new word from the 
reliable and unreliable speakers. We hypothesized that infants would be more likely to learn a 
novel word from the reliable speaker. Knowledge inference, false belief, and associative learning 
tasks were also administered. In the first two studies of the current dissertation, a relation was 
found between infants’ selective social learning and their knowledge inference abilities, as 
measured through Moll and Tomasello’s (2007) task. It was of interest to assess infants’ 
knowledge inference using a different task to determine whether these findings could be 
replicated and extended. We predicted that such a relation would exist. Specifically, we expected 
that infants with superior knowledge inference abilities would demonstrate more selectivity in 
their word learning, consistent with Study 1 and Study 2. Finding this effect with a different 
knowledge inference task would provide additional support for the rich interpretation. Although 
infants’ selective social learning was linked to their performance on the knowledge inference 
task in Study 1, no such effect was observed with the false belief task. However, infants’ poor 
performance on this false belief task (Buttelmann et al., 2009) may be a possible explanation for 
the null results. Thus, it was important to include a different false belief task in order to verify 
that no link exists between false belief and infants’ selective social learning. Lastly, an 
associative learning task was administered, as it had yet to be explored with 18-month-olds’ 
selective word learning. In general, we hypothesized that infants who performed better on the 
theory of mind tasks would be less likely to learn a new word from the unreliable speaker. We 
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did not expect infants’ performance on the associative learning task to be related to their word 
learning.  
 The results of Study 3 were consistent with our hypotheses. Firstly, we found evidence of 
selective social learning in infancy using a within-subjects design, as infants were more likely to 
choose the reliable speaker to learn a new word from. Next, regarding the mechanisms, we 
observed findings consistent with the first two studies of the dissertation. Infants who passed the 
knowledge inference task were less likely to learn a new word from the unreliable speaker 
compared to infants who failed. No effects were observed with the false belief or associative 
learning tasks. The findings of Study 3 provide additional evidence for the rich interpretation of 
infants’ selective social learning.  
Main Contributions  
The findings of the present study contribute to the literature on selective social learning in 
several ways. Firstly, the results of the selective social learning tasks in each study replicate and 
extend previous research demonstrating that infants prefer to trust and learn from reliable sources 
of information (see review by Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Evidence of selective 
social learning was found in the present dissertation in both 14- and 18-month-olds by 
manipulating reliability cues in both the epistemic and emotional domains.  
Within the epistemic domain, Studies 1 and 3 both demonstrated that infants preferred to 
learn a new word from a reliable speaker compared to an unreliable one. This replicates previous 
research showing that infants’ word learning is influenced by whether the informant labeled 
familiar objects accurately or inaccurately (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013a; Koenig & 
Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012; Luchkina et al., 2018). Furthermore, Koenig 
and Echols (2003) demonstrated that even 16-month-old infants looked significantly longer at an 
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unreliable speaker than at a reliable one, with several infants even attempting to correct the 
unreliable speaker (e.g., producing the correct label, shifting their eye gaze from object-to-human 
while vocalizing and pointing, shaking head “no”, waving their hands, pointing to correct object 
such as their own shoe). According to Stephens and colleagues (2015), infants can detect 
messages that are in conflict with their existing knowledge, such as conflicts of meaning (e.g., 
labeling a ball a shoe). This conflict of meaning provokes infants to evaluate the competency of 
the speaker and reject their statement (Stephens et al., 2015). In order to reject such inaccurate 
testimony, children are required to use epistemic defense mechanisms, such as “coherence-
checking” in order to compare the testimonial statement to their prior beliefs (Stephens et al., 
2015).  
A unique aspect of the current dissertation was the inclusion of a within-subject design to 
measure infants’ selective social learning. The majority of the studies investigating this ability in 
infancy have used a between-subjects design in order to minimize task demands (i.e., minimal 
executive functioning abilities required). This is an important gap in the literature that requires 
more research as a within-subjects design is the most conservative and optimal approach to 
assess infants’ selective behaviour. To date, only one study has used such a design, and their 
findings contrast with the present results (Schmid et al., 2018). Study 3 demonstrated evidence of 
selective word learning using a within-subject design, whereas in Schmid and colleagues’ study, 
the results did not. However, methodological differences may explain the contrasting results, as 
Schmid and colleagues used an eye-tracking paradigm (i.e., an endorsement and disambiguation 
task). Despite the finding in our study that infants were more likely to select the reliable speaker 
to learn a new word from, we observed that the forced-choice paradigm was rather difficult for 
18-month-olds. This may be due to the higher task demands involved in a within-subject design. 
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For instance, having infants select one of two informants to learn from requires superior 
inhibitory control and working memory abilities (Hermes, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2018). Infants are 
required to process an abundance of information, including remembering what each 
experimenter labeled as well as who was accurate and inaccurate. In addition, infants observed 
three experimenters during this task, which may have been distracting.  
Within the emotional domain, Study 2 revealed that 14-month-olds were less likely to 
trust an individual who demonstrated an incongruent emotional reaction to a situation. These 
findings are in line with research demonstrating that infants as young as 10 months of age are 
able to detect incongruent emotional expressions (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013; Hepach & 
Westmann, 2013; Reschke et al., 2017; Skerry & Spelke, 2014). In the second year of life, it has 
been shown that infants’ exposure to emotional incongruency influences their subsequent 
behaviour with the emoter in a different context (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Chow et al., 
2008; Walle & Campos, 2014). For instance, recent studies demonstrated that infants are more 
likely to act prosocially and to empathically help a congruent emoter rather than an incongruent 
emoter (Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Walle & Campos, 2014). Taken together, the current 
findings reveal that infants are able to adjust their learning based on an individual’s epistemic 
and emotional reliability.  
The second main contribution of the dissertation is that the findings offer insight into the 
controversial debate in the literature regarding the depth of infants’ selective social learning 
(Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Sabbagh et al., 2017; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). On one side 
of the debate, researchers theorize that infants’ selective social learning is guided by domain-
specific abilities, such as theory of mind (e.g., Poulin-Dubois, 2017). Theory of mind has been 
suggested as a cognitive mechanism underlying infants’ selective social learning as children can 
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use their understanding of others’ mental states when selecting who is knowledgeable and who is 
deceptive (Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Thus, children with superior theory of mind 
abilities should demonstrate more selectivity (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015). In contrast, the 
alternative view suggests that infants are using domain-general abilities, such as statistical 
learning or associative learning (e.g., Heyes, 2017). According to the lean view, other species 
such as rats and pigeons also engage in selective social learning, suggesting that sophisticated 
cognitive abilities are not responsible for the development of this ability (Heyes, 2017). 
Furthermore, some researchers believe that both mechanisms may be at play (Hermes, Behne, & 
Rakoczy, 2018; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). For instance, Sobel and Kushnir proposed a 
developmental progression, in which infants may be using statistical learning abilities and then 
switch to higher-order abilities that allow them to infer the informant’s competence once they 
have the conceptual knowledge. Additionally, Hermes, Behne, and Rakoczy (2018) have argued 
for a dual-process account of selective social learning, which suggests that children make 
inferences about an informant’s knowledge but may use more basic cognitive abilities dependent 
on task demands as well as the child’s executive functioning skills and conceptual background 
knowledge.  
Taken together, the findings of all three studies that are included in the present 
dissertation provide support for the rich interpretation of infants’ selective social learning, by 
demonstrating that infants’ selectivity is related to domain-specific abilities, such as the 
precursors of theory of mind. Specifically, all three studies demonstrated that infants who passed 
a knowledge inference task were less likely to trust and learn from an unreliable informant using 
two different tasks. Thus, regardless of whether selective social learning was measured by 
manipulating epistemic or emotional cues, or by using a between- or a within-subject design, the 
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results were consistent and clear: infants who had superior knowledge inference abilities were 
more selective in their behaviour. These striking results suggest that infants’ ability to infer 
others’ knowledge states may have helped them infer that the unreliable informant was ignorant 
and not knowledgeable, and therefore not a good source to trust or learn from. The findings are 
consistent with several studies that have shown a relation between children’s theory of mind 
abilities and their selective social learning (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 
2008; DiYanni et al., 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas et al., 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). 
The present dissertation (Study 1) was the first to demonstrate that this link is also present in 
infancy.  
Furthermore, the findings demonstrating an effect with knowledge inference add to a 
growing body of literature on how trait reasoning is involved in children’s selective social 
learning, rather than global impression formation (e.g., halo effect), which is a leaner 
mechanism. Children have been shown to infer traits based on a model’s past behaviour that 
would make them a good source of information in the future for particular tasks (Hermes et al., 
2017). For example, Lutz and Keil (2002) demonstrated that 3- and 4-year-olds sought 
knowledge from a doctor and a car mechanic within their area of expertise. Moreover, Kushnir, 
Vredenburgh, and Schneider (2013) discovered that 3- and 4-year-olds asked for help from the 
toy fixer when fixing a toy and from the competent labeler when wanting to know the name of a 
toy. Other results have shown that 3- to 5-year-old children preferred to ask questions about food 
to adults compared to children (as adults know more about food) and ask questions about toys to 
children (as children know more about toys) (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). More recently, 
Hermes and colleagues (2015) found that 4- and 5-year-olds preferred the knowledgeable 
individual (and avoided the inaccurate one) for knowledge-related tasks and the strong individual 
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(and avoided the weak one) for strength-related tasks. This was only true for children who had 
conceptual knowledge of these traits. Overall, these studies demonstrate that children infer 
competencies/traits and then select the informant that is best suited for a task (Hermes, Behne, & 
Rakoczy, 2018). Similar to the present dissertation, based on infants’ observation of the 
informants labeling objects, infants inferred that the unreliable informant was ignorant/not 
knowledgeable and therefore chose not to learn a new word from her. Likewise, infants may 
have inferred that the incongruent emoter was ignorant of what was inside the container (did not 
experience seeing = knowing as one would expect) and chose to subsequently not trust her 
affective and visual cues.  
It is important to note that the link with performance on the knowledge inference task 
was specific to the unreliable condition/block in all three studies, which supported our 
hypotheses. One potential reason for this consistent finding is that infants are constantly exposed 
to individuals labeling objects accurately as well as individuals expressing emotions congruent 
with situations. For example, infants learn new words from these individuals in their everyday 
lives without the need to infer the competence of the speaker. Another potential reason may be 
that children have a bias to trust others; however, this bias can be overridden once children have 
the conceptual knowledge and executive functioning abilities to distrust an unreliable model 
(Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018). Having a default to trust testimony can be adaptive, as it 
saves children time from having to verify everything they are told since most of what people are 
told is likely to be accurate (Harris et al., 2018). Individuals do occasionally say something 
inaccurate due to error, ignorance, or deception; yet this occurrence is rare (Jaswal & Pérez-
Edgar, 2014). Having a bias to believe permits one to benefit from others’ expertise and 
knowledge (Jaswal & Pérez-Edgar, 2014). However, according to Stephens and colleagues 
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(2015), children may generally accept testimony unless the speaker gives them a reason not to 
(e.g., mislabeling an object), in which then they can revise these testimony-based beliefs. Taken 
together, it may be that no effect was found in the reliable condition/block in the present 
dissertation as infants have a bias to trust testimony and therefore do not need much cognitive 
effort to trust the testimony of the reliable model. In contrast, more cognitive processing is 
necessary, such as inferring the informant’s knowledge state, in order to mistrust the unreliable 
model.  
Of note, only knowledge inference was related to infants’ selective social learning and 
not other theory of mind skills, such as false belief. This was observed in Studies 1 and 3 using 
different knowledge inference and false belief tasks. In Study 1, infants who passed and failed 
Buttelmann and colleagues’ (2009) false belief task performed similarly on the selective social 
learning task. However, this may have been due to infants’ chance performance on the false 
belief task (55% pass rate), which is in contrast to the original results (72% pass rate). Thus, it 
was of importance to re-test the link between infants’ false belief and selective social learning 
using a different false belief task in order to rule out this socio-cognitive ability as a potential 
mechanism. Study 3 confirmed the null results with false belief observed in Study 1 using a 
different task. Unfortunately, performance on this task was also not significantly different from 
chance (55% pass rate) and did not replicate the original study by Southgate and colleagues 
(2010) (75% pass rate).  
The poor performance observed on the false belief tasks may be one reason why false 
belief was not related to infants’ selective social learning in the present dissertation. It is worth 
pointing out that several studies have also failed to replicate Southgate and colleagues’ (2010) 
study (Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016; Király et al., 2016) and have 
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failed or reported weak replications in the case of Buttelmann and colleagues’ study (Poulin-
Dubois & Yott, 2016; Priewasser et., 2018). This is part of a much larger issue; that is, a 
replication crisis (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2018). Many recent studies have failed to replicate all 
implicit false belief tasks used in infancy, including anticipatory looking and violation of 
expectation paradigms, as well as interactive helping paradigms (e.g., Burnside et al., 2018; 
Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Grosse Weismann et al., 2018; Kulke 
et al., 2018; Powell et al., 2018; Schuwerk et al., 2018; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). Thus, 
researchers have yet to establish a reliable measure of infants’ false belief understanding. 
Fortunately, a large multisite project (ManyBabies 2) is underway with the goal of promoting 
reproducibility and best practices in infancy research and more specifically theory of mind.  
Another reason for the null results may be that false belief is a rather shallow concept in 
infancy. In fact, implicit false belief understanding has been heavily debated in the literature 
(Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2017). According to the rich view, it is believed that infants’ false belief 
abilities are comparable to those of preschoolers and adults, except they are masked by task 
demands (Carruthers, 2013; Baillargeon et al., 2016). In contrast, researchers adopting a lean 
view argue that performance on implicit false beliefs tasks are based on low-level novelty 
(Heyes, 2014) or a violation of behavioural rules (Ruffman, 2014; Ruffman & Perner, 2005), 
suggesting that infants do not have a mentalistic false belief understanding. The aforementioned 
non-replications support the lean interpretation as they cast doubt on the robustness and 
reliability of infants’ false belief abilities. In other words, the lack of effect with false belief may 
be due to the lack of depth of this ability in infancy. According to Tomasello (2018), infants and 
apes pass implicit false belief tasks using socio-cognitive skills that are also used in other tasks 
not measuring false belief. For example, they can predict an agent’s behaviour based on what the 
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agent sees and therefore knows (i.e., seeing = knowing). That is, implicit false belief tasks are 
measuring infants’ ability to infer knowledge based on what an agent sees, rather than their 
ability to infer that an agent has a false belief. However, if this were true, then we would expect 
infants’ performance on the false belief tasks in the present dissertation to be related to their 
selective social learning as is the case with the knowledge inference tasks that measure seeing 
equals knowing. Our findings do not seem to support this view as no link was present with the 
false belief tasks.  
Lastly, an additional reason for the null findings with false belief may be that infants’ 
false belief abilities are not the best predictor of their selective social learning. Instead, infants’ 
ability to infer others’ knowledge states, rather than their ability to infer others’ false beliefs, is a 
much stronger predictor. Results from Studies 1 and 3 support this hypothesis. Specifically, 
when examining infants’ selective word learning as a function of their performance on the theory 
of mind tasks, the knowledge inference task had an effect size that was three and five times 
greater than the false belief task in Study 1 and Study 3, respectively.  
Finally, results from all three studies in the present dissertation ruled out domain-general 
mechanisms (i.e., statistical learning and associative learning) as playing a role in selective social 
learning, providing no support for a lean interpretation of infants’ selective social learning. The 
present dissertation was the first to examine the relation between these domain-general abilities 
and infants’ selective behaviour. Since then, a recent study also ruled out an associative learning 
mechanism for 18-month-olds’ selective word learning (Luchkina et al., 2018). Specifically, 
when the speakers asked questions instead of statements using the accurate and inaccurate labels 
of the objects, infants inferred that neither informant was reliable. This study indicates that 
infants did not use associative learning mechanisms, but instead used epistemic competence to 
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evaluate the speaker. Taken together, infants in the present studies were not using statistical 
regularities or object-label associations to select whom to learn a new word from, nor were they 
using situation-emotion associations to decide whom they should trust. The lack of relation with 
performance on the statistical learning task and associative learning task does not support Heyes’ 
(2017) arguments that infants are using very basic cognitive abilities that are shared with other 
species in order to selectively learn from others. This provides further support for the rich 
interpretation of infants’ selective social learning. In other words, infants’ selective social 
learning may already be a form of cultural learning.  
Overall, the findings of the present dissertation have important implications for young 
children’s social-cognitive development. Young children, including infants, constantly rely on 
information from others, however this information may be false or deceptive (Poulin-Dubois & 
Brosseau-Liard, 2016; Stengelin, Grueneisen, & Tomasello, 2018). Consequently, young 
children need to be vigilant when trusting others and identify those who can and are willing to 
provide accurate information (Sperber et al., 2010). Poor selective social learning abilities may 
bring about negative consequences in children’s social development (Mills, 2013). For example, 
children who have very high trust beliefs (i.e., are naïve in believing that others will always keep 
their promises) and children who have very low trust beliefs (i.e., are cynical in believing that 
others will not keep their promises) in their peers and best friends have been shown to have more 
internalized maladjustment (e.g., depression, anxiety, loneliness) and social exclusion, as well as 
less self-perceived acceptance and social preference (Rotenberg, Boulton, & Fox, 2005). 
According to Mills (2013), believing in inaccurate information may also cause educational 
consequences (e.g., errors on a test by believing that Wikipedia is a reliable source of 
information), interpersonal consequences (e.g., having an argument with a peer due to believing 
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a rumour to be true), and health-related consequences (e.g., making decisions about one’s health 
based on information provided by a questionable website). Thus, examining the individual 
differences underlying this ability is essential. This research provides strong evidence that infants 
with superior socio-cognitive abilities, such as knowledge inference, are more critical and 
selective from whom they learn. Therefore, it may be that young children are more likely to take 
a critical stance by improving their ability to infer the epistemic states of others.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
 There are a number of limitations to the present dissertation. One such limitation was the 
specific associative learning task used in Studies 2 and 3. A common measure to assess 
associative learning is to calculate a baseline ratio (e.g., Bhat et al., 2010), which was not 
possible in this set of studies due to the problematic baseline. Previous research has mainly tested 
associative learning in younger infants (3-6-month-olds), whereby the infant’s body part (e.g., 
wrist, ankle) is attached to the apparatus with a string (Bhat et al., 2010; Rovee-Collier et al., 
2001). In the acquisition phase, every time infants move that body part, the apparatus is 
activated. The baseline phase consists of a baseline measure of how many times infants move 
that same body part without the reward of the apparatus. As we tested older infants (14- and 18-
month-olds), a large red button that infants were required to push in order to activate the toy was 
used, as we believed this device would be more age appropriate. Although the acquisition and 
extinction phase worked very well with the button, the baseline phase turned out to be 
problematic as infants seemed attracted to the large red button and were motivated to push the 
button regardless if the toy was activated or not. This may have resulted in a higher than 
expected frequency of pushes in the baseline phase, rendering the baseline ratio unusable to 
measure associative learning. In sum, pushing the button was intrinsically rewarding for the 
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infants, which contrasted with previous studies measuring associative learning. Future research 
should modify the button (e.g., smaller size) or use a different task to measure associative 
learning and its relation to selective social learning. For instance, an associative learning task that 
does not have any reward in the baseline phase should be used. Nevertheless, we were able to 
demonstrate that infants did in fact engage in associative learning, as demonstrated through their 
increase in the rate of pushes across the acquisition phase. This demonstrates that they were able 
to learn the association between pushing the button and toy activation. Furthermore, the lack of 
relation between infants’ associative learning and their selective social learning replicates 
previous research that ruled out associative learning (e.g., Luchkina et al., 2018).   
 Another limitation of the present dissertation was that infants’ performance on the false 
belief tasks did not replicate previous research as their performance was not statistically 
significantly different from chance. This is in contrast to the original studies that developed these 
tasks, as they found that infants performed above chance level (Buttelmann et al., 2009; 
Southgate et al., 2010). It is important to note that there were slight methodological changes from 
Buttelmann and colleagues’ procedure, such as the administration of the task at a table instead of 
on the floor, which may have impacted our results. These null findings are also consistent with 
an abundance of research demonstrating that a non-replication crisis exists in this research area 
(Poulin-Dubois et al., in press). This includes previous non-replications of current false belief 
tasks used in this dissertation (Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016; Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Grosse 
Wiesmann et al., 2016; Király et al., 2016). Despite the lack of replication of the original false 
belief tasks, the distribution of scores was optimal as one would need balanced sample sizes to 
compare infants who passed and failed this task. Since we used two interactive false belief tasks 
that were not replicated, future research should assess infants’ false belief and its relation to their 
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selective social learning using other paradigms, such as anticipatory looking or violation of 
expectation.  
 An additional limitation, as mentioned in Study 2, was that there may have been a 
confound of not having a toy in the container in the Reliability Exposure Task. A leaner 
interpretation of the selective trust results is that infants took longer to begin examining the 
contents of the container because they quickly learned that it was empty. However, this 
explanation does not seem plausible as the gradual increase of the latency to examine the 
contents of the container was linked to infants’ knowledge inference skills. These findings are 
consistent with results from Studies 1 and 3, which demonstrated that 18-month-olds with 
superior knowledge inference abilities were more selective on a word learning task. Why would 
theory of mind abilities be related to infants’ lack of interest in examining the contents of an 
empty container? This issue remains to be explored. In an attempt to control for the confound of 
an absence of reward, a future study could manipulate both negative and positive emotional 
displays in a 2 (toy/no toy) X 3 (happy, neutral, sad) design. For instance, one could investigate 
infants’ latency to examine the contents of the container after observing an experimenter express 
sadness when looking inside a container that is empty (congruent emoter) or that contains a toy 
(incongruent emoter). Infants who observed the incongruent emoter (sadness/toy in container) 
should take significantly longer to examine the contents of the container compared to infants 
who observed the congruent emoter (sadness/no toy). This would rule out the explanation that 
the behaviors in this task are confounded with the presence or absence of a reward in the 
container.  
 Another potential limitation was the forced-choice word learning paradigm used in Study 
3. Using a within-subject design to test infants’ selective social learning has many benefits, such 
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as being a more conservative and optimal approach to assess this ability as well as filling a large 
gap in the literature. However, it was observed that the task was rather challenging for 18-month-
olds. Although infants significantly preferred to learn a new word from the reliable speaker, the 
proportion of correct responses in the reliable block was not significantly above chance. We 
aimed to minimize task demands by introducing two blocks of trials in order to test their word 
learning from the reliable and unreliable informant separately and to re-expose them to the 
reliability of the speakers. Despite this re-exposure to the speaker’s accuracy, it seems that there 
were still too many task demands. For instance, being presented with two informants and having 
infants select whom to choose from requires superior executive function abilities, such as 
working memory and inhibitory control. Future research should modify the within-subjects 
design to further minimize the task demands. A trial of the word learning task could be 
administered after each speaker labels two familiar objects. This would be repeated four times, 
for a total of eight exposure trials and four test trials Additionally, it could be of interest to 
include executive functioning measures to investigate whether infants with superior performance 
on these tasks would also have superior performance on the word learning task. For instance, a 
battery of executive functioning tasks (e.g., Carlson, 2005) could be included in future studies, 
however this would add to the length of the procedure, which could generate a fatigue effect. Not 
only would these findings help explain infants’ poor performance on the word learning task, but 
they could also shed light on other potential mechanisms of infants’ selective social learning, 
such as executive functioning abilities.  
   Lastly, an additional limitation of the present dissertation is the lack of general 
intelligence measure when examining the mechanisms underlying selective social learning. 
Despite this limitation in the first study, we used infants’ vocabulary size as a component of their 
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verbal intelligence and found no relation with their selective social learning. In addition, we did 
not find a relation between selective social learning and all correlate tasks, as it was specific to 
the knowledge inference task, suggesting specificity. Future studies should include a general 
intelligence measure, such as the Bayley Scales of Infant and Toddler Development – Third 
Edition, when examining the mechanisms of infants’ selective social learning in order to control 
for their intellectual ability.  
 Furthermore, other theory of mind abilities may be at play and should therefore be 
investigated. Aside from examining false belief and knowledge inference abilities as potential 
mechanisms underlying selective social learning in infancy, future research should examine 
whether infants’ ability to infer others’ intentions is involved. According to Dunfield and 
Kuhlmeier (2010), infants are able to recognize specificity of intentions (Buresh & Woodward, 
2006), differentiate intentional vs. accidental behaviour (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; 
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009), as well as distinguish someone who is unwilling vs. unable 
(Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). In fact, Dunfield and Kuhlmeier (2010) found that 
21-month-olds preferred to help an individual who intended to give them a desired object 
compared to an individual who did not, demonstrating that the individual’s positive intention 
influenced their prosocial behaviour towards that individual in subsequent interactions. With 
regard to selective social learning, researchers argue that children use both competence and 
intentions when inferring the reliability of an informant (Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 
2012; Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011). This is an important cue as individuals can 
intentionally provide inaccurate and misleading information (Stengelin, Grueneisen, & 
Tomasello, 2018). A recent study demonstrated that 12- to 15-month-old infants can understand 
deceptive intentions and are less likely to trust a deceptive but knowledgeable individual than 
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one who is helpful and knowledgeable (Varró-Horváth, Dorn, & Lábadi, 2017). Given the 
importance of understanding communicative intent, a next step in examining the mechanisms 
underlying infants’ selective social learning could be to investigate its relation with infants’ 
intention understanding (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995).  
Future research should also continue to explore individual differences involved in 
selective social learning. Heyes (2016) argues that meta-cognition may guide older children and 
adults’ selective social learning due to their experience with social interaction, and that such 
abilities are absent in infancy. Metacognition may be a mechanism involved in selective social 
learning, as one may need to assess his or her own knowledge state in order to learn from others 
(Heyes, 2016; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Recent research in our laboratory has started to 
investigate meta-cognitive and causal learning abilities as potential mechanisms in infancy and 
found that both mechanisms might be at play (Kuzyk, Grossman, & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). 
Specifically, 18-month-olds who demonstrated less confidence in their own knowledge as well 
as superior causal learning skills were more likely to learn a new word from an unreliable 
informant. This has yet to be explored with older children. Other mechanisms of interest could 
be examining whether infants’ attachment style and temperament underlie infants’ selective 
social learning. Previous research has shown that 4- and 5-year-olds with a secure attachment 
used a flexible strategy on the selective social learning task, whereby they relied on claims from 
both their mother as well as from a stranger when appropriate (Corriveau et al., 2009). A 
different picture emerged for children with an insecure attachment. Avoidant children relied the 
least on their mother’s claims, while resistant children overly relied on their mother’s claims. 
Children with a disorganized attachment demonstrated a pattern of responding that was the least 
systematic. It could be of interest to examine whether infants would show such patterns. In 
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addition, research has demonstrated that infants between 28 and 38 months of age with higher 
levels of affect/extraversion had a superior performance on a selective social learning task, 
indicating that aspects of temperament may be a predictor of children’s selectivity (Canfield et 
al., 2015). This may be the case as individual differences in affect/extraversion may enhance 
young children’s social interactions, which can then strengthen their selective social learning 
abilities. Alternatively, young children who have higher levels of affect/extraversion may 
perform better on a selective social learning task as they are more attentive and willing to engage 
with the experimenter. Future research should explore the relation between temperament and 
selective social learning in infancy.  
Finally, a longitudinal design examining selective social learning in infancy and 
subsequently during the preschool period can shed light on the depth of infants’ selective 
behaviour. Specifically, infants of the present study could be tested when they are 4-years of age 
to examine the stability of the mechanisms across development. It would be of interest to 
examine if infants’ performance on the selective social learning task in infancy would predict 
preschoolers’ performance on the selective social learning task, which would suggest stability of 
this ability across development. Such stability would provide further support for the rich 
interpretation of infants’ selective social learning.  
Conclusion  
 In conclusion, the current dissertation investigated the psychological mechanisms of 
infants’ selective social learning in the epistemic and emotional domain. Evidence of selective 
social learning was found, as 14-month-olds were more like to trust the emotional displays of a 
congruent emoter and 18-month-olds were more likely to learn a new word from a reliable 
speaker. More importantly, all three studies demonstrated that infants with superior knowledge 
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inference abilities were less likely to learn from and trust the unreliable model. Furthermore, 
domain-general abilities such as statistical learning and associative learning were consistently 
found to be unrelated to infants’ selective social learning. These findings provide important 
contributions to the field of selective social learning, particularly to the controversial debate on 
the mechanisms underlying this ability. The results provide support for the rich interpretation of 
infants’ selective social learning, as infants seem to be using socio-cognitive mechanisms to 
guide their learning. In other words, the depth of infants’ selective social learning is not shallow, 
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Associative Learning Analyses using the Baseline Ratio – Study 2 
The ANOVA investigating the relation between infants’ associative learning abilities and 
their latency to examine the content on the last trial yielded no significant interaction, F(1, 56) = 
1.01, p = .32, ηp2 = .02. Planned comparisons revealed that for infants in the incongruent 
condition, those who passed the associative learning task (n = 8, M = 14.10, SD = 13.25) took 
equally long to examine the content of the container on the last trial compared to infants who 
failed this task (n = 23, M = 15.46, SD = 11.58), F(1, 56) = .20, p = .65, ηp2 = .004. There was 
also no significant difference between infants who passed (n = 6, M = 14.22, SD = 11.59) and 
those who failed the associative learning task in the congruent condition (n = 23, M = 9.52, SD = 
9.25), F(1, 56) = .90, p = .35, ηp2 = .02.  
 Moreover, it was of particular interest to investigate whether infants’ performance on the 
gaze following task was related to their associative learning abilities. The ANCOVA (controlling 
for age) examining the link between infants’ associative learning abilities and the proportion of 
trials in which infants followed the experimenter’s gaze behind the barriers (non-visible trials) 
yielded no significant interaction, F(1, 51) = .07, p = .80, ηp2 = .001. Planned comparisons 
revealed no statistically significant difference in following the gaze of the incongruent 
experimenter between infants who passed (n = 8, M = .38, SD = .33) and failed (n = 21, M = .27, 
SD = .34), F(1, 51) = .43, p = .52, ηp2 = .01. Similar findings were observed in the congruent 
condition, such that infants who passed (n = 5, M = .33, SD = .41) and failed the associative task 
(n = 22, M = .33, SD = .37) followed the gaze of the congruent experimenter equally often, F(1, 
51) = .04, p = .84, ηp2 = .001. 
 In terms of the baseline ratio, the data were found not to be normally distributed. As a 
result, a log transformation was applied to the data. A Pearson correlation was computed to 
 157 
examine whether the baseline ratio (M = 2.25, SD = 3.88) was related to infants’ performance on 
the reliability exposure task. No statistically significant correlation was found between infants’ 
baseline ratio and their latency to examine the content of the container on the last trial in the 
incongruent condition, r(29) = .16, p = .38, or congruent condition, r(27) = .10, p = .60. 
Moreover, a partial correlation controlling for age revealed that infants’ baseline ratio and the 
proportion of trials that they followed the gaze of the experimenter were not significantly 
correlated in the incongruent condition, r(26) = .16, p = .41, or in the congruent condition, r(24) 
= .12, p = .56. 
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Appendix B: Recruitment materials 
Recruitment letter – Study 1 
Recruitment letter – Study 2 




The Cognitive and Language Development Laboratory, which is part of the Center for 
Research and Human Development at Concordia University, is presently conducting a study on how 
children learn selectively from others. If you have participated in a study in the past, we would like 
to thank you for your enthusiasm and commitment to research. Our research has been funded by 
federal and provincial agencies for the past twenty-five years and our team is internationally 
recognized for its excellent work on early child development. Our articles are frequently published 
in prestigious journals, such as “Infancy” and “Developmental Science”. You also might have heard 
about our studies on national radio or on the Discovery Channel. 
 
For the present study, your child will have the opportunity to participate in a few short games. 
In the first game, your child will observe an experimenter label familiar objects either incorrectly or 
correctly. Next, your child will have the opportunity to learn new words from this individual. Of 
interest is whether his/her prior learning experience with the experimenter will influence his/her 
ability to learn from her. Other tasks will involve helping an experimenter search for a toy, sharing a 
novel toy with an experimenter, and predicting an experimenter’s preference for an object based on 
previous selection in a jarful of objects. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat 
and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape the entire session and all tapes will be 
treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
 
Overall, your participation will involve approximately one 60-minute visit to our laboratory at 
the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, in Notre-Dame-
de-Grace. Appointments can be scheduled at a time which is convenient for you and your child, 
including weekends. Free parking is available on the campus and we offer babysitting for siblings who 
come to the appointment. Upon completion of the study, a Certificate of Merit for Contribution to 
Science will be given to your child, and you will be offered a financial compensation of 20$ for 
participating. A summary of the results of our study will be mailed to you once it is completed. 
 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 17-19 months of age, who 
hear English or French at home or at daycare, and who do not have any visual or hearing difficulties. 
If you are interested in having your child participate in this study, or would like any further 
information, please contact Cristina Crivello at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2279, or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois 
at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2219. For more information on our studies, please visit our website at 
http://crdh.concordia.ca/dpdlab/. We will try to contact you by telephone within a few days of 
receiving this letter. 
 





______________________    
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.             
Professor 
Department of Psychology                                    
______________________    
Olivia Kuzyk, B.A.  
Laboratory Coordinator 
Department of Psychology                                    
 ______________________ 
Cristina Crivello, M.A. 
Ph.D. Student 




The Cognitive and Language Development Laboratory, which is part of the Center for 
Research and Human Development at Concordia University, is presently conducting a study on how 
children learn selectively from others. The Commission d’Accès à l’Information du Québec has kindly 
given us permission to consult birth lists provided by the Agence de la santé et des services sociaux 
de Montréal. Your name appears on the birth list of March 2016, which indicates that you have a child 
of an age appropriate for our study. Our research has been funded by federal and provincial agencies 
for the past twenty-five years and our team is internationally recognized for its excellent work on 
early child development. Our articles are frequently published in prestigious journals, such as 
“Infancy” and “Developmental Science”. You also might have heard about our studies on national radio 
or on the Discovery Channel. If you have participated in a study in the past, we would like to thank 
you for your enthusiasm and commitment to research. 
 
For the present study, your child will have the opportunity to participate in a few short games. 
In the first game, your child will observe an experimenter display happiness while looking inside a 
container that either holds a toy or is empty. Next, your child will participate in a game of finding 
figurines hidden behind different barriers. Other tasks will involve sharing a novel toy with an 
experimenter and understanding cause and effect. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child 
seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape the entire session and all tapes will be 
treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
 
Overall, your participation will involve approximately one 60-minute visit to our laboratory at 
the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, in Notre-Dame-
de-Grace. Appointments can be scheduled at a time which is convenient for you and your child, 
including weekends. Free parking is available on the campus and we offer babysitting for siblings who 
come to the appointment. Upon completion of the study, a Certificate of Merit for Contribution to 
Science will be given to your child, and you will be offered a financial compensation of 20$ for 
participating. A summary of the results of our study will be mailed to you once it is completed. 
 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 13-15 months of age, who 
hear English or French at home or at daycare, and who do not have any visual or hearing difficulties. 
If you are interested in having your child participate in this study, or would like any further 
information, please contact Cristina Crivello at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2279, or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois 
at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2219. For more information on our studies, please visit our website at 
http://crdh.concordia.ca/dpdlab/. We will try to contact you by telephone within a few days of 
receiving this letter. 
 
We are looking forward to speaking with you in the near future. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
______________________    
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.             
Professor 
Department of Psychology                                    
______________________    
Sara Phillips, B.A.  
Laboratory Coordinator 
Department of Psychology                                    
 ______________________ 
Cristina Crivello, M.A. 
Ph.D. Student 
Department of Psychology 
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Dear parent(s), 
The Cognitive and Language Development Laboratory, which is part of the Center for 
Research and Human Development at Concordia University, is presently conducting a study on how 
children learn selectively from others. The Commission d’Accès à l’Information du Québec has kindly 
given us permission to consult birth lists provided by the Agence de la santé et des services sociaux 
de Montréal. Your name appears on the birth list of July 2016, which indicates that you have a child 
of an age appropriate for our study. Our research has been funded by federal and provincial agencies 
for the past twenty-five years and our team is internationally recognized for its excellent work on 
early child development. Our articles are frequently published in prestigious journals, such as 
“Infancy” and “Developmental Science”. You also might have heard about our studies on national radio 
or on the Discovery Channel. If you have participated in a study in the past, we would like to thank 
you for your enthusiasm and commitment to research. 
 
For the present study, your child will have the opportunity to participate in a few short games. 
In the first game, your child will observe an experimenter label familiar objects incorrectly and 
another experimenter label familiar objects correctly. Next, your child will have the opportunity to 
learn new words from these individuals. Of interest is whether his/her prior learning experience with 
the experimenters will influence his/her ability to learn from them. Other tasks will involve helping 
an experimenter search for her toys and understanding cause and effect. During all tasks, your child 
will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape the entire 
session and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
 
Overall, your participation will involve approximately one 60-minute visit to our laboratory at 
the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, in Notre-Dame-
de-Grace. Appointments can be scheduled at a time which is convenient for you and your child, 
including weekends. Free parking is available on the campus and we offer babysitting for siblings who 
come to the appointment. Upon completion of the study, a Certificate of Merit for Contribution to 
Science will be given to your child, and you will be offered a financial compensation of 20$ for 
participating. A summary of the results of our study will be mailed to you once it is completed. 
 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 17-19 months of age, who 
hear English or French at home or at daycare, and who do not have any visual or hearing difficulties. 
If you are interested in having your child participate in this study, or would like any further 
information, please contact Cristina Crivello at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2279, or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois 
at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2219. For more information on our studies, please visit our website at 
http://crdh.concordia.ca/dpdlab/. We will try to contact you by telephone within a few days of 
receiving this letter. 




______________________    
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.             
Professor 
Department of Psychology                                    
______________________    
Catherine Delisle, B.A.  
Laboratory Coordinator 
Department of Psychology                                    
 ______________________ 
Cristina Crivello, M.A. 
Ph.D. Student 
Department of Psychology 
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Appendix C: Consent forms  
Consent form – Study 1 
Consent form – Study 2 
Consent form – Study 3 
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Parental Consent Form 
 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with graduate student Cristina Crivello of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 




For the present study, you will be invited to complete a short questionnaire about your child’s 
vocabulary. You will also be invited to complete a short questionnaire about your own child-rearing 
values. Then, your child will participate in a series of short games with three female researchers. In the 
first game, your child will observe an experimenter label familiar objects either incorrectly or correctly. 
Next, your child will have the opportunity to learn new words from this individual. Of interest is whether 
his/her prior learning experience with the experimenter will influence his/her ability to learn from her. 
Other tasks will involve helping an experimenter search for her toy, sharing a novel toy with an 
experimenter, and making predictions based on statistical probabilities.  
We will videotape your child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of 
confidentiality. That means that the researcher will not reveal your child’s identity in any written or oral 
reports about the study. You and your child will be assigned a coded number, and that code will be used 
on all materials collected in this study. All materials and data will be stored in secure facilities in the 
Department of Psychology at Concordia University. Only members of the research team will have access 
to these facilities. Questionnaires and electronic datafiles will be identified by coded identification 
numbers, unique to each family. Information collected on paper (questionnaires) or videotapes (observed 
behaviours) will be entered into computer databases. Raw data will be kept for a minimum of 5 years. 
When it is time for disposal, papers will be shredded, hard-drives will be purged, and videotapes and 
computer disks will be magnetically erased.  
As well, because we are only interested in comparing children’s understanding as a function of 
age, no individual scores will be provided following participation. The whole session should last 
approximately 60 minutes. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated 
directly behind.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you for his/her 
participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the confidentiality of 
your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this investigation that inquire about child 
maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover 
information that indicates the possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent 
harm, they are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for this concern with 





D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
§ I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time 
without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any questions that 
might arise during the course of the research. 
§ I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know but will 
not disclose my identity). 




I would be interested in participating in other studies with my child in the future (yes/no): ______ 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY 
CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
 
   SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to contact the 
Research Ethics and Compliance Officer of Concordia University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by 




___________________________  __________________________ 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.              Cristina Crivello, M.A.  
Professor    Ph.D. Student                                           
Department of Psychology                                                                                Department of Psychology           
514-848-2424 ext. 2219       514-848-2424 ext. 2279                      









Parental Consent Form 
 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with graduate student Cristina Crivello of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 




For the present study, you will be invited to complete a short questionnaire about your child’s 
vocabulary. Then, your child will participate in a series of short games with three female researchers. In 
the first game, your child will observe an experimenter display happiness while looking inside a container 
that either holds a toy or is empty. Next, your child will participate in a game of finding figurines hidden 
behind different barriers. Other tasks will involve sharing a novel toy with an experimenter and 
understanding cause and effect. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be 
seated directly behind. 
We will videotape your child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of 
confidentiality. That means that the researcher will not reveal your child’s identity in any written or oral 
reports about the study. You and your child will be assigned a coded number, and that code will be used 
on all materials collected in this study. All materials and data will be stored in secure facilities in the 
Department of Psychology at Concordia University. Only members of the research team will have access 
to these facilities. Questionnaires and electronic datafiles will be identified by coded identification 
numbers, unique to each family. Information collected on paper (questionnaires) or videotapes (observed 
behaviours) will be entered into computer databases. Raw data will be kept for a minimum of 5 years. 
When it is time for disposal, papers will be shredded, hard-drives will be purged, and videotapes and 
computer disks will be magnetically erased.  
As well, because we are only interested in comparing children’s understanding as a function of 
age, no individual scores will be provided following participation. The whole session should last 
approximately 60 minutes. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated 
directly behind.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you for his/her 
participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the confidentiality of 
your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this investigation that inquire about child 
maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover 
information that indicates the possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent 
harm, they are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for this concern with 






D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
§ I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time 
without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any questions that 
might arise during the course of the research. 
§ I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know but will 
not disclose my identity). 




I would be interested in participating in other studies within the Centre for Research in Human 
Development (CRDH) with my child in the future (yes/no): ______ 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY 
CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
 
   SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to contact the 
Research Ethics and Compliance Officer of Concordia University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by 





     ______________________                             _____________________ 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.                  Cristina Crivello, M.A. 
Professor                     Ph.D. Student 
Department of Psychology                                             Department of Psychology 
514-848-2424 ext. 2219                                                 514-848-2424 ext. 2279    






Parental Consent Form 
 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with graduate student Cristina Crivello of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine how children decide which person 
is the best source of information. 
 
B. PROCEDURES 
For the present study, you will be invited to complete a short questionnaire about your child’s 
vocabulary. Then, your child will participate in a series of short games with three female researchers. In 
the first game, your child will observe an experimenter label familiar objects correctly and another 
experimenter label familiar objects incorrectly. Next, your child will have the opportunity to learn new 
words from these individuals. Of interest is whether his/her prior learning experience with the 
experimenter will influence his/her ability to learn from her. Other tasks will involve helping an 
experimenter search for toys and understanding cause and effect. 
We will videotape your child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of 
confidentiality. That means that the researcher will not reveal your child’s identity in any written or oral 
reports about the study. You and your child will be assigned a coded number, and that code will be used 
on all materials collected in this study. All materials and data will be stored in secure facilities in the 
Department of Psychology at Concordia University. Only members of the research team will have access 
to these facilities. Questionnaires and electronic datafiles will be identified by coded identification 
numbers, unique to each family. Information collected on paper (questionnaires) or videotapes (observed 
behaviours) will be entered into computer databases. Raw data will be kept for a minimum of 5 years. 
When it is time for disposal, papers will be shredded, hard-drives will be purged, and videotapes and 
computer disks will be magnetically erased.  
As well, because we are only interested in comparing children’s understanding as a function of 
age, no individual scores will be provided following participation. The whole session should last 
approximately 60 minutes. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated 
directly behind.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you for his/her 
participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
 
There is one condition that may result in the researchers being required to break the confidentiality of 
your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this investigation that inquire about child 
maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover 
information that indicates the possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent 
harm, they are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for this concern with 






D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
§ I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time 
without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any questions that 
might arise during the course of the research. 
§ I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know but will 
not disclose my identity). 




I would be interested in participating in other studies within the Centre for Research in Human 
Development (CRDH) with my child in the future (yes/no): ______ 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY 
CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
 
   SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to contact the 
Research Ethics and Compliance Officer of Concordia University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by 




___________________________  __________________________ 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.              Cristina Crivello, M.A.  
Professor    Ph.D. Candidate                                       
Department of Psychology                                                                                Department of Psychology           
514-848-2424 ext. 2219       514-848-2424 ext. 2279                      













Child’s Name: _____________________________     _______________________________   
   First        Last 
Child’s Date of Birth: ___________________ Child’s Gender: c M c F 
        MM / DD / YY 
Basic Family Information 
Parent A’s Full Name: _____________________     _______________________ c M c F 
First    Last 
Parent B’s Full Name: _____________________     _______________________ c M c F 
First    Last 




Phone numbers Where? (e.g. home, Mom work, Dad cell) 





E-mail:  _____________________________________________ 
Does your child have any siblings?   
Name of Sibling Date of Birth 
MM / DD / YY 
Gender 
Can we contact you for 
future studies for this 
child? 
  M    F c Yes c No 
  M    F c Yes c No 
  M    F c Yes c No 
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Languages Spoken in the Home, School, or Childcare Setting 
Note. Total of all languages should add up to 100%. 
 
What percent of the time does your child hear English? _________ % 
What percent of the time does your child hear French? _________ % 
What percent of the time does your child hear another language? _________ % 
Please specify this language: ________________________ 
 
Has the child lived/vacationed in any country where s/he would hear a language other than 
English or French? c Yes        c No   




What was your child’s birth weight?  __ __ lbs __ __ oz   OR __ __ __ __ grams 
How many weeks was your pregnancy? ____________weeks 
 
Were there any complications during the pregnancy? c Yes       c No  
If yes please detail ________________________________________________________ 
 
Has your child had any major medical problems? 
If yes please detail_________________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems? 
If yes please detail_________________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child currently have an ear infection? c Yes       c No 
 
Has your child had any ear infections in the past?  c Yes       c No  
If yes at which ages_________________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child have a cold today?     c Yes       c No      
If yes, does he/she have pressure/pain in ears (if known)?  c Yes       c No 
Is there any other relevant information we should know (health or language-related)? 
 
 
Has another university contacted you to participate in one of their studies? c Yes   c No 
If yes, which university? _________________________________ 
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Family and Child Background Information (optional) 
 




















Parent A's Current Level of Education  
Check any/all that apply:  
c Primary School 
c Some High School 
c High School 
c Some College/University 
c College Certificate/Diploma 
c Trade School Diploma 
c Bachelor’s Degree 
c Master’s Degree 
c Doctoral Degree 
c Professional Degree 
c Not Applicable/Unknown 
c Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
Parent B’s Current Level of Education  
Check any/all that apply:  
c Primary School 
c Some High School 
c High School 
c Some College/University 
c College Certificate/Diploma 
c Trade School Diploma 
c Bachelor’s Degree 
c Master’s Degree 
c Doctoral Degree 
c Professional Degree 
c Not Applicable/Unknown 
c Other (please specify): ____________ 
 
 
Parent A's Occupational Status (optional) 
Check any/all that apply:  
c Employed Full-Time 




c Not Applicable/Unknown 
c On Temporary Leave (e.g., 
maternity, paternity, sick, etc.; 
please also check status when not 
on leave) 
c Other (please specify): 
__________________________ 
c Occupation: ________________ 
 
Parent B’s Occupational Status (optional) 
Check any/all that apply:  
c Employed Full-Time 




c Not Applicable/Unknown 
c On Temporary Leave (e.g., 
maternity, paternity, sick, etc.; 
please also check status when not 
on leave) 
c Other (please specify): 
_____________________________ 
c Occupation: __________________ 
In which of the following ranges does your annual household income fall (per year/before 
taxes)? 
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c < $ 22 000 
c Between $22,000 and $35 000 
c Between  $35 000 and $50 000 
c Between  $50 000 and $75 000 
c Between  $75 000 and $100 000 
c Between  $100 000 and $150 000 
c > $150 000 
 




c Other (please specify): ________________________________________________ 
 




c West Asian 
c South Asian 
c East and Southeast Asian 
c Caribbean 
c European 
c Latin/Central/South American 
c Pacific Islands 
c Canadian 
c Not Applicable/Unknown 
c Other (please specify): _______________________________________________ 




c West Asian 
c South Asian 
c East and Southeast Asian 
c Caribbean 
c European 
c Latin/Central/South American 
c Pacific Islands 
c Canadian/American 
c Not Applicable/Unknown 
c Other (please specify): _______________________________________________ 





      Appendix E: Coding forms 
 
Coding form for the word learning task – Study 1 
Coding form for the false belief task – Study 1 
Coding form for the knowledge inference task – Study 1 and 2 
Coding form for the statistical learning task – Study 1 
Coding form for the reliability exposure task – Study 2 
Coding form for the gaze following task – Study 2 
Coding form for word learning task – Study 3 
Coding form for the false belief task – Study 3 










Condition:    Unreliable   Reliable 
 
Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 




1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
2 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
3 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
4 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
5 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
6 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
7 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
8 
1st Toy Touched      
F  N   
1st Toy Offered      
 
  *F denotes familiar object trial 

















Totals Correct Incorrect Score 
Novel    
Familiar    
 
Did the child disengage from their toy and look at the object being labeled? 
Labeling Object Yes No 
1st time   
2nd time   
3rd time   
4th time   
 
  










Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
Did child open boxes 
during training? 
Colour and location of box where E1 
first places toy  
Colour and location of box where 
E2 hides toy  
 
Orange:     Yes    No 
Green:   Yes    No 
 
Colour:        Orange      Green 
Location:      Left           Right 
Colour:       Orange     Green 










Pass        Fail 
 
 





False Belief Task – Study 1 
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Cristina’s PhD Study 2 
Knowledge Task – CODING SHEET 
 





Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 


















Did child touch the toy? 
Pretest:  
Score 
Ball:       Yes    No 
Teddy:   Yes    No 
Car:        Yes    No 
Pass             Fail 
Pass             Fail 










Pass            Fail 
 
Pass            Fail 
 









Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
Trial 1 Minority Majority 
 







First touch: ____________ 
 
First offer: ____________ 
Pass            Fail 
 
Pass            Fail 
 
 
Trial 2 Minority Majority 
 







First touch: ____________ 
 
First offer: ____________ 
               Pass            Fail 
 
               Pass            Fail 
 
  










Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
 
Warm-up Phase:  
 
Trial     Opened lid   Examine content  
   (Y or N)        (Y or N) 
 
1   ___________    ___________ 
 
2   ___________    ___________ 
 
 




























(Y or N) 
1 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ 
         
2 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ 
         
3 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ 
         
4 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ 
         
*Begin timing right after the experimenter says, “Now it’s your turn” and places the 
container in front of child.  
 
** Examination of content: peeking into container, leaning forward and looking down at the 
container, or putting hand inside the container   
  
Examination Score: ______ / 4 trials 













Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
CONTROL      EXPERIMENTAL 
Blue Wall:  
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 Blue Wall:  
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
Orange Wall: 
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 Orange Wall: 
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
Red Bucket:  
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 Red Bucket:  
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
Yellow Box: 
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 Yellow Box: 
 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 
  













Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
Target object: __________________ 
 
     1st Toy Offered 
 
 
Total number of correct trials using reliable label:     ____________ 
Total number of completed trials (reliable):               ____________ 
Proportion of correct trials using reliable label:          ____________ 
 
Total number of correct trials using unreliable label: ____________ 
Total number of completed trials (unreliable):  ____________ 
Proportion of correct trials using unreliable label:      ____________ 




1st Toy Touched      
Dax  Fep 
1st Toy Offered      
2 
1st Toy Touched      
Dax  Fep 
1st Toy Offered      
3 
1st Toy Touched      
Dax  Fep 
1st Toy Offered      
4 
1st Toy Touched      
Dax  Fep 
1st Toy Offered      
5 
1st Toy Touched      
Dax  Fep 
1st Toy Offered      
6 1st Toy Touched      Dax  Fep 






Did the child disengage from their toy and look at the object being labeled as a DAX? 
Labeling Object Block 1 Block 2 
1st time   
2nd time   
3rd time   
4th time   
 
Did the child disengage from their toy and look at the object being labeled as a FEP? 
Labeling Object Block 1 Block 2 
1st time   
2nd time   
3rd time   













Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
Warm-up Colour and location of box where E1 
first places toy  
Colour and location of box where 
E2 hides toy  
Duck:     Yes    No 
Teddy:   Yes    No 
# of trials: _____ 
Colour:        Orange      Black 
Location:      Left           Right 
Colour:       Orange     Black 























Order: ____ Include:    Yes    No Reason for Ex________________________________ 
 
 
Trials Include Target Object – 
Approach 
Score Wiggly Attentive Comments 
 





Pass        
Fail Y     N Y     N 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 





Pass        
Fail Y     N Y     N 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 





Pass        
Fail Y     N Y     N 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 





Pass        





Proportion to target:       __________ 
Proportion to distractor: __________ 
 
Score:  Pass        Fail 
 
 
Knowledge Inference Task – Study 3 
